

The Month in Review

IN THE CLOSING WEEKS of 1957 the Communist countries of Eastern Europe worked hard clearing away the last visible rubble of the eruptions that shook the area the previous year. Everywhere new ground was being broken, but most of it around old landmarks abandoned after the liberalizing Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Party held barely two years ago. Everywhere, in all sectors of national life, the movement was back to the past: back to the shades of the Cominform in the creation of a new "Commonwealth of Socialist countries"; back to the dreary dictates of "Socialist realism" in the revival of Zhdanovism; back to uniformity in the inexorable drive to stamp out most deviations from the Soviet model. A year ago, Poland was hacking its path through uncharted regions. Then barely freed from the shackles of Stalinism, the ragged country was eager to start afresh. New leaders arose, new methods were tried, new goals were set. Now many of the old faces are back, the experiment has been curtailed and the Poles are slowly retracing their steps. Hungary twelve months ago was emerging from a Revolt which, in a few memorable days, had destroyed a decade of Communist misrule. Kadar was then in control of a small clique maintained in power by Soviet force. Today the last vestiges of the uprising have been swept away and the substance of Communist domination has been re-imposed. In all the other countries a faint breeze of intellectual freedom had filtered through. Now the air is rank with repression.



There are still separate roads to Socialism, but they now all lead to Moscow. The New Year has ushered in what is undoubtedly a long-range plan, devised by the Soviet leaders and imposed by them, for areawide political homogeneity and economic integration. Plans, for instance, are now being worked out among all the European Soviet bloc countries for a rational division of production efforts over the next 15 years. As fast as possible the area is thus being shaped into an indivisible, self-sufficient entity. Internationally, this means that the present year is unlikely to see the Soviets ready to accede to various suggestions now current in the West for the creation of a belt of neutral countries in central Europe partly carved out of the Communist domain. Internally, the policy portends strict adherence to ideological purity, firmer Party control in all spheres, stepped-up collectivization of the land and, in imitation of the Soviet example, some decentralization, some curtailment of the bureaucracy, and efforts to improve the disastrous housing conditions.

Such is the broad picture of events in Eastern Europe in 1957 and of developments anticipated this year. What is missing from this account is the price that had to be paid for results achieved so far and the even greater cost required for goals yet unattained. In monetary terms alone the Soviet Union has had to spend billions of rubles to save Poland and Hungary from utter bankruptcy, to woo Yugoslavia, and to enable the other regimes to carry out concessionary reforms. But the political cost has been far greater, and with time it will grow and end, as all repressions must, in further setbacks. The need for the kind of liberalization fostered by the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress did not vanish with its quashing. On the contrary, there is now the added impetus of appetites whetted by the taste of freedom, as shown by the persistent demands of Communist intellectuals in all the countries, including the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the old problems that arose under Stalin's rule are coming back to the fore. Party members of vision and energy are being cowed into silent conformity at the very time they are asked to instill life and purpose in a bureaucracy slumbering in contented inertia. Peasants are ordered to produce more to raise living standards while being pushed (except in Poland) into hated collectives. Workers are told to increase their productivity, but genuine workers' councils are now proscribed, restricted or abolished. Many of Stalin's most repressive measures have not so far been readopted, yet as the year opens the trend is very noticeably toward more reliance on the rule of fear. Naked force by the police, apathy in the State-Party apparatus and resentment among the people brought the Communists to the brink of disaster in the past; the mixture of these elements is likely to be even more explosive in the future.

A number of old symptoms are already apparent. Yugoslavia, for instance, has again been forced into a "heretical" stance by the new rigidity of Soviet policies. Tito's representatives at the Moscow celebrations of the October Revolution apparently did not participate in the talks that led to the launching of the "Commonwealth" plan. Not only did they not sign the document, but in subsequent days the Yugoslav Party explicitly condemned the whole scheme as unwise and unnecessary. Somewhat belatedly—and still very cautiously—the Yugoslav press also started a critical reappraisal of Soviet-sponsored drives against "revisionism," apparently sensing that Yugoslav innovations (such as their workers' councils) are now under fire.

In Poland the echoes from the past are all the louder for having been stifled for so long. Stalinists now once again stalk the land. Many such former top Party stalwarts are being sent across the country by the Central Committee to "explain" the resolutions of the recent Tenth Plenum of that body. Ever more frequently, taking advantage of Gomulka's stand against "revisionists," these unregenerate fanatics express their views in print. Despite rearguard actions to hold them at bay, the tone of the Polish press, so startlingly free and fresh until recently, is now slowly reverting to the shrill triteness of yore. But even more ominous is the fact that the Polish Minister of the Interior saw fit to tell listeners over Radio Warsaw that "the intervention of the security service is becoming ever more effective." From all accounts he was right.

The key issue in Poland today—as indeed in all the other countries too—is the future of the Communist intelligentsia. It is now clear that the much-advertised "verification" campaign—that is, the thorough checking of all Party members and the ejection of all deemed unfit or unworthy of the movement—is turning into a witch-hunt against Communist intellectuals in general. The regime has officially condemned this tendency, yet on the other hand has in fact encouraged it by its stern attitude toward "liberal" writers, journalists and others. In short, Gomulka is trying to avoid shifting the power clipped from the intellectual wing of the Party to what he considers to be the opposite extreme, the alliance of Stalinists and mediocre careerists. So far he appears to be failing in his attempt.

Perhaps the clearest sign of the political cost of strict orthodoxy is the acute problem of "corruption" now plaguing all the regimes. Ever more frequently the most exalted members of the managerial aristocracy were being brought to trial for having fraudulently enriched themselves at the expense of the "Socialist" State. The sums involved are immense, and the available data indicates that entire networks, sometimes straddling countries, have been built up by greedy Communist officials proficient in illegal "private enterprise." Official fulminations, severe penalties—including death sentences in Bulgaria—and propaganda, have all been to no avail.



**NASZA
NOWA
POWIEŚĆ**

Ernest

Hemingway

Tłumaczył
Bronisław Zieliński

**SZTANDAR
NIEDZIELA
MŁODYCH**

Cena 50 gr Warszawa, sobota 25, niedziela 26 maja 1957 r. Nr 124 (2196)

Illustration for the first installment of the Polish translation of Ernest Hemingway's "For Whom the Bell Tolls." It appeared on the front page of the Warsaw daily *Sztandar Młodych*, May 26, 1957. Hemingway is currently one of the most popular of Western writers in the Soviet bloc. "For Whom the Bell Tolls," however, with its refusal to make untainted heroes of the Communist fighters in the Spanish Civil War, has until recently not been permitted publication by the regimes of the area.

Western Literature: A New Approach

Until fairly recently the Communist-ruled lands of East and Central Europe were almost totally sealed to all cultural currents from the West, including most of its literature. Now, under the aegis of "coexistence," some relaxation of the embargo has taken place. The present article discusses this change and critical reactions to it in the area.

"THE TWILIGHT of the West has already ended. . . . Late evening has now fallen. In France, there are no longer writers like Balzac, Stendhal, Hugo, Flaubert or Zola; no Dickens, Byron or Shelley can be found in England." (*Nowa Kultura* [Warsaw], November 8, 1953.)

Thus spoke Soviet Russia's perennial Ilya Ehrenburg in 1953, contrasting Western decay with the Soviet orbit's certain approach to a cultural high noon. In the four years that have passed since *Nowa Kultura* printed his remarks, the Satellite countries have undergone major upheavals, and Communist propagandists have had to swallow some of their most cherished theories in the wake of popular campaigns for liberalization and "truth." The once loudly proclaimed thesis of a declining West and rising East has lost much of its former shrillness; for stronger voices, released from their prison of silence in some countries of the area, have by now exposed the poverty in daily life, the persecution in political life, and the dullness in artistic life in what, in Stalin's days, had uniformly been described as a new East European paradise. These admissions not only have fostered a new appraisal of the Communist world, but have also resulted in a new, more realistic approach to the West and its cultural heritage.

In the field of literature, the Stalinists had nourished their

theory of a declining West by enforcing a strict silence on Western developments, mentioning them only as phenomena to be shunned and condemned. To prevent soiling by foreign "ideologies," they allowed only a small number of translations of Western works to appear (and these chiefly by Communist authors), justifying their stand by the rejection of most Western writers as vulgar, worthless, decadent members of the bourgeoisie. The practice was, for instance, to attack Hemingway as a degenerate servant of US imperialism, and to acclaim Howard Fast as one of the few lights in the darkness of the American literary scene. Since the captive reader, particularly if he belonged to the new generation, knew relatively little about Hemingway or any other Western writer beyond the official appraisal, his views on Western cultural developments were, of necessity, distorted.

By 1956, when the Communists were forced to raise the curtain hiding West from East because of popular pressure and political considerations, a new pattern of literary criticism began to evolve in those countries where liberalization had gone farthest. In Poland, and to a lesser degree in Hungary, the press began to repudiate Stalinist literary criteria, to correct past distortions, and to suggest that the West had not really reached its last cultural gasp. While criticism in the other countries continued to follow the old

Zhdanov line, it became somewhat more objective, and the simultaneous increase in the number of translations of outside works brought the captive reader nearer to the truth. Indeed, the East European peoples seized upon newly-published Western works with an avidity characteristic of those finally permitted to taste experiences long denied them. By 1957, it was apparent that among certain groups of Satellite intellectuals Western literature had become the rage and was more highly esteemed than it might have been had not the Communists banned and slandered it all during the dim postwar years.*

Poland

TOWARD THE END OF 1955, with an extensive thaw permeating the intellectual scene, the Communist press began to publish repeated demands for the abolition of restrictions isolating Poland from the West. That little or no credence had been given to the clichés and catchwords about a disintegrating West was stated openly by the former regime-dominated Catholic publication *Dzis i jutro* which, in its May 13, 1956 issue, sardonically summed up past policy: "One searched futilely in the press for information on Western culture. One could find only a mock struggle and easy victory over the 'definite ones'—that is, over that which was bad and damaging in Western art. . . . A dark picture of the West evolved. . . ."

Rejecting the oversimplified picture of the West that had been fobbed off as reality throughout the Stalinist period, Polish Communist intellectuals seized the occasion of the thaw to call for detailed and objective news and to demand the right to form their own opinions. The nation's desire to learn about the West from first-hand accounts instead of biased slogans was largely responsible for the popularity of a series of articles on America by the Communist journalist Jerzy Putrament, who visited the US in 1956. By suggesting that Coca-Cola actually was less virulent than vodka (consumed in dangerous quantities by the Polish population), and by ascribing virtues to New York restaurants, the Ford factory and various other aspects of America, Putrament found a large audience of individuals eager to know ways of life hitherto denounced or ignored by the regime. Although the opinions expressed in these articles seemed to bear the stamp of official thaw policy and were neither bold nor profound by Western standards, they did mark a departure from the past and paved the way for a new attitude towards "capitalist" society which, as it developed, ranged in the press from "reasoned appreciation" to overt enthusiasm.

As for Western literature, the thirst for information was determined not only by curiosity but was part of the average Polish intellectual's natural desire to become familiar with developments outside the Soviet orbit. Throughout the postwar period, the cultural bureaucrats had acclaimed "Socialist realism" as the only road to artistic progress and had railed against the surrealism, subjectivism and amorality, etc., which, they asserted, characterized literature in

the West. During the thaw, however, Polish writers and critics began to voice the pessimistic view that the Zhdanov line had brought Communist culture to a desiccated end, and to indicate that contamination from the West was not the worst to be feared. In his search for new directions, the Polish artist both needed and wanted to absorb the best that Western literature had produced, and the cry for artistic freedom which reverberated in the press at that time was, in part, based on the belief that culture was international, rightfully above politics rather than subservient to it.

Call for Truth

REBELLION against the Party's slanted view of Western literary production first became evident in the spring of 1956, after the publication of an anthology of "progressive" American short stories entitled *John Cucu's Record*. The volume provoked a series of negative reviews, including one by Andrzej Kozłowski, who rejected it as "stupid propaganda" and declared that it was harmful to select stories with the aim of presenting the US as a "black abyss of misery and persecution" (*Zycie Literackie* [Cracow], May 20, 1956). Kozłowski also strongly objected to the fact that the anthology contained no works by such important American writers as Dos Passos, Caldwell, Lewis, Steinbeck, Hemingway or Fitzgerald: "While preparing a selection of progressive writers," he said, "we should not limit ourselves to authors approved by the Party. . . . If not all the [above-mentioned] writers have retained their right to the title of progressive . . . their stories, at any rate, are progressive and, *what's more important, they represent the American literary vanguard*" (italics added).

Not only did Kozłowski try to give the word "progressive" a meaning almost equivalent to that of "modern" but he defended American "bourgeois" writers from an attack by the anthologist for "showing a friendly attitude towards the system in which they have been brought up, which has been inculcated in them, and which guarantees their prosperity." Said Kozłowski, "We can't condemn writers for this."

A similar reaction to the anthology appeared in the November 25, 1956 issue of *Swiat* (Warsaw), which demanded to know whether the fact that the selected authors had in common "their criticism of American capitalism and the progressive character of their writings," was enough to make their stories interesting. *Swiat* condemned the anthology for giving a misleading, negative picture of the US and for lacking artistic merit—two criticisms virtually unheard of in past years, when "political correctness" was judged to be sufficient to justify a work of art.

"The Objective View"

EFFORTS TO REVIVE aesthetic values and to present a more truthful picture of Western cultural life grew in momentum in late 1956 and 1957. In contrast to previous regime policy of limiting translations largely to Communist and pro-Communist writers and of dismissing the bulk of

* See the July 1954 issue of this magazine, pp. 39-45, for the Communists' pre-thaw attitude towards Western literature.



Illustration for an installment of Hemingway's "For Whom the Bell Tolls."

Sztandar Młodych (Warsaw), July 7, 1957

Western literature as worthless, Polish publishing houses now began to announce plans for printing a variety of Western writers regardless of their political views. For 1957, the Polish Publishing Institute scheduled forty Twentieth Century novels, including works by Kafka, Camus, Hamsun, Faulkner, Joyce, Chesterton, Proust, Wells, Romain Rolland, and Thomas Mann. Czytelnik, the largest publishing company, promised Maugham's autobiography, Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, and books by Caldwell (a great favorite in Poland), Simenon, and A. E. Coppard. The National Publishing Institute also listed titles by Camus (*The Plague*), Hemingway (*A Farewell to Arms*), Mann (*Confessions of Felix Krull*), Faulkner (*Sanctuary*), and Kafka (*The Trial*), in addition to works by Simone de Beauvoir, Stefan Zweig, Laxness, and Pratolini, and new translations of Western classics.*

The relaxed censorship also applied to periodicals, and in several instances, the Communist intellectuals' campaign for a broader policy of cultural exchange gave rise to renewed contacts with the non-Communist Left in France. In April 1957, *Tworczosc* (Warsaw), the most important literary monthly in Poland, devoted its entire issue to pieces written mostly by prominent members of the French "left-

wing."** The contributions included essays by Sartre ("Marxism and Existentialism"), Camus ("The Artist and Contemporaneity"), Maurois ("An Average Frenchman in 1956"), Andre Chamson and Henri Lefebvre, and poems by Aragon and Prevert. In introducing the issue, the editors of *Tworczosc* defended the principle of the free exchange of views in a manner which has now become common to the Polish press:

"The many shades of French thought contained in this issue are not only a reflection of the many shades of contemporary French culture, but also of the tragic disintegration of the French left-wing. Regardless of how we might explain this disintegration, one thing is certain: it exists and greatly hampers the political activities of the leading group of the French working class—the French Communist Party. . . .

"[However,] while following the example of the Twentieth Party Congress and revising the errors of Stalinism, we must question the thesis according to which criticism of some tactical move of the Party, or pronouncement of an opinion different from the Party's political line . . . auto-

* The French issue was published one month after Sartre devoted the entire February-March 1957 of *Les Temps Modernes* to writings by Polish Communists. The review included pieces by Adam Wazyk, Jan Kott, Antoni Slonimski, Wiktor Woroszyński, Roman Zimand and Adolf Rudnicki, all prominent figures in the Polish thaw.

* The above list is by no means complete and is intended to serve only as a general indication of the new policy.

matically places the critics in the ranks of our most dangerous enemies, more dangerous than the whole group of those who proclaim themselves against Socialism and for capitalism. . . .

"If coexistence is not to mean resignation from our ideology, if it is to be guided by Socialist perspectives, we have to speak with such people as Sartre, Camus or Nadeau, with people from the left. They often tell us things that are unpleasant or painful, but they speak of matters which vitally interest us. As Marxists, we should not be afraid of one thing at least: of the free exchange of thoughts, of sincere, honest discussion. . . .

"It is not our fault that the participation of French Communist writers in this issue is rather small. We approached many of them, but only Aragon and Henri Lefebvre answered our appeal."

In Fall 1957, the regime announced plans for a new literary monthly, *Europa*, to be dedicated to "renewing contacts between Poland and other European countries, particularly, France, Britain and Italy, as well as the United States" (Radio Warsaw, September 20). The magazine's editorial board was to include such outspoken and popular writers as Adam Wazyk (author of the famous *A Poem for Adults*), Mieczyslaw Jastrun and Marek Hlasko. The 1958 publishing plans included "the best works by Sherwood Anderson, Scott Fitzgerald and Irwin Shaw, and several other American writers hitherto almost unknown in Poland. (Radio Warsaw, September 16.) *Europa*, however, never reached the newsstands. The Party suppressed the first issue and in protest Wazyk and several other editors resigned from the Party (see *East Europe*, December 1957, p. 37).

Criticism Revised

THE SHIFT towards truth produced comparable changes in the field of literary criticism. Aside from demanding more translations, Communist critics in Poland began to repudiate some of the clichés of the past and to amend prejudiced viewpoints tailored to previous requirements of political orthodoxy. De-emphasis on political content was conspicuous in the new approach to American literature. The critics insisted, for example, that it was incorrect to jettison the bulk of US literary production as uniformly brutal and inhuman, and necessary to inspect it in all its variety. They also focussed attention on long-neglected problems of literary technique, with the result that the question of style came to occupy a prominent place in discussions of American writing. *Zycie Literackie* (Cracow), May 6, 1956, was not the only Polish paper to admit that "American literature attracts us through its superior technique": "Let us say frankly that, at the present time, no other contemporary literature has at its disposal such superior technique. . . . Even in Polish literature, we can trace the trend leading to imitation of Hemingway."

The critics' enthusiasm for the American writer's technical mastery represented a cautious but earnest effort to revise Communist literary standards along more realistic lines. Although the charge of decadence continued to be levelled at most US writers, even the more orthodox Communist critics maintained that the Polish reader would profit from acquaintance with them, and that decadence did not necessarily deprive art of all merit. Indeed, it was



Illustrations for a picture story on the International Press Club in the heart of central Warsaw. This is not a press club in the usually accepted sense, but a combination coffee-house-reading room-art gallery-discussion club. Above, left, is the newspaper room, where papers and periodicals from all over the world may be read; strikingly, these include not only Communist journals but such newspapers as the *Manchester Guardian*, the *London Times*, and *Le Monde*. Right, the club bookshop which "has the latest novels in foreign languages."

Photos from *Poland* No. 9 (25), 1956

"Amateur Historians"

THE AMATEUR HISTORIAN undoubtedly is a phenomenon closely connected with the social and economic system of a country. He must have time, money, experience, and a solid education. It is no wonder that he still can be found in England and has been extinct for some time in Poland. The English tradition of wielding a pen while temporarily unengaged in public life reaches far back. Such was the origin of Bacon's essays, thus wrote the wealthy lords of the Eighteenth Century. And thus writes Winston Churchill in the Twentieth Century."

Tworczosc (Warsaw), February 1957

this attitude which enabled *Zycie Literackie*, May 13, 1956, to complain that for the past ten years the regime had published American writers who occupied only a marginal place in American literature: "We have convinced the reader, or at any rate, have been trying to convince him that [Communist writers] Howard Fast and Albert Maltz are the best writers." To correct this false impression, the author of the above-mentioned article called for more translations of Hemingway, Steinbeck, Faulkner, Dos Passos and Caldwell as well as Polish editions of works by Capote, Bowles, Peter Taylor, Louis Auchincloss, Norman Mailer, James Jones, Ellen Glasgow, Thornton Wilder, John O'Hara and Dorothy Parker—despite the fact that he described these writers as decadent and presented a view of American literature which differed little from that offered to the public in the last decade:

"The great luminaries [Farrell, Faulkner, Dos Passos, Hemingway, etc.] of American literature are falling silent. . . . [They] taught the new generation . . . literary technique, showed them the road to naturalism, imbued them with a sense of hopelessness of man's struggle, showed them how to draw attention to the element of violence and cruelty in human relations. The rest has been accomplished by economic conditions, the iron law of competition, the . . . tempo of American life and all that which American sociologists call the ever-increasing American tendency to violence and evil. With all this, it is a literature employing the highest, sometimes breathtaking technique. We should get acquainted with it for many reasons. . . . American literature during the last thirty years is the history of development—or, if one prefers—the history of the downfall of social thought; it shows how in this great nation common sense was traded for a pinch of illusion which bears the name of excitement, sensation, Great Experience."

Although there seems to be unanimity on the subject of increasing translations, not all the critics agree on the more delicate problem of meaning. While the critic in *Zycie Literackie* assessed American literature in terms of the "downfall of social thought," Alexander Rogalski, writing in *Slowo Powszechne* (Warsaw), February 9-10, 1957, suggested that the stifling atmosphere in Poland during the Stalinist era had prevented a deep understanding of American writing and that only now was it possible to "fully delight in Hemingway, Steinbeck, Caldwell, and Faulkner":

"Although some of these writers found their way to Po-

land a good many years ago . . . contact with America could not be developed fully and deepened in the atmosphere which then prevailed in Poland. As for emotions, they were completely out of the question; they were frozen before they had a chance to bud. All that could blossom at the time were the insipid and ephemeral flowers of Socialist realism."

Rogalski then defended American literature from the pat judgments which dominated Communist criticism in the past. He dismissed as nonsense attempts to portray US writing as "black" writing—that is, "as a literature conveying a hopeless, naturalistic picture of life imbued with amorality and negation":

"Even the most brutal of all the books mentioned here—*God's Little Acre*—contains not only a very gloomy picture of reality, not only an eloquent example of the tragedy of human efforts, but also a splendid glorification of life. This is perhaps the chief factor in the prodigiousness of American literature. It must not be identified . . . with French naturalism, the philosophical attitude which found its expression in complete disillusionment and nihilism. Despite the fact that American writers so often describe the gloomy side of life, they are indeed life's glorifiers. Hopelessness is only on the surface, in the individual and social picture of human existence. But from somewhere in the depths, there emanates a powerful faith in the sense of being."

Imbued with a similar desire for the more subtle truth, another critic, Roman Zimand, writing in *Po Prostu* (Warsaw), June 2, 1957, dispensed with the fictitious notion that the average American is a bald, uncomplicated character: "Almost as a rule," he declared, "the great American literature of the Twentieth Century adopts a non-conformist attitude towards the myth of the 'simple' American man, pictured in Caldwell [and propagated as Americanism]. Dreiser, Sinclair Lewis, Dos Passos or Hemingway—each in his own way exposes the legend of the 'simple' American man."

Zimand also opposed propaganda on the scurrilous qual-

"Invasion of Americanism"

THE INVASION of 'Americanism' on the European continent is undoubtedly one of the most significant events in contemporary civilization. Europe, seen from this point of view, gives the impression of a tired, weak person, ill from an excess of inner wealth . . . clinging in woman-like fashion to the youthful, vigorous, manly America. Of course, as is usually the case in this kind of relationship, there are also certain manifestations of resistance, dislike and antagonism. For deep feelings are like the sea: they have their flow and their ebb . . . and are the result of two forces: attraction and repulsion.

"There is no doubt, however, that . . . in this respect we are lagging behind Western Europe: while there are many indications that the latter already has gone through the most emotional phase of its acquaintance with America, we are only now going through our first ecstasy and through the violence of new experiences. . . ."

Slowo Powszechne (Warsaw), February 9-10, 1957

ity of American literature. So distorted an appraisal, he claimed, was responsible for the fact that *God's Little Acre* (in his opinion, an inferior work) now enjoyed greater popularity in Poland than a work such as Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath*:

"For a number of years the reader's knowledge of American literature has been based mainly—if we leave out *Fast*—on articles speaking about the eroticism, crimes and perversion pervading that literature. American prose—even if completely unknown to our readers—acquired the taste of forbidden fruit, not only because it was not published, but also because the things written about it aroused the interest of every normal man. For this reason, the publication [in Polish] of *The Old Man and the Sea* and a collection of Hemingway's short stories inevitably brought disillusionment. The same can be said of Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath* and *The Pearl*. Of all the American novels published in Poland, only *God's Little Acre* answered the requirements of the reader's fantasy, excited by our fight against cosmopolitanism. . . . This critic cannot overlook the fact that the majority of readers with whom he spoke about *God's Little Acre* showed greatest interest in the famous passage where Will tears off Griselda's clothes. . . .

"I think that the basic artistic shortcomings in *God's Little Acre* lies in the very reason it has been so popular in our country. [It lies in the fact that] Caldwell has created a tragedy of instinct. In my opinion, the real tragedies of literature . . . (i.e., those which afford us wide moral and intellectual horizons) are based not on the impossibility of fulfilling the postulates of instinct, but on the contradictions of moral reason."

Most of the Communist critics have preserved their "Marxist outlook" in evaluating Western literature, but they have abandoned the former practice of slandering the characters of Western writers and of brusquely repudiating viewpoints differing from their own. In the post-Congress period they have broadened their outlook in regard to the nature of human experience. Typical of the present attitude of tolerance was a review in *Polityka* (Warsaw), May 8-14, 1957, praising Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath*: "In Steinbeck's novels the painful principle of confronting dreams with reality is presented, a principle as old as the history of great literature but which is . . . forever fresh and novel in the hands of great writers." Similarly a discussion of Hemingway in *Zycie Literackie*, August

John Reed Rehabilitated

"TEN DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD" shows that, to a large degree, the revolution was in contradiction to all that which was mythologized by over-eager people and falsifiers [in the Stalinist period]. . . . Its timeliness is amazing, despite the fact that almost forty years divide us from the memorable events so precisely, simply and honestly recorded by the American journalist. After years of sad experiences and defeats, this book today allows us to look at the revolutionary outburst of those times more properly than we were able to in the period of the cult of the Standard Bearer [Stalin]. Thus, this is a real rehabilitation—of both the book and ourselves."

Zycie Literackie (Cracow), February 24, 1957

On Mauriac

"THE CONCLUSIONS which Mauriac reaches in his works and which, despite his efforts, recede into the background of his books, cannot be accepted by us. But while we reject the author's conclusions and while the action takes place in a setting which by now seems somewhat exotic to us, his books are very valuable for the Polish reader because of their [acute] analysis of psychological and moral phenomena."

Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), March 26, 1957

5, 1956, contained the following:

"There is not even a hint of the naive Rousseau in Hemingway. Nature is cruel, people are cruel and life is cruel—but what a relief to be simple, to be dependent on oneself, not to feel the weight of that which is beyond us, not to bow before the shadow of any alienation—this is true deliverance. This is freedom, romantic freedom, the land of dreams where everything is possible, where decision belongs only to us, and if we capitulate, it is not because of conscious or unconscious pressure but only because our strength fails us and we are too weak to be victorious. Hemingway's tragedy is the tragedy of people with absolute possibilities. They are not intimidated by the Moloch of history but rather by the fatality of nature which, as it were, may be blind but cannot be perfidious."

It should be pointed out that enthusiasm for Western literature in Poland seems to be greatest among Catholic circles and the group connected with *Poprostu*, which recently has been suppressed by the Gomulka government for going too far in demands for liberalization. In both cases, it would appear that the enthusiasm for Western writing is a form of defiance—of what is being written in Poland and of Communist political policies. Other periodicals have shown a more conservative interest in Western writing and have tried to guard against attitudes of unbalanced and uncritical acceptance among readers.

Hungary

IN HUNGARY, TOO, THE post-Stalin period heralded a far more relaxed policy with respect to Western literature. Although the thaw there never reached the Polish dimensions, by 1956 the Soviet-controlled New Hungarian Publishing Company (once dedicated exclusively to Communist tracts) was prepared to issue works by Fielding, Balzac, Rimbaud, Stendhal, Flaubert, Ibsen, Goethe, Wilde, Zola, Jane Austen and Emily Bronte; and as for contemporary authors, the company scheduled novels by such writers as Roger Martin du Gard, Thornton Wilder, Thomas Mann, Evelyn Waugh, Steinbeck and Caldwell. Because of the political considerations involved, the editors announced that each would be introduced by an essay explaining the author's "anti-capitalist tendencies," but it is to be presumed that the plan for "Marxist" prefaces was of interest solely to Party officials. Other Hungarian publishing houses echoed this trend by promising works by Proust, Kafka, Huxley, Freud, Frazer and Bertrand Russell, and by mid-year it

seemed as if the rigid censorship of the past finally had been broken.

The new concessions in literary policy were summed up in a report on a publishers' conference held shortly before the Hungarian Revolt. According to *Irodalmi Ujsag* (Budapest), September 22, 1956, the meeting "discussed at length the paralyzing effects of dogmatism and emphasized that new methods would be used by publishers in choosing works. The harmful practice of injecting political tendencies everywhere will be abandoned, and so too will the undue caution hitherto applied in the publication of foreign authors."*


The conference coincided with the peak of the liberalization campaign waged by Hungarian Communist intellectuals who, encouraged by Polish developments and pronouncements at the Soviet Twentieth Congress, were demanding a more viable cultural policy and an end to enforced isolation from the non-Communist world. Indeed, the blanket of ignorance imposed upon readers as a protection against toxic Western winds had been so thick that one correspondent, in an article entitled "Notes from Washington," admitted that although he had wanted to buy works by leading contemporary American authors during a visit to the US, he had not known what books to look for:

* *Irodalmi Ujsag* was the organ of the Writers' Union in the pre-Revolt period. After the Revolt, the Union's periodical appeared under the name of *Elet es Irodalom*.

"For the past ten years I have not even heard of a living American author, not to mention his works, with the exception of Fast and Hemingway. Primarily I must blame my own ignorance, but I believe that, to some extent at least, this is due also to our literary policy of recent years, which made it impossible for us to become acquainted with Western art and literature and which left only a small opening for the few authors who were members of progressive movements.

"America has made tremendous technical and economic progress, but as for . . . culture, it is way behind Europe. Yet we must admit that, aside from many objectionable characteristics, there are attractive features even in its culture. If we tried to become familiar with these attractive features instead of rejecting the whole, we would enrich Hungarian culture." (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], August 7, 1956.)

Although Communist intellectuals had begun to rebel openly against the combination of bigotry and ignorance which was forcefully applied in regard to American works, the ban on French literature probably aroused the greatest resentment. Before the war Hungarians had always turned to Paris as Europe's cultural center, and when the Stalinist censorship cut them off from the majority of French writers (including Sartre and other members of the Left), they undoubtedly felt deprived of a part of their traditions and, to some extent, their intellectual roots. This much was implied by *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), August 16, 1956,



"A scene from John Steinbeck's 'Of Mice and Men'—at the Nowa Huta Theatre."

Poland (Warsaw), 12 (28), 1956

when it hailed plans to publish a new translation of Roger Martin du Gard's *Les Thibault* (one of the most popular works in prewar Hungary) as the major event of the literary thaw:

"For a time, the representatives of dogmatism were afraid even of the works of Western Communists. Fortunately, this attitude changed as early as 1953 [during Nagy's New Course] and since then the works of some progressive and even bourgeois writers have been published in Hungary (Merle . . . , Vercors), and the names of authors completely rejected previously have begun to appear in anthologies. The thaw is represented primarily by translations of two great works of Roger Martin du Gard. One of these, *Les Thibault* . . . will contain parts eliminated by the censorship of the Horthy regime. . . . [Plans have also been made] to publish an anthology of French poets which will fill a sore need, and there has been talk about . . . a collection of Sartre's short stories and Cocteau's collected poems. . . .

"[However], I must note that the selection and translation of new works are not only hampered by the still existing forces of . . . schematism and dogmatism, but also by technical difficulties and lack of funds. It is very difficult to acquire new works . . . and the foreign currency budget for fees is very limited. If we overcome these difficulties, we can satisfy the public and at the same time do a service to Hungarian literature, which always has derived inspiration from the wealth of French art. In recent years our publishing activities were governed by the ridiculous principle: 'That which does not appear can cause no trouble.' Now we must make sure that the administrators guilty of our spiritual mutilation are not able to act with impunity."

The new policy towards Western literature which had begun to emerge clearly by the summer of 1956, did not undergo discernible change in the period following the Hun-

Crime Pays

"OUR EXPERIENCE SHOWS that in the field of artistic creation, the first danger after the liquidation of strict political censorship is not the appearance of politically hostile, anti-Socialist creations. . . . The serious danger . . . is literary trash, domestic and translated. . . . In Poland, the opinion arose that publishing houses . . . should be guided by the profit principle. Thus a great deal of trash, usually in the form of crime stories, has appeared on the market. . . . Now that this trash is competing with Steinbeck, Huxley and many other Western artists, we find it is not Steinbeck and Huxley who are winning the day. . . . This is the chief reason why it seems to me that it is absolutely impossible to abandon a cleverly guided cultural policy. . . . On the other hand, the term *trash* is very elastic. It would be sufficient to have just a few people with an extremely puritanical attitude toward literature and more than 20 million readers would again find themselves without entertaining literature. . . . Somewhere between these two extremes [free competition and administrative control] runs the correct road to the 'hundred flowers' of Socialist culture. . . ."

Poland's Jerzy Putrament for *Borba*
(Belgrade), September 8, 1957

garian uprising, despite repression in other fields. Western literature continued to be published as planned in amounts varying from 10,000 to 70,000 copies per book and, according to unofficial reports, was snatched up by an eager public. Furthermore, at the beginning of 1957, the Magveto Publishing Company announced that its list of titles for the year would include works by Thomas Mann, Hemingway, Cocteau and Huxley; the Tancsis Publishing Company, born under the Kadar regime, promised books by Linklater and Wells; and the Corvin Publishing Company launched both an inexpensive (paperback) and regular series of great works, chiefly English and French classics.

Significant, too, was the fact that stories and poems by Western writers began to be reprinted in the Hungarian press. Not long ago *Nok Lapja* (the magazine for women) published a piece by Thurber; other periodicals contained stories by de Maupassant and Graham Greene and poetry by Verlaine and Elizabeth Barrett Browning. More important, the magazine *Nagyvilág*, founded in the spring of 1956 for the exclusive purpose of acquainting readers with Western culture, reappeared after the Revolt, on April 14, 1957, with stories by Saroyan, Thomas Mann and Graham Greene, and various reviews and essays about Western writing. Indeed, Kadar's concessions in the field of foreign literature, though cautious, cannot be regarded without a note of grim irony: most of the Hungarian Communist intellectuals who pressed for liberalization in the pre-Revolt period have had little benefit from the present relaxation; many of them have engaged in a year-long silence strike against the Kadar regime and others are languishing in the narrow confines of Communist jails.

Literary Criticism

BECAUSE OF REGIME resistance to a real, all-changing thaw both in the pre- and post-Revolt period, discussions of Western literature in the Hungarian press have retained a more narrow political flavor than those in Poland. In the spring of 1956, Hungarian literary critics were still considered daring when they insisted that it was wrong to label all Western literature decadent and to use this peremptory dismissal as an excuse for keeping it from the Hungarian public. After writing an article on this theme in *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), June 24, 1956, one of the Communist critics, Tibor Lutter, received such a warm response that he followed with another article analyzing trends in modern British writing. In defending such writers as Joyce, D. H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf and E. M. Forster, Lutter strongly emphasized the "positive political tendencies" in their work:

"Although they never reached a positive ideology . . . in response to the disillusioning shadow of the history of bourgeois society, they deliberately turned away from the values of bourgeois ideology. They turned against nationalism, militarism, religion, bourgeois hypocrisy, and generally against everything that represented bourgeois prejudice and bigotry."

As for the present, Lutter stated:

"There are a few British story tellers who seem to flourish



MARIA CONCEPTION

KATHERINE ANN PORTER
(2)

Illustration and heading for the second installment of Katherine Anne Porter's story, *Maria Conception*.

Swiat (Warsaw), June 9, 1957

even on a soil gone 'sour.' This is demonstrated by some of the [recent] works of E. M. Forster, Graham Greene, Rosamond Lehmann, Evelyn Waugh and [H. E.] Bates. . . . Greater attention should be paid to the writers who have represented progress and demonstrated a clarity of judgment. . . . We should follow and review more closely developments in present-day British poetry. For instance, two brief accounts and two radio programs were all that we did on the prematurely deceased. . . . Dylan Thomas, despite the fact that he is considered by many to be the outstanding figure in present-day British literature."

The Hungarian critics' desire to foster a new appreciation of Western literature and their simultaneous need to show proper concern for political content probably have done much to determine the cautious but approving tone of recent reviews. For instance, *Magyarország* (Budapest), July 10, 1957, commented as follows on *For Whom the Bell Tolls*—a work banned in Hungary for the past ten years and recently translated, to the joy of Hungary's intelligentsia:

"The style, social views, manner of description and storytelling art of Hemingway can be explained and praised, but the customary manner of reviewing certainly would fail to give a true analysis of the entire work, its poetic and human qualities and its overwhelming effect on the reader. There is something indefinable, something that can be approached only vaguely, his faith in man and his unbounded respect for human dignity.

"His novel is the eyewitness account of his experience in Spain. The author, who under any circumstances cannot be called a Communist and who expresses his aloofness from Communist ideology in several instances in this work, finally discovers the truth for humanity (and for himself) on the side of the Communists. . . .

"The heroes of this epic work are more glorious than the demigods of the old heroic poems because they conquer

not only the elements and their human adversaries, but also their own shortcomings. . . . The central female figure, Pilar, is not an idealized heroine: she must overcome her lack of education, superstitions, and even, at times, her man hunger in order to be able to serve the Republic with complete devotion. Her man Pablo is hardly more than a beast, but he, too, reaches the point at which he must grow out of himself. The moral principles of Anselmo hardly would serve as the basis of an ethical textbook, and yet, in their simplicity, they reflect the people's belief in justice and their pure morals."

Similarly, the Communist critics have praised Faulkner's *A Fable* for its preoccupation with man's desire for peace. Contrasting the theme and outlook of this book with previous works by Faulkner, *Csillag*, May 1956, declared:

"Almost all previous works of Faulkner are dominated by man's overwhelming fear and anxiety in face of the supernatural. . . . Faulkner expresses the conviction that this oppressive anxiety is the primary factor in the world and everything else only a consequence. All action, the characters themselves, are created under this ominous cloud. . . . The objective character of social laws has become unrecognizable for Faulkner—their 'hostility' is condensed in an indefinable pressure, in choking anxiety."

Czechoslovakia

ALTHOUGH THE CZECHOSLOVAK regime has tolerated closer cultural ties with the West, it has kept a tight rein on its intellectuals and has issued frequent warnings to writers about the dangers of straying from "Socialist realism." The fact that Hemingway's *The Old Man and the Sea* (recently translated) was a literary sensation in Prague undoubtedly gave the regime some uneasy moments

Oscar Wilde

"... ART ABOVE ALL was his belief. At times he had strange ways of calling attention to his principles. He would walk the streets of London dressed as a dandy with huge flowers in his buttonhole. But his eccentric behavior was only a cover for profound truths. . . . Today we can again express our humble admiration for Oscar Wilde. And this is not sparked by [celebrations of] his 100th or 102nd anniversary (some claim that Wilde was born in 1854) but by his art, which has become entwined with Hungarian literary traditions of the past three generations."

Magyar Nemzet (Budapest), October 10, 1956

in regard to the nation's thirst for Western literature. While the current year's plans for translations of contemporary Western writers are far broader than those of previous years, the Party has consistently curtailed the kind of enthusiastic discussions of Western literary output which have appeared in the Polish press and to a lesser extent in the Hungarian.

The trend towards relaxation got slowly underway in 1956, after the Soviet Party Congress. Communist publishing houses made plans to publish works by Hemingway, Dreiser, Wilde and Moravia, as well as new editions of Western classics, and in the spring of the year a new magazine, *Svetova Literatura*, made its appearance in Prague with the aim, according to *Rude Pravo* (Prague), April 20, of "helping to fill the gap in our knowledge of . . . contemporary [world] literature."

The magazine received hearty endorsement from intellectual circles, and on May 12, *Literarni Noviny*, organ of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union, and one of the few papers in Prague that pressed for a thaw, welcomed the first issue by condemning the former practice of ignoring foreign literature: "Along with the [incorrect] theory of the increasing class struggle . . . [we] applied a wrong theory in a field which by its very nature should be released from the fetters of strict control."

Literarni Noviny continued the campaign by calling for more translations of Western authors such as Hemingway and Graham Greene and by urging (on June 23) renewed contacts with the French Left, i.e., Sartre and Vail-

land: "It is necessary," the paper wrote, "to extend a hand to the talented ones. We do not want to make enemies of them. On the contrary, we want to rally all those in whom there is something valuable to our side."

By autumn *Literarni Noviny* was even more outspoken. The literary critic J. F. Franek published an article in its columns of September 29 which contained the following: "Immeasurable harm was caused by our isolation from Western literature; this also made it impossible . . . to attain a real . . . and objective opinion of present-day Western literature and art. We were like astronomers who saw only half the moon, and the less perfect our methods were, the bolder our conclusions became in regard to the whole moon and its second half. Indeed, we were more like astrologers than astronomers."

Franek also acclaimed the first three issues of *Svetova Literatura*, and insisted that many contemporary Western writers had aims akin to those of the Communists:

"What we frequently consider a characteristic of the Socialist trend turned out to be a characteristic of the period. One certainly cannot describe what Socialism is in one 'wise sentence,' but that it is a struggle for man . . . is perhaps not an untruth. And this [struggle] is the common goal of the Lewises, Steinbecks and Sartres, and the Sholokhovs and Aragon. . . ."

In the period immediately following the upheavals in Hungary and Poland, the regime largely suppressed discussions of Western literature in cultural periodicals but, by the beginning of 1957, voices again began to be heard on the subject of "Stalinist misconceptions" about the West. Jiri Hajek, writing in *Literarni Noviny*, January 26, declared, for instance:

"We have taken leave—and I believe for good—of the entirely untrue concept that in capitalist countries—with the exception of writers who have adopted the Communist position in politics—literature is universally and automatically rotting, while in our world it is flourishing equally automatically. We are learning to evaluate non-Socialist Western writers by the only possible criterion—the relationship of their art to reality."

Hajek's belief that the past had been left behind was partly confirmed in the spring, when *Svetova Literatura* made plans to include in its covers works by Prevert, Vailand, Sandburg, Caldwell, Lardner and Faulkner, and to

"You Got To Be Smart — With Connections You Can Get Anything."



"Hiya, Uncle Goza, let me have a couple lemons."



"Greetings, Comrade Boss, can you give me some soap?"



"I kiss your hand, baby."



"Hey, Gyula, old pal, I want 'The Old Man and the Sea.'"

Nepakarat (Budapest), February 17, 1957



They are all reading Hemingway's "The Old Man and the Sea."
Dikobraz (Prague), April 4, 1957

increase the number of its copies from 6,000, to 12,000 to fulfill readers' demands. At the same time, the State Publishing Company announced plans to print works by Steinbeck, Faulkner, Hemingway, Verlaine, Wilde, Strindberg and Thomas Mann, indicating that the regime had agreed to go ahead with liberalization in this field—even though it was simultaneously harassing its own Communist writers for departing from "Party positions" in literature.

That Western books were enormously popular in Czechoslovakia, particularly among young people, was admitted in an article in *Literární Noviny*, August 17. In calling for a new appreciation of Conrad, who has not succeeded in winning mass recognition in Czechoslovakia, the paper commented as follows on the present effects of past policy:

"An unhealthy gap was created in our literary consciousness, particularly among our youth, for whom Anglo-American literature has now acquired the taste of forbidden fruit. It is therefore only logical that it has now, temporarily, become the rage. . . . It depends entirely on our publishing houses and literary periodicals as to how fast a healthy equilibrium and sound judgment can be restored, a [judgment] which is not prejudiced but also is not based on uncritical ecstasy."

Literary Criticism

MOST OF THE LITERARY CRITICISM in Czechoslovakia still bears the earmarks of "Stalinist criteria," despite the enlargement of translations. For instance, in a commentary on new editions of works by Mark Twain, *Ucitelské Noviny* (Prague), February 7, 1957, after praising their "joyful humor," declared: "They will enable children not only to get acquainted with a segment of young America's life but also with one of her most burning problems [the Negro problem]." The same paper also showed a cautious attitude in welcoming new translations of Kipling: "Who can doubt . . . that Kipling's *Jungle Books* are a great poem in prose, although we used to view the author with some mistrust as an admirer of the virtues of the 'white man'."

A review of Howard Fast's *Silas Timberman* in *Lidova Democracie* (Prague), March 10, 1957, followed even more closely the Stalinist mold of literary evaluation*:

* Subsequently, the Communist press denounced Fast for leaving the Party after the Hungarian Revolt and declared that his works would survive as testimony of the folly of his present stand.

" . . . The weight of this book lies in its documentary value. The statement at the beginning of the book to the effect that the characters in the novel are fictitious and that any resemblance to real persons is purely coincidental is . . . [merely a form] of concealment which, in itself, is characteristic of the position of creative workers in a country which in recent years has had to assure itself so often and in such an odd way about the loyalty of those fulfilling some public function. If we consider how many professors were expelled from universities and how many cultural workers were confronted by committees similar to those Professor Timberman had to face, then we discover that the resemblance is in no way coincidental. . . . We have the full right to see in the history of . . . Silas Timberman a shocking document of the times. . . ."

* * *

IN ROMANIA AND BULGARIA, the regimes have kept even tighter control over their Communist intellectuals, and the absence of a thaw has prevented significant changes in the field of literary criticism. A greater number of translations has been permitted, however, in conjunction with what seems to be an areawide policy, and according to reports from Western correspondents in these countries the new editions of Western literature have been extremely popular.

Information from Bucharest has indicated that despite the continued "Stalinist" appraisals of Western literature in the Party press, translations of authors such as Caldwell, Hemingway and Faulkner have been snatched up by the reading public, along with new editions of French classics which traditionally have occupied an important place in Romanian culture. *Rumania Today* (Bucharest), No. 7, 1957, in describing a recent Romanian book exhibit organized in the Sorbonne, declared that French authors represent some 40 percent of the books translated into Romanian:

" . . . Before the war, many translations from the French were published in Rumania, but too many of them were books of inferior quality . . . and this gave a wrong impression of French civilization and culture. The books trans-

"The Fall"

" . . . ONE READS this rather short book with difficulty, great inner resistance, even unwillingly; but after one puts it aside, one thinks about it incessantly. . . . It is impossible to give a resume of this book, or even to say what point it tries to make. It is saturated with inner content to a degree seldom achieved in books by the best of authors. . . . The author digs into the reader's soul, and leaves him overwhelmed. . . ."

"Camus says: man is a monster regardless of the social and governmental system, of geographical position or the prevailing religion. Perhaps it is true that man is a monster, but this depends on the social and governmental system, on the meridian, and on the prevailing religion. Do read *The Fall*."

Przegląd Kulturalny (Warsaw), July 11-17, 1957

lated today give quite another impression . . . and the fact that the translations are made by eminent professors or writers, makes for good quality.

"The great French classics are easily accessible to Rumanian readers. Translations include Moliere's works (published in 85,000 copies), Anatole France, Romain Rolland, Balzac (200,000 copies) and Hugo (226,000). But there are also translations from the modern writers, such as Aragon, Eluard, Robert Merle, Pagnol and Giraudoux. Publishing houses are now preparing translations of Mauriac, Cocteau, Jules Romains, Andre Chamson, and during the press conference, [the writer] Petru Dumitriu drew attention to the interest of the Rumanian public in Anouilh and Sartre. . . ."

Indeed, in Bucharest, as well as in less rigidly censored cities of Eastern Europe, the revival of interest in Western cultural developments has become one of the most prominent features of current intellectual life.

"The Way of All Flesh"

"... THE WAY OF ALL FLESH is reminiscent of the novels of Butler's more famous countryman, Charles Dickens. Butler also deals with the development of a young man. . . . Here, too, we have an oppressive childhood, soiled by the insults and injustices of adults, even though—in contrast to the socially humiliated heroes in Dickens—this hero comes from a wealthy family. And perhaps Butler's novel is so precise and critical—frequently to the point of sarcasm—precisely because he describes life within this class. He not only exposes the hypocrisy of the bourgeois family idyll, but also attacks such institutions as the church, school, business, etc. Butler's book is not breathtaking, but it does give a good portrayal of so-called . . . high society in the English countryside in the 19th Century, and is filled with a sense of tragi-comedy. . . ."

Vecerni Praha (Prague), April 27, 1957

Czechoslovak Verses

In Czechoslovakia during the spring and summer of 1957 there were printed a number of poems which carried on, in symbolic and indirect language, the ferment of criticism which had otherwise by that time been stilled. The poem below is one of these; others were reprinted in East Europe, November 1957, p. 32.

Cinderella

by Miroslav Holub

("Cinderella is sorting the peas" was the title and refrain of a famous poem of the resistance during the Nazi German occupation, glorifying the USSR. "Cinderella" is, of course, Czechoslovakia.)

Cinderella is sorting the peas;
good peas, bad peas, good little buds, bad little buds,
yes and no, yes and no.
And she does not cheat, And she does not deceive.

Somewhere they laugh.
They yoke the horses for someone,
someone will have a pompous ride.
The slipper, they say, is no longer small,
once the toes have been cut off
it is the truth. Believe!

Cinderella is sorting the peas:
good peas, bad peas,
yes and no, yes and no.
And she does not cheat. And she does not deceive.

With the wink of an eye the carriages will be here for
the ball
the crowd of dwarfs will applaud
this usurper bride.

No blood is streaming, it is only red birds
from far away who flew in and in
and tore their plumage (in struggle) on the way.

Cinderella is sorting the peas:
good peas, bad peas,
yes and no, yes and no.
There are no nuts, no prince,
we are only longing for mother
and there is only one hope:
Cinderella is sorting the peas.

Silently, as if thatching the roofing
they put together timing intricacies
or maybe they just mix dough.
And perhaps it is lighter than the air,
perhaps it is only a tune in the mind,
perhaps it is only a feather of truth.

Cinderella is sorting the peas:
good peas, bad peas,
yes and no, yes and no.
Cinderella knows. She knows the depth,
she knows she is alone, with no young doves around.
And yet she will sort out those peas.

Novy Zivot (Prague)
April 1957

The Cross and the Party—II

A Two-Year Review of Church-State Relations

The first part of this article, in last month's issue, discussed problems connected with the Catholic Church's improved status in Gomulka's Poland and described the Hungarian regime's attempts to reach a modus vivendi with ecclesiastical authorities after having liquidated many of the freedoms so dramatically attained in the 1956 Revolt. The present article deals with the position of the Churches and the fate of the faithful in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, where events in the past two years though significant have been far less turbulent. Though policy varies in each country, tight control remains paramount in all.

Czechoslovakia

THE PAST TWO YEARS have brought relatively few changes in State-Church relations in Czechoslovakia. Although the government recently has shown more generosity in its subsidies to the churches and has relaxed its ban on religious meetings (in May 1957, for example, the official press reported that some 30,000 people had joined a procession in Liberec), it has made no major concessions in such important matters as religious education, and the status and structure of church hierarchies. Indeed, it is significant that while the phase of large-scale persecution of religious leaders ended shortly after Stalin's death, arrests of members of the clergy have not stopped entirely.

Status of Clergy

THE GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL to allow the churches any substantial freedom accounts for the fact that almost none of the formerly imprisoned leaders of Czechoslovakia's Roman Catholic Church, which claims about 73 percent of the population, has been fully rehabilitated. For instance, Archbishop Joseph Beran, who was removed from his diocese in March 1951, has not been permitted to resume his clerical duties. Premier Siroky "explained" the reason why in a press conference with foreign correspondents on May 24, 1956. Asked about the fate of Archbishop Beran in the light of developments elsewhere in the orbit, Siroky said:

"What the Hungarian Government did with Mindszenty and Grosz, I do not know. I, too, have read that Mindszenty's punishment has been suspended and that he is somewhere on vacation. . . . Archbishop Beran has not been imprisoned, nor has he been arrested. Archbishop



Head of the Lomnice (Czechoslovakia) Madonna. This masterpiece of medieval religious art was part of an exhibit, "Ancient Art in Czechoslovakia," sent by the regime to Paris in June 1957. *Czechoslovak Life* (Prague), July 1957

Beran does not perform his office. The Czechoslovak State has the right to demand that every citizen of the Republic submit to existing laws. It naturally demands this of the clergy also, and if a member of the clergy does not intend to submit to these laws, the government has the right to take adequate measures. . . . The fact that Archbishop Beran does not fulfill his office does not change the fact that in our State there is absolute freedom of religion. . . ." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], May 25, 1956.)

An unofficial report from Vienna in June 1956 threw further light on the subject. The report stated that the 68-year-old Archbishop, who is rumored to be living in a villa in Bohemia, had rejected the terms offered him by the government (which included the demand that he submit an unconditional plea for clemency) and had declared that he would rather remain a prisoner than become a puppet churchman.

From developments later in the year, it appeared that the regime was willing to reinstate those religious leaders who succumbed to its pressures and complied with its demands. *Rude Pravo* (Prague), October 21, 1956, announced that Bishop Robert Pobožný, who was removed as Apostolic Administrator in Rožnava, Slovakia, in the spring



Joseph Plojhar, right, Czechoslovak Minister of Health, head of the puppet People's Party, head of the National Committee of the Catholic Clergy for Peace. A Roman Catholic priest, he was excommunicated in 1948. He is here shown receiving a decoration from the Soviet Ambassador.

Tschechoslowakei (Prague), No. 1, 1953

of 1953 because he had refused to take a loyalty oath to the regime, had undergone a "change of heart." The newspaper declared that Bishop Pobožný had issued a statement saying that he recognized the "validity of Communist laws" and therefore would now be permitted to take up his official duties.

As a sign of its "good will" the regime announced the release of two old and ailing Slovak clergymen shortly before the capitulation of Bishop Pobožný. Radio Prague, October 10, 1956, reported that Bishop Jan Vojtassak of Spis and Auxiliary Bishop Michal Buzalka of the Apostolic Administration of Trnava, sentenced respectively to twenty-four years imprisonment and life on January 15, 1951, had been pardoned and would be allowed to live in a house placed at their disposal by the Catholic *Caritas* organization.

In 1957, the regime indicated that its "friendly gestures" towards the Catholic clergy did not signify improved relations with the Vatican or extend to priests who showed hostility towards the Communist system. For instance, a dispatch from Reuters on October 25, 1957, stated that Roman Catholic priest Jan Stojaspal had been arrested in Eastern Moravia for "misusing his religious activities to defame the Republic." It was charged that Father Stojaspal had incited his parishioners against the regime and "had raised in them hopes for an overthrow."

Earlier in the year, a campaign was mounted against the Society of Saint Francis de Sales.* On June 25, 1957, *Rude Pravo* printed an editorial stating that the Salesians had continued to engage in espionage after the arrest of Bishop Trochta in 1954, and had established "new contacts" to replace the "espionage network" that had been built up by the Bishop and was destroyed by the government after his imprisonment. The paper accused Fathers Tatak, Chudarek, Smekal, Tinka and Filipec of cooperating with the American Intelligence Service. It said that they had been aided by nuns at the Liptal Convent in Moravia which had become "a refuge for criminals on the run from justice to the West." Filipec allegedly hid in the convent and directed his "anti-State" activities from there until the situation became too dangerous. Then, according to the accusation, he tried to escape through the Soviet zone of Germany, but was apprehended by border guards.

Later in the month, former Salesian priest Vojtech Frellich and seven other religious and lay members of the Salesian Congregation in Ostrava were tried and imprisoned for disseminating anti-State literature and holding secret, illegal meetings. Father Vaclav Filipec was tried and convicted in August, as were two nuns from the Liptal Convent. In September, *Rude Pravo* reporting on the trials, delivered a strong attack on the Vatican:

"The Vatican was very satisfied with the anti-State activities of the Salesians. . . . It is again the Vatican which acts against our people. It has again been confirmed from the anti-State activities carried out by the clergy in the People's Democracies that all roads do indeed lead to Rome. . . . We shall not permit anyone to hide under

* A mendicant order.



"One of the loveliest of Czechoslovakia's [Roman Catholic] churches, that on Holy Hill in Olomouc, Moravia, suffered severe damage in the war. It has been restored at State expense and was recently re-opened." State propaganda to demonstrate church aid.

Photo and quoted text from *Czechoslovak Life* (Prague), June 1957

canonical dress . . . to endanger . . . the life of our people. We respect the religious feelings of our citizens, we spend considerable sums on the repairs of churches and the salaries of priests. But we will not tolerate anyone misusing religious faith for dirty political machinations against the Republic." (*Rude Pravo*, September 17-19, 1957.)

"Patriotic Priests"

LIKE THE OTHER COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS, the Czechoslovak regime has continued to make frequent use of the collaborating "patriotic priests," whose chief tasks are to destroy the influence of the Vatican and non-collaborating church leaders, and to persuade the faithful of the superiority of the Communist system and the correctness of Communist policy. Agricultural collectivization, for example, has been persistently urged by the "patriotic priests" and their press organs. In the March 1957 issue of *Duchovny Pastier*, a leading Slovak "patriotic priest" fulfilled his "mission" by explaining that believers should have no apprehensions about joining collective farms because there "is no ideological conflict between our religion and its truth, and the cooperative form of work." In its April issue, the publication continued its propaganda by printing an article on the moral justification "for recasting the agricultural structure."

The Peace Committee of the Catholic Clergy—headed by Health Minister Joseph Plojhar, a defrocked priest—has also endorsed the collectivization program, as well as other Communist policies. On September 19, 1957, to cite only one of its activities, the Committee held a peace rally in Prague at which it drafted a resolution protesting the re-

militarization of West Germany and calling for a ban on atomic weapons. In an address to the meeting, Plojhar attacked Christian politicians and church representatives "who incited [the people] to new wars," and deplored that "some political circles in the Vatican" had shown evidence of such activity by "recently attacking Hungary's patriotic priests."

One of the most vociferous salesmen of the "people's democratic order" has been J. Hromadka, Dean of the Theological Faculty of the Czech Brethren Church.* Aside from travelling to various parts of the globe to establish contacts with other churches and spread the "Marxist word," Hromadka has been active on the home front, and his press organ, *Kostnické Jiskry*, has consistently reiterated the Party's line. For instance, on November 15, 1956, the paper declared that the Nagy government had lost control over events in Hungary and had paved the way for Western intervention in the Revolt: "The opening of the borders and the support which Western States granted emigre representatives and brutal groups of reactionaries, show that this was obvious intervention. . . . The Western world tried to give Hungarian events the character of an attack by the Soviets."

Atheistic Propaganda

THE SURVIVAL OF RELIGION among youth and Party members has remained a crucial problem for the regime, which in the past two years has persistently called

* The Czech Brethren Church is the main Protestant Church in the Czech provinces. It was founded after the First World War on the basis of the teachings of Jan Hus (1373-1415), the Bohemian Reformation preacher, burned as a Catholic heretic.

for an ideological offensive against "religious superstitions." On January 19, 1956, the Ostrava daily *Nova Svoboda* issued a typical complaint when it demanded an intensification of atheistic propaganda to combat the widespread "religious propaganda" being carried out in the country. *Nova Svoboda* lamented that many Party organizations claimed that they had more important things to do than issue "scientific propaganda." The paper added, however, that the campaign to show the "harmful character of religion" must not include administrative measures (the euphemism for force) or attempts to ridicule religion.

The same theme was stressed at a Party Central Committee meeting on June 13, 1957. Central Committee Secretary Jiri Hendrych complained that religion still influenced some Party members and declared that the Party could not remain indifferent to this situation. Among other things, Hendrych called for systematic political educational work among youth. The CC subsequently published a long resolution on ideological matters which contained the following:

"[The Party must not for one moment] lose sight of the problem of overcoming religious prejudices. This must be achieved by systematic patient education, so that the believers themselves gradually and voluntarily, on the basis of their own conviction, liberate themselves from the influence of religion. Scientific, atheistic propaganda must be carried out in close relationship with all political, cultural and enlightenment work." (*Lidova Demokracie* [Prague], June 16, 1957.)

Bulgaria

THE POST-STALIN PROGRAM of normalizing relations between the State and the Church got underway in May 1953, when a Patriarch assumed leadership of the Bulgarian Eastern Orthodox Church for the first time in nearly six centuries.* After the election to this office of regime-supported Archbishop Kiril of Plovdiv, a number of priests were released from prison, Communist attacks on the clergy diminished, and expropriated monastery lands and buildings were returned to the Church. By 1957, both Bulgarians and Western observers reported signs of a religious revival, marked by large Church attendance, the free organization of the Orthodox congregations, and an improvement in the Church's financial and political status.

On May 9, 1957, *Tsarkoven Vestnik* (Sofia), the official organ of The Holy Synod, reviewed religious developments in the four years since the re-establishment of the Patriarchate. The newspaper pointed to restoration of old church buildings, in particular the Rila Monastery,** and

* Six million of Bulgaria's seven million people belong to the Orthodox Church. In addition, there are about 60,000 Catholics, 20,000 Protestants and 550,000 Moslems, chiefly of Turkish descent.

** *Otechestven Front* (Sofia), December 8, 1956, revealed that one of the regime's main purposes in allocating large sums of money for the restoration of the Rila Monastery was to attract tourists: "[The monastery will be restored] in the course of two years. . . . Renovated and reconstructed, the Rila Monastery will become a more attractive place for thousands of tourists and guests from within the country and from abroad."

the construction of new ones. It also expressed satisfaction at the increase in Church revenues through the establishment of model church farms and industrial enterprises, and at the growing ranks of believers:

"A real religious revival is noticeable. The churches are visited by numerous . . . people. A creative, fraternal life exists in the Orthodox Christian Brotherhood. There is systematic instruction of Brotherhood members by means of regular . . . lectures which disclose in simple language the truths of the faith. . . . The religious press is increasing. The number of copies of and subscriptions to the Church periodical is increasing. There are reasons to believe that next year our Holy Church will be enriched by one more periodical."*

* The religious instruction of Brotherhood members was ordered by Patriarch Kiril in July 1955 for the period of a year. The Holy Synod extended the order in July 1956. One of the purposes of this order was to explain Orthodox liturgy and oppose sectarians. As for the religious revival in general, the Western press reported that Church attendance during the 1957 Easter holidays was larger than it had been at any time in the past five years. One report stated that some 30,000-40,000 people were crowded into the Alexander Nevski Cathedral in Sofia for midnight mass, and that the majority were young people under thirty. This would indicate that the large turnout was a demonstration of opposition to the Communist regime which, for the most part, has suppressed any sort of vocal protest against its policies by intellectuals and youth, and has kept vigilant watch for any signs of "deviation" and "revisionism."



St. George's Church, Sofia, the oldest building in Bulgaria. Portions of the structure are said to date from the third century. It has been preserved as a monument in the midst of extensive new buildings.

Bulgaria Today (Sofia), May 9, 1957

Other signs of an extension of the Church's freedom have been the establishment of new religious schools and the ordaining of new Bishops. *Tsarkoven Vestnik*, July 18, 1957, reported, for example, that the Holy Synod had decided to open a school for monks in the Troyan Monastery. Earlier in the year, on January 17, 1957, the same paper reported that Archimandrite Maksim, formerly Dean of the Bulgarian Church in Moscow and, after mid-1956, Secretary General of the Bulgarian Holy Synod, had been ordained as Bishop Branitskii. On April 22, the paper announced the ordaining of Bishop Joseph, vicar of Sofia's Archbishop Patriarch Kiril, and formerly head of the Religious Department at the Holy Synod.

According to unconfirmed reports, the relaxation has also affected the status of the Protestant clergy. It is said that two of the four Protestant leaders sentenced to life imprisonment in March 1948 for "high treason, espionage, currency abuses," etc., have been pardoned. Reportedly released are Reverend Vasil Ziapkov, head of the Congregational Churches in Bulgaria, and Reverend Nikola Mihailov, head of the Bulgarian Baptist Churches. There is still no information about Reverend Ionko Ivanov of the Methodist Church and Reverend Georgi Chernev, head of the Bulgarian Churches of the Pentecost. They, too, might be pardoned in the near future.

Controversy Over Religious Education

ALTHOUGH THE REGIME has made various concessions to the clergy, it has persistently urged the eradication of "religious fanaticism," and has strongly rebuked the Holy Synod for demanding that religious education be reinstated in public schools. The occasion for the rebuke was an article in the Holy Synod's publication *Duhovna Kultura*, No. 12, 1956, which contained among other things, the statement that "an attempt to impose only atheistic views in schools is an encroachment on the citizens' most cherished freedom and is inevitably doomed to failure." In answer to *Duhovna Kultura*, *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), January 31, 1957, insisted that religious freedom was guaranteed and honored in Bulgaria, and attacked the author, Dimitar Penev, and the Synod's editors for indulging in a "grossly insulting" distortion of facts. *Literaturen Front* stated:

"... Let us not speak about centuries. Let us look at our history after the First World War: then we will see that the Church was involved in the horrible excesses of the bourgeois-fascist administration. . . In the name of the 'most sacred freedom of citizens,' the bourgeois State imposed religious education on all school pupils, regardless of their views. Is this what Dr. Penev and the editors of *Duhovna Kultura* want to restore? . . .

"According to *Duhovna Kultura*, another reason for the introduction of religious education is the 'psychological peculiarities' and needs of our people. The paper writes: 'Spiritually, the Bulgarian is a philistine and a practical fellow, alien to emotional sensations, deprived of the variety and fullness of enthusiasm and supreme adoration because of long Turkish rule. After the Liberation, the preoccupation with creating professional cadres led to the



The Three Hierarchs Church in Jassy, one of Romania's most notable Orthodox churches.

Romania Today (Bucharest), No. 9, 1957

development of a coarse and positivist character. All this produces spiritual misery, emotional coarseness, lack of aesthetic feeling. The neglect of religion, ethics, aesthetics, history, music and painting, has produced coarse persons . . . unable to appreciate our cultural wealth, lacking in humanism and honor."

"Never has there been a more negative assessment of the character of our people. If we ask whom such an evaluation serves, we will come to rather unfavorable conclusions. All known and unknown centers and radio stations of the capitalist world insult our people in exactly the same way. . . ."

Literaturen Front also charged *Duhovna Kultura* with failing to comment on the Hungarian Revolt and the fact that a "Cardinal [Mindszenty] had delivered a reckless sermon about murdering Communists and returning the land and factories to their former owners."

Training in Atheism

Throughout the past two years, the regime has never wavered in its determination to use the nation's schools as a breeding ground for atheism. The Party press prints frequent articles on the importance of "overcoming" home influences through persistent education in schools and has warned parents not to obstruct this process. *Otechestven Front* (Sofia), March 30, 1956, stated for example, that:

"When the parents and relatives of the children are themselves captives of religious prejudices and cannot aid in educating their children in the atheistic spirit, they at least should not obstruct the schools . . . and introduce painful conflicts in the children's minds. Every religious father and mother should remember that, to make life easier for their children, they should avoid filling their heads with religious prejudices."

Similarly, Radio Sofia, June 19, 1957, discussed the problem of "religious fanaticism," particularly among the Turkish minority:

"It is well-known that while among our own people one can note an uninterested, sober and even negative attitude towards religion, among other nationalities living in our country . . . religious feeling is often intense. Indeed, religious fanaticism is so strong among these nationalities that it prevents penetration of progressive ideas and impedes the emancipation of the workers' consciousness. . . . Religious fanaticism is a tradition passed on from old to young. . . . All possibilities offered by schools . . . must be utilized. Assistance must be obtained from both youth and public organizations and from within the family. Of course, one must not go to extremes, since this can cause anger and no positive results will be obtained. . . .

"Family upbringing leaves lasting and deep marks on the consciousness of children, and when this upbringing is incorrect, the consequences are always negative. . . . It is necessary for the schools to maintain close relations with families and to assist parents in overcoming religious prejudices in the consciousness of children. Anti-religious education can best be carried out at school. . . ."

Churches' Political Role

WHILE THE REGIME has accorded the churches more independence, it has continued to demand the clergy's support in carrying out its domestic and foreign policies and has made only minor concessions in this sphere. The so-called "peace priests" have accordingly endorsed the Communists' disarmament proposals, have protested the persecution of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus, have denounced the "Anglo-Israeli armed aggression against Egypt," and have loudly hailed "Bulgarian-Soviet friendship." It is significant, however, that none of the political declarations of the Orthodox Church in 1957 has appeared in the Party paper, *Rabotnichesko Delo*. The fact that they have been printed only in Church publications (they have also been broadcast by Radio Sofia) suggests that the Party has decided to make less blatant use of the Church as a political tool.

The Orthodox Church also failed to submit to Party pressure and issue a public condemnation of the Hungarian Revolt. The only mention of the events in Hungary to appear in *Tsarkoven Vestnik* was in reference to the return of Metropolitan Pimen of Nevrokop from Budapest, where he had gone to consecrate a Bulgarian Church: "The consecration . . . took place on November 11 [1956] instead of on October 22, as was originally planned. Metropolitan Pimen showed an apostle's fearlessness by remaining in Budapest . . . to witness the establishment of order in the Hungarian capital and complete the task entrusted to him."

As previously, the Communists have continued to promote contacts between the Russian and Bulgarian Churches in order to strengthen relations between the two peoples. For example, Russian Patriarch Alexei arrived in Sofia on September 10, 1957, to participate in celebrations of Bulgaria's eightieth anniversary of liberation from the Turks. On September 21, *Rabotnichesko Delo* reported that Patriarchs Alexei and Kiril had signed a declaration in support of the Communist "peace" campaign.

The Chief Mufti of Bulgaria, Akif Osmanov, has also been assigned specific political tasks. In a broadcast on February 29, 1957, he complained, for example, that certain newspapers in Turkey had told "a thousand and one lies" to damage relations between Bulgaria and Turkey: "In their assertions, these papers write of discontent, revolutions and disorders in Bulgaria, but everything they write is a lie. There is peace and order in Bulgaria, and everyone is busy with his own work. The Moslems of Bulgaria are completely satisfied with the domestic and foreign policies of our government and give them full support." The other churches in Bulgaria have carried out similar activities.

Romania

THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST REGIME has altered little in its policy towards religion since 1955, when it began to give the Orthodox Church* a more prominent part in furthering the Party's foreign policy goals. In the past two years, Patriarch Justinian and other Church leaders have been used repeatedly to cement relations with other Orthodox Churches, to advance the Communist "peace struggle" and to act as "good will ambassadors" of the Romanian regime abroad. Recently, for instance, Patriarch Justinian has been given the task of establishing closer relations with the Yugoslav Orthodox Church, a step which coincides with the government's policy of renewing ties with that country. In June 1957, Patriarch Justinian went to Belgrade to sign an agreement with the Yugoslav Patriarchy on collaboration between the two churches and there received an important decoration from Marshal Tito.

The Orthodox Church (which has been favored by the regime above all other Churches in the country because of its usefulness in strengthening ties between the Romanian and Soviet peoples) has also been given the task of improving relations with Protestant Churches abroad. In December 1956, for example, Anglican Bishop Thomas of Gibraltar was invited to Romania to discuss mutual church relations with Patriarch Justinian. The press reported that the subject of these relations will be brought up at the Congress of Anglican Churches to be held in Lambeth, Scotland in 1958.

"Peace Propaganda"

In addition, the Orthodox Church has been extremely active in disseminating "peace propaganda." For instance,

* About 70 percent of the Romanian population belongs to the Orthodox Church.



The Rila Monastery, which has been extensively restored by the State as a tourist attraction. At the extreme right, the Balkantourist hotel. *Bulgaria Today* (Sofia), May (10) 1957

on May 24, 1957, the Synod of the Orthodox Church sent a message to the Communist-dominated World Peace Council expressing "solidarity" with its aims. Similarly, on April 5, 1957, Patriarch Justinian made the following statement in an address to the Romanian Committee for the Defense of Peace, which was meeting in plenary session in Bucharest:

"In what concerns our present obligations regarding the new provocations of aggressive centers of the imperialist countries against peace and a peaceful world, the only thing we can do is promise again in the name of the Romanian Orthodox Church . . . that we will further intensify our fight to explain to all our parishioners their duty to become members of the peaceful army of our country—partisans of peace. The events in Hungary must be a good lesson for us, and we must keep them in mind in order to carry out the activities proposed by the National Committee for the Defense of Peace. Such activities must involve more intense explanations of international events and the gravity of such events. It also means explaining to the mass of citizens the beautiful and peaceful institutions of our popular democratic regime and of all Socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union." (*Biserica Orthodoxa Romina*, the official bulletin of the Romanian Patriarchate, March-April, 1957.)

Status of the Churches

Aside from increased propaganda activities, the status of the Orthodox Church and the other churches in the country has changed little in the past few years and strictly religious matters are rarely mentioned in the press. The Greek Catholic, or Uniate Church, which was forcibly merged with the Orthodox Church in the Stalinist period, has not been revived. It has been reported, however, that three of the former Greek Catholic bishops arrested in 1948 (Ilius Hossu, Alexandru Russu and Ion Balan) have been transferred from the Sighet jail to the Orthodox monastery of Curtea de Arges.

The regime has made no concessions in regard to religious education, and the churches can run schools only for the training of priests. In the past year, the German Evangelical Church reportedly tried to obtain the return of its confiscated properties, but the government categorically refused to discuss this. In July 1957, the matter was taken up in Berlin by representatives of the Romanian Embassy in East Germany and Maria Torhorst, Chief of International Relations in the East German Ministry of Education. According to reports, suggestions were made for reopening the Church's schools and staffing them with East German teachers, but so far none of these suggestions has been carried out.*

* The status of the Jews in Romania and elsewhere in the orbit will be discussed as a separate topic in an article on minorities. According to 1955 statistics, Romania has 250,000 Jews; Poland some 40,000-50,000 Jews; Czechoslovakia, 10,000-15,000; Bulgaria, 4,000-6,000; and Hungary, 120,000. About one third of Hungary's Jewish population fled during the Revolt in Oct.-Nov. 1956.

Two Letters to Party Secretary Gomulka

The following are two letters from the staff of the recently banned liberal Polish Communist weekly Po Prostu to Party leader Gomulka. The periodical had long been a forerunner in the Polish ferment and had supported Gomulka in his accession to power: its banning is one of the sharpest ironies in present-day Poland and was the cause of riots in Warsaw and elsewhere in October (see East Europe, November 1957, p. 36, for the riots and background on the banning). The two letters below, the first protesting the ban itself, the second protesting militia repression of the journal's student adherents, were received outside of Poland from an unofficial source; several official regime comments indicate them to be authentic.

Letter from the Basic Party Organization of Po Prostu

WE PROTEST AGAINST the decision taken by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' [Communist] Party to ban *Po Prostu*. The staff itself had a critical attitude toward the first post-vacation number of the weekly, which was expressed both in the discussion with Comrade Starewicz,* and in the document handed to the leadership of the Party concerning the program of the weekly as well as in the second version of the number. The banning of *Po Prostu* took place after the team had presented the second version of the issue and the program document, and the reasons for this decision were not given to us; we were not even informed of the text of the resolution of the CC Secretariat.

"The banning of the weekly took place at the moment when, after a long period of discussion, the team had crystallized its program. During the last few months the team went through many difficulties and on several occasions asked for a meeting with the Party leadership and with you personally. However, for reasons unknown to us, our requests were not granted. The motives of our protest are twofold:

"1) We protest against the fact [of the ban] itself, as we think that in spite of various inconsistencies arising out of our difficulties as well as the character of the magazine as a forum, the function of *Po Prostu* was democratic and Socialistic. Also the program formulated by us recently—which set as the primary task of the magazine the current extremely essential constructive work, the awakening of Socialist centers of social enterprise, the suggestion of effective means for a real improvement of the difficult financial situation of people, the broadening of self-government and the ideological as well as practical struggle with the social rightists—was, in our opinion, a Party program.

"2) We protest against the methods applied toward *Po Prostu*. During September an atmosphere of fear was created around the team. We were not given the oppor-

tunity to have a meeting with the comrades from the Secretariat, as a result of which no one had a discussion with our team on the program of the magazine, and no one tried to make a political evaluation of our work. The evaluation of Comrade Starewicz was based on one post-vacation issue and the method of this evaluation—consisting of quoting single sentences and statements taken from various articles—did not provide the basis for a factual discussion. But the banning of *Po Prostu* reflects the attitude of the leadership of the Party toward our work of the last two years. Not merely the confiscation of the first issue, but the total banning of *Po Prostu* can be understood by us in no other way than as an expression of disapproval of the whole of the activities of our weekly during the last two years. We are afraid that this action, as the symptom of a definite tendency, will have an influence on the weakening of Socialist forces in the country and on the strengthening of the right."

Text of the Open Letter Written by Po Prostu to Gomulka

ON OCTOBER 3, 1957, the ZMS (Socialist Youth Union) called a meeting of students in Warsaw at the Students' Home in Narutowicz Square, for seven P.M., in connection with the decision to disband the *Po Prostu* team. They found that the doors to the hall had been locked on the instructions of the Rector of the Warsaw Polytechnic. Therefore they started to assemble outside the building, nevertheless conducting themselves peacefully. They were attacked by militia units using truncheons and tear gas grenades.

"The massed militia attack was indiscriminately directed at all those in the square, not excluding casual passers-by. Women were beaten and kicked. The senseless brutality was exemplified by the militia breaking into a cafe and beating up persons sitting at the tables; they also threw tear-gas bombs into private apartments. The result was a considerable number of injured students and passers-by. All this brought about the spontaneous defense of those attacked. Compelled by the behavior of the militia, the crowd, which had grown during the militia operations, re-

* Chairman of the Party Central Committee Press Office.



Wide World

The meeting of students at the Warsaw Polytechnic Institute on October 4 protesting the ban on *Po Prostu*. Riots in Warsaw and other cities followed the meeting.

sisted, and only after the withdrawal of the militia did it disperse. During the disturbances the militia arrested a considerable number of people from among those gathered

in the Square, including passers-by having no connection with the meeting.

"It is obvious that senseless and brutal attacks on passers-by, and the kicking of women, are contrary to the law and to elementary humanitarian concepts. They cannot be judged otherwise by public opinion than as bringing shame on men acting in the uniform of representatives of authority. But even disregarding the form of the militiamen's attack, the very fact of an attempt to break up a peaceful popular demonstration, kept within limits normally accepted and sanctioned by the laws and usages of political life, must arouse protest.

"We are not concerned with the formal truth of the estimate of these facts. It is clear that in the present period of struggle for the country's political stabilization and for the mobilization of all forces for effectuating a constructive economic program, such acts of protest must be considered unsuitable. But it is beyond question that the meeting was legally called, and did not have an anti-people or anti-government character. In these circumstances the militia excesses must be judged as an act striking at the elementary demands of Socialist democracy.

"The consequences of this kind of practice can be nothing but the paralyzing of political activity and the population in general, and youth in particular, as well as the re-introduction of fear in place of persuasion and political argument; in short, the use anew of the argument of force in place of forceful argument.

"The disturbances as a whole, after the irresponsible decision to bring the militia into action, harmed the Party, suggesting a return to the practice and methods condemned in October [1956]. They harmed the Party by incensing public opinion, striking at the people's sense of justice and social law and order and creating a new fissure in the rebuilt bond between the workers and their authorities. That is why, in protesting against such forms of militia practice, we ask you to examine the matter, and draw consequences concerning those responsible."

The *Po Prostu* Team



The Party and the Peasant—III

Previous articles covered the failure of attempts to collectivize agriculture in Poland and Hungary. The following article describes the situation in Bulgaria, where collectivization is now practically complete; Czechoslovakia, where the regime is striving to collectivize most of the land by the end of this year; and Romania, where progress is still slow. It ends with a bird's-eye view of collectivization in Albania, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Bulgaria

THE OFFICIAL FOLKLORE of Communism treats the peasant with great respect. He is a man of the soil, a weatherbeaten patriarch, a wise though conservative cousin of the city worker. His intense dislike for the programs and policies of Communism is never fully admitted. Thus the bitterness of Stalin's collectivization drive in the early Thirties, a campaign which was nothing less than a war upon the peasantry, was explained by the official literature in the following way: "Solid collectivization was not just a peaceful process . . . but a struggle of the peasant masses against the kulaks. Solid collectivization meant that all the land in a village area in which a collective farm was formed passed into the hands of the collective farm; but a considerable portion of this land was held by kulaks, and therefore the peasants would expropriate them, driving them from the land, dispossessing them of their cattle and machinery and demanding their arrest and eviction from the district by the Soviet authorities."*

* *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, New York: International Publishers, 1939, p. 303.



Soviet threshing machines on a Czechoslovak collective farm.
Tschechoslowakei im Bild (Prague), No. 1, 1952

"Old Grandfather Spas"

IN EASTERN EUROPE the Communists have had to revise the myth in face of the peasant's obvious reluctance to accept the socialization of agriculture. The current version emphasizes the peasant's conservatism, his reluctance to

give up his old way of life, and the necessity of showing him how much better off he will be in a collective farm. Even in Bulgaria, where about 86 percent of the arable land is now under State control, there is no pretense that collectivization was a spontaneous movement. A recent issue of a Bulgarian magazine designed for Western readers tells of an old peasant who had been "invited" to join a collective farm.

"No . . . he would never give up his land! It was his—watered with his sweat, nourished with his tears, when hail had destroyed its fruits. . . . And old Grandfather Spas stretched out a hand for the cooperative farm membership form which had been tossed on the table before him. He crushed it angrily in his bony fingers and threw it in his son's face, saying: 'May you be buried in the black earth if you dare to sign this! And if you do, be off with you!' And he pointed to the gate with a trembling finger."

His daughter-in-law argued in vain:

"'People live comfortably [in the collective farm], work together and pile up the cash! As for your "much or little, all we have is our own"—just take a look at us and see how we live! How long is it since Ranghel and I started to build our house, and we still live in the basement like ground-squirrels! We can't save enough money to get even one room ready; but at the other end of the village even Genyu, the poorest of us, has built himself a house!'"

But as time went by the old man and his family grew poorer. There was a dry year. "It had rained only after they had brought in the sheaves; the vineyard at Gencho's Well had yielded nothing at all, and their tobacco had brought them just enough to pay for the blue vitriol they had wasted." But the peasants on the collective farm were flourishing. Their wine "was thick and had a fine tang to it, with that undeniable flavor of burnt sugar that only a master hand can give it." The old man's son showed him some figures comparing the income of his family with that of a similar family who had joined the collective farm. While Grandfather Spas and his sons earned only 10,400 *leva* in 1956, that other family had made 27,560 *leva*. "They got wine, and wheat, and hard cash too, 22 *leva* a workday."

"They all read the table, and the old man gazed long at the finely written figures through his iron-rimmed spectacles. He knew his condition, but had never seen it set down in black and white like that. These figures, so dry and laconic at first sight, proved stronger than his strongest arguments. And much as he loved his land, he would have to give it up. He was past his prime. It was the turn of the young ones now, and they wanted to live better, and to arrange their lives on a basis of greater well-being."*

The Pressures

THE STORY OF GRANDFATHER SPAS is told often in one form or another by the Communist press in its campaign to induce peasants to join collective farms "voluntarily." The official thesis is that collective farming is inherently more economical than private farming—though

* "What Ranghel's Balance Showed," *Bulgaria Today* (Sofia), Vol. VI, No. 12, June 1957.

Collectivization in Bulgaria

Year	Collectives	Households
1944	110	—
1945	382	34,362
1946	480	41,027
1947	549	44,100
1948	1,100	78,900
1949	1,608	156,483
1950	2,587	525,628
1951	2,739	—
1952	2,747	552,968
1953	2,747	568,989
1954	2,723	—
1955	2,735	591,185
1956	3,100	911,037
1957 (November)	3,158	960,000

Sources: *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), Jan. 1, 1951, Jan. 27, 1957, Dec. 3, 1957; *Zemledelsko Zname* (Sofia), Dec. 3, 1952, Nov. 28, 1953, Dec. 2, 1953; *Otechestven Front* (Sofia), Feb. 17, 1955. Figures as of Dec. 31.

published information does not so far support this idea—and that the chief task of Party workers is to convince the peasant by showing him. All of the Satellite regimes have in recent years publicly forsworn the use of force in carrying out their collectivization campaigns, and have insisted that wherever force had been employed it was in violation of Party principles. Thus Dimitur Ganev, secretary of the Bulgarian Party Central Committee, said in April 1956: "Except for individual cases in which the principle of 'voluntariness' was violated—cases which the Party and government sharply criticize and will endeavor to prevent in the future—most of the private farmers joined the collective farms voluntarily and sincerely."

A closer examination of Bulgarian reality shows that the Communists have used so many techniques to get the peasants into collectives that the process can hardly be described as voluntary—unless the word is taken to mean "without the official use of brute force." One reason Grandfather Spas found his family getting poorer and the collective farmers getting richer was the Communists' policy of economic discrimination against private farmers and in favor of the collectives. For example, a recent decree specified that average grain delivery quotas for private farmers were to be twice as high as those for collective farms.* Since the prices the State pays for quota deliveries are about a third of those it pays for above-quota deliveries, this amounts to taxing private farmers much more heavily than collective farmers. The same discrimination was used in setting income taxes. Private farmers, by a law of 1950, were taxed on their gross income at rates from 4 to 25 percent, while collective farms paid a rate of 7 percent on their taxable income only (gross income minus the proceeds from compulsory deliveries and the cost of

* Decree No. 15 of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, issued January 28, 1957, and published in *Izvestia na Presidiuma na Narodnoto Sabranie* (Sofia), February 1, 1957.

Size of Collective Farms in Bulgaria by Number of Workers

Workers	Farms
Up to 50	1 percent
51 to 100	3
101 to 150	7
151 to 200	8
201 to 300	17
301 to 500	25
501 to 750	18
751 to 1,000	10
1,001 to 1,500	7
1,501 to 2,000	3
More than 2,000	1

Source: *Statistika* (Sofia), No. 4, July-August 1957. Figures include those able-bodied members "who are required to work the minimum number of labor days." Data for end of 1956.

seed and fodder). Moreover, collectives were exempt from taxes for the first two years of their existence.

Other pressures brought against the peasants have run the gamut of "administrative methods" from bribes and chicanery to imprisonment and threats. A recent refugee in the West has given the following account of the way in which a village in the province of Kolarovgrad was collectivized. When a first attempt failed to produce any result, the Party agitators proceeded to exploit the weaknesses of the individual peasants. The local politician was promised a job as president of the collective farm. Four other men were promised official positions on the farm. Three men who were behind in their taxes were told that their debts would be cleared. Seven men were forced to join with the threat that their sons would lose their jobs in nearby towns and villages unless they agreed. Four men were held by the police for several days until they signed up, and another was threatened with criminal action for a past offense. In the meantime the authorities broadcast greatly exaggerated reports on the progress of collectivization in nearby villages.

Other reports from Bulgarian exiles mention similar methods. Entrance requirements in the higher schools and special schools were changed so as to favor the children of collective farm members over those of other peasants. Private farmers were denied the right to cut wood in the nationalized forests. All sorts of devices were employed to create a bandwagon psychology, such as announcing that peasants who had left their villages in order to escape collectivization had joined up somewhere else. Peasants already in the collectives were enlisted in the campaign by playing on their jealousy of those who had remained independent.

These tactics have succeeded in bringing Bulgarian agriculture to the highest degree of collectivization outside the Soviet Union. This is in marked contrast to the practical abandonment of collective farming in Poland and Yugoslavia, and to its very slow growth in Czechoslovakia

(44 percent of the agricultural land), Hungary (less than 10 percent of the arable land) and Romania (15-20 percent of the arable land).

Most of Bulgaria's collectivization took place in the years 1950-1952 and 1955-1957. During the first period nearly 400,000 homesteads were amalgamated, and the methods used were much less inhibited than those described above. Early in 1951 riots broke out in the counties of Kula and Yablanitsa when peasants revolted and tried to leave the newly formed collectives. Armed forces had to be sent to the area. The disturbances forced the Party Central Committee to admit that the peasants had been harshly treated. A decree was issued placing the local officials under arrest and accusing them of "bureaucratic indifference to the needs of the peasants" and of using such tactics as "unlawful arrest" and "arbitrary fines." (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 19, 1951.)

The pace slackened between 1952 and 1955 while the regime consolidated its gains. During this time the number of collective farms actually declined, but this resulted from mergers and not from a loss of members. In October of 1955 the collectivized sector encompassed a little more than half the total arable land. Former Premier Chervenkov launched a new drive late in the year with the traditional Communist slogan, "We cannot sit on two chairs for very long." This campaign, formally abjuring all violence and proclaiming voluntary agreement as its principle, proceeded at a pace rivalling that of 1950. In April 1956 Anton Yugov, the new Premier, announced that 282,000 households had been brought into collectives since the beginning of the year, thus expanding the collective sector to 77 percent of the total number of households and to 75 percent of the arable land. The rest was largely a mopping-up operation, and by October 1957 the regime claimed that it had collectivized 86.5 percent of the land and more than 82 percent of the households (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, October 20). Those of the peasantry still remaining outside the collectives are in mountainous or hilly areas where large-scale farming of any sort is out of the question.

Size of Collective Farms in Bulgaria by Area of Arable Land

Dekares	Farms
Up to 1,000	2 percent
1,001 to 2,000	5
2,001 to 4,000	13
4,001 to 8,000	26
8,001 to 12,000	19
12,001 to 16,000	13
16,001 to 24,000	13
24,001 to 32,000	5
32,001 to 50,000	3
More than 50,000	1

Source: *Statistika* (Sofia), No. 4, July-August 1957. Data for end of 1956. A dekare is a tenth of a hectare, or about a quarter of an acre.



Peasants on a Romanian collective farm processing corn.
La Roumanie d'Aujourd'hui (Bucharest), January 1955

The Bulgarian collective farm (*Trudovo-Kooperativno Zemedelsko Stopanstvo* or "Labor Cooperative Farm") differs from the Russian *kolkhoz* in that its charter grants the members rights of ownership to the land they contribute, including the right to sell or mortgage it. The charter also entitles them to an income from the contributed land in the form of rent. In recent years these rights have been whittled down until they have little meaning in practice, and the regime is now beginning a campaign to abolish them altogether. First Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov wrote an editorial in *Pravda* (Moscow) on October 19, 1957, stating that the aim is to revise the collective farm charters gradually "so that the land will become a property of society as it is in the Soviet artel."

Czechoslovakia

"WHERE IS THE MISSING GRAIN? Why has it not been delivered?" Thus ran a complaint in *Rude Pravo* as the harvest of 1957 neared its end. The Party newspaper was pointing to the weak spot in Czechoslovakia's partly collectivized agriculture. As of September 15, about one-eighth of the required grain deliveries had not been made—not because of a poor harvest but because "much grain still remains in the farmers' barns, including grain that ought, by now, to have found its way into the State bulk delivery silos." The editorial attacked "those farmers who prefer to indulge in dubious speculations" instead of selling their grain to the State.

"These farmers know quite well that any grain they do not sell to the State can be fed to livestock and then turned into money 'under the counter'—above all, in the form of pork. Farmers conscious of their civic obligations realize, however, that the interests of society must always

take precedence and that whatever benefits our country and national economy must also benefit the farming industry and each farmer. Our country needs not only meat and milk, but also an adequate supply of grain." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], September 20, 1957.)

While this plea is not unusual in Czechoslovakia at harvest time, it points up the still unfinished struggle of the regime against private enterprise in the countryside. The attempt to collectivize agriculture has run into the same obstacle as elsewhere in Eastern Europe: the stubborn resistance of the peasant to all the pressures and entreaties of the State. Czechoslovak Party Secretary Antonin Novotny told his Central Committee in the summer of 1955: "The struggle against the old mode of thinking and for the building of a new Socialist society is not an easy and simple affair, especially with regard to the farming people. A particularly consistent struggle must be waged against their backwardness and their conservative outlook." (*Rude Pravo*, June 30, 1955.) The struggle so far has wavered back and forth, and if the setbacks have not been as great as those in Hungary neither have the Communists any success to rival that in Bulgaria.

Retreats and Rallies

DEVELOPMENTS SO FAR have passed through three stages. In the first stage, lasting from 1949 to mid-1953, the collective sector grew to include a third of the agricultural land. After Stalin's death a period of retrenchment began. President Zapotocky himself admitted that some of the tactics used had been overly harsh, and warned that forcing people into collectives was not the way to solve the agricultural problem. In a speech on August 1, 1953, he said:

"It is a big problem to set up agricultural collectives without consideration and irrespective of whether we have convinced those whom we are gaining for cooperative farming of the necessity of cooperative ideas. Therefore, the setting up of agricultural collectives by means of administrative measures, by order, by force, will not help us. Such collectives as we have created administratively and by force will only just manage to exist. Those people will not work properly and will never like the collectives. They will be of no use to us. For this reason we shall have to investigate the question of agricultural collectives." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], August 2, 1953.)

He then implied that peasants who wished to leave the collective farms would be free to do so, but warned at the same time that the Communists would not abandon their ultimate goal. "To those who think that they will improve their lot by running away from the collectives, we can say quite frankly: 'It will not help you. In a few years' time you will have to set up these farms again.'"

The effect of Zapotocky's words was to start a large-scale departure from the collectives, one that almost rivaled the mass exodus which was taking place in Hungary at the same time. In the course of two years the membership in collective farms dropped by 30 percent, and the area of collectively tilled land by almost 25 percent. For the Communists this was a period of retrenchment and review, and

Collectivization in Czechoslovakia

Date	Number of Collectives
Dec. 1949	28
Dec. 1952	5,848
June 1953	7,038
Dec. 1953	6,679
Dec. 1954	6,502
June 1955	6,478
Dec. 1955	6,795
July 1956	7,832
Dec. 1956	8,016
Oct. 1957	over 10,000

Sources: *Nova Mysl* (Prague), No. 11, 1954; *Rude Pravo* (Prague), Dec. 19, 1953, April 15, 1954, Feb. 19, 1955, July 1, 1955, Aug. 12, 1956, Sept. 14, 1956, Feb. 12, 1957; Radio Prague, Oct. 2, 1957.

The figures include collective farms of Type III and Type IV. Before 1952 the great majority of the "Socialist cooperatives" were Type I and Type II, in which the members retained ownership of their land, implements and livestock. These were not really collective farms, and in recent years they have been practically abandoned. By the end of 1956 more than 98 percent of the "cooperative farms" were Types III and IV. Type III retains a vestige of ownership in the form of land rent and is similar to the Bulgarian TKZS and the Romanian CAP. Type IV, not yet very widespread, abolishes private ownership and is like the Soviet *kolkhoz*.

they devoted their energies to more fundamental economic problems. The years of Stalinism had resulted in what was frankly admitted to be a distorted economy: an overgrowth of heavy industry accompanied by shortages of fuel, power and raw materials and by a stagnant agriculture. The effort to collectivize farming had not been a genuine attempt to improve agriculture but a doctrinaire pursuit of Soviet policies of twenty years before. Premier Viliam Siroky, in a speech on September 15, 1953, described the basic problem as follows:

"The serious lag in agricultural production causes incessant difficulties in supplying workers with food, the light and food industries with agricultural raw materials, and is a serious obstacle in raising workers' living standards more rapidly. While in 1953 industrial production will be twice that of 1948, agricultural production in this period will have increased about one third and will still be below prewar levels."

To repair this situation the Communists set about channelling more money and resources into the neglected agricultural sector. Among other things, they raised the prices paid to farmers for their products, reduced the compulsory delivery quotas, and extended financial assistance to the struggling collectives. The Tenth Party Congress in June 1954 underscored the agricultural problem again, and set forth a program to raise farm yields by from 10 to 30 percent in the next three years.

On the political front the Party found itself in a contradictory position. While continuing to stress the economic importance of large-scale farming and the ultimate necessity of collectivizing agriculture, its spokesmen for-

swore any intention of imposing this solution by force. Evidently the Party leaders felt that they could not impel the mass of the peasantry into collectives in a short space of time without grave political risk. If the process was to be a long-term one then it was important not to alienate the large body of independent farmers whose energetic labors were essential to the national economy. In an address to the National Assembly on December 13, 1954, Premier Siroky castigated elements in the Party who, clinging to traditional Communist methods, had failed to grasp the new policy.

"There are those who have shamefully violated the principle of voluntary membership in collective farms and who have taken refuge in methods of administrative and economic pressure. There are those who regard the worker-peasant alliance as an alliance between the workers and the collective farmers, and who do not regard independent small and medium farmers as allies of the working class. . . . They frequently claim that support for the productive efforts of independent small and medium farmers leads to a strengthening of capitalist elements in the countryside and a strengthening of prejudices favoring small-scale production, and that it represents a retreat from rural Socialism. These people do not understand that the collective farms are not being developed against the farmers, but with them and in their own interest. They do not understand that support for private farmers is a condition for the success of rural Socialization." (*Rude Pravo*, December 14, 1954.)

The Third Stage


The period of retrenchment ended in the middle of 1955. At a meeting of the Central Committee on June 29-30, First Party Secretary Antonin Novotny inveighed against the "stagnation" in the growth of collectives and announced that the Party would "embark on a systematic persuasion drive to convince smallholders and medium farmers of the need to join collectives and to establish new collectives." (*Rude Pravo*, June 30, 1955.) He added that the "persuasion campaign" would be concentrated on medium farmers—those having from 5 to 15 hectares—since these had the most land and produced a substantial part of the total product.

In the two years that followed, collectivization slowly mounted. In August 1957 Premier Siroky was able to announce that "since the July 1955 meeting of the Central

Distribution of Agricultural Land in Czechoslovakia (Percent)

Government-held land	17
Collective farms	34
Private farms	49
Under 2 hectares	8
2-15 hectares	34
Over 15 hectares	7

Sources: Information published in the Czechoslovak press as of August 1, 1957. By September 30 the land in collective farms was said to have reached 44 percent.



A propaganda photo, showing the large fields and mechanization which the regimes claim to be among the advantages of collectivization. *Czechoslovak Life* (Prague), April 1955

Committee, when the Party stepped up its efforts for further [collectivization], the number of collectives has increased by 2,069—that is, nearly 32 percent—and the collectively tilled agricultural land by 438,000 hectares—that is, by 25 percent.” He did not point to the fact that in terms of membership and total land the collective sector had still not surpassed the size attained in 1953 before Zapotocky’s famous speech. He emphasized instead that the “Socialist sector” in agriculture—the collectives, the State farms and other government-operated farms—now included more than 50 percent of the country’s agricultural land.*

* According to the Central Committee’s “Letter to the People” (*Rude Pravo*, October 18, 1957), the collectivized sector had reached 3,229,716 hectares by September 30, or 44 percent of the agricultural land. Similarly, the “Socialist sector” had been extended to 61 percent of the arable land.

Siroky also addressed himself to the central problem of the regime’s agricultural policy, the practical difficulty of raising farm production while simultaneously pressing the important segment of middle peasants into collectives. The Second Five Year Plan, he noted, called for raising production 30 percent by 1960. He warned that collectives set up in 1959 and 1960 “will hardly be able to contribute by their production to the attainment of the . . . targets in the Second Five Year Plan.” Consequently the battle of collectivization would have to be fought and won in 1957 and 1958.

Neither he nor any other Communist spokesman has indicated what the immediate goal for collectivization is. The National Party Conference in June 1956 declared that the “Socialist sector” in agriculture ought to attain an “overwhelming preponderance” over the private sector by 1960, and Siroky repeated this declaration without defin-

ing it. While Party leaders have refrained from committing themselves to a precise target, a writer in the Ministry of Agriculture's newspaper *Zemědělské Noviny* (October 5, 1956) said: "The Second Five Year Plan assumes that in 1960 the collectives will farm 86.6 percent of the agricultural and 87.6 percent of the arable land of regionally-planned enterprises." This implies a target of roughly 70 percent of the country's land and a reduction of the private sector to little more than 10 percent of the land.*

Independent Peasants

At the time of Siroky's speech in August private farmers still had nearly half the agricultural land. The most important segment of private farmers, and those the regime must overcome before it can claim any real victory for collectivization, are the so-called small and medium farmers—those holding from 2 to 15 hectares. There were 447,000 of them in August, and they held about a third of the agricultural land. Their economic importance is even greater: in 1954 this segment supplied the State with more than half of the total deliveries of grain, meat, milk, eggs and potatoes (*Rude Pravo*, October 5, 1955). While the total number of small and medium farmers has declined since then, they are still so important to the country's economy that Siroky's concern was quite justified. It is precisely this group of the peasantry that has formed the solid obstacle to Communist agrarian policy elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

Another segment of unconverted peasants were the 810,000 proprietors of less than two hectares. According to Siroky, half a million of them were industrial workers and craftsmen living in the villages but not dependent upon farming as their major source of income. While the holdings of this segment were small—totalling only 550,000 hectares—the fact that so many of its members are "workers" rather than farmers has been a source of political embarrassment for the regime. "A large part of them," said Siroky, "are also Party members, and in a great number of villages they form a majority in the Party organization, devotedly carrying out tasks in the Party and in national committees [municipal governments]. They are a very significant part of the working class and ought to play a very active role in the advance of collectives." But far from being a spearhead of Socialism in the countryside, these part-time farmers give the regime more trouble than any other element. Party workers in the Jihlava district of Moravia have complained of their indifference.

"We don't know what to do with these so-called metal and construction farmers. We call an evening meeting. Not only do they fail to come but they dissuade the others too. A smith from Hojkov working in the neighboring Borsov quarry is a case in point. He says: 'We don't need anything, we are well off.' And in general he says that

so long as he is in the community there will be no collective farm." (*Prace* [Prague], January 11, 1957.)

This group has grown in numbers in consequence of the postwar land reform and with the growth of the towns. "In 1930," runs one account, "approximately 88,000 small farmers . . . were employed outside of agriculture in Slovakia. In 1956 there were 148,692 of them, along with 83,575 family members. . . . This means that altogether—in industry, in transportation, in building and in other branches—we have over 232,000 farmers [in Slovakia]. . . . These small owners live in the villages and carry small-enterprise thinking and psychology into the factories."

"The ideology of the small owner infects a part of the working class and the intelligentsia. Instead of carrying the environment of the plants to the villages, we frequently witness the opposite phenomenon: plants being influenced by a village, small-ownership environment. The intelligentsia, particularly that part which lives in the villages, is succumbing to the petty bourgeois manner of life; the ideology of the little house and small farm is characteristic of a considerable part of our intelligentsia." (*Ekonomický časopis* [Bratislava], No. 6, 1956.)

The remaining group of private farmers, holding about 15 percent of the privately-owned land, were those with more than 15 hectares. Included in this small group were the so-called "kulaks" or "village exploiters"—i.e., those of a presumably capitalist mentality whom the Communists treat as enemies of the people. The Party's program for the kulak has been one of economic restriction and social ostracism, intended to squeeze the kulaks to such a degree that they would cease to have any future as a "class," and to split away the broad stratum of "medium peasants" who would then, presumably, be drawn into the collectives.

The Picture

The hold of the State on the countryside was still perilous and weak, encompassing little more than a fifth of the peasant households. The collectives, in fact, were islands in a sea of private enterprise. The government had yet to claim total collectivization of even a single village. *Rude Pravo* observed on August 14 that in communities having collective farms there were still 735,000 independent farmers outside of the collectives. In such villages 43.5 percent of the small and medium farmers had refused to enter the local collective, and so had 66.1 percent of the very small farmers (those with less than 2 hectares). At the same time, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, about 37 percent of Czechoslovakia's villages had no collective farm at all (*Zemědělské Noviny*, August 10, 1957). In the Czech regions 44 percent of the villages had no collectives and in Slovakia 66 percent had none.* With such a tenuous grasp upon the countryside the State could obviously not afford to dally in its collectivizing, and Siroky's

* "Regionally-planned" enterprises include collectives and private farms, in distinction to "centrally-planned" enterprises which consist of State farms and other publically owned farms. The latter now control 17 percent of the agricultural land or 1,250,000 hectares. Assuming that the total area of agricultural land remains at 7,250,000 hectares, the target for collective farms would be 86.6 percent of 6,000,000 hectares, or 5,196,000 hectares. On September 30, 1957, the collectives were said to have 3,229,716 hectares.

* The percentages of villages having collectives were as follows, by region: Prague, 68; Ceske Budejovice, 86; Pilsen, 67; Karlovy Vary, 58; Usti nad Labem, 63; Liberec, 54; Hradec Kralove, 49; Pardubice, 56; Jihlava, 70; Brno, 68; Olomouc, 67; Gottwaldov, 62; Ostrava, 68; Bratislava, 86; Nitra, 71; Banska Bystrica, 60; Zilina, 37; Kosice, 56; Presov, 20.

urgent plea was a recognition that the drive must be pushed hard if it is to succeed.

How They Get Them In

IN ITS CAMPAIGN of "persuasion" the Party and Government use every means available short of outright force. The official policy of avoiding force does not result from any moral imperative but from the simple recognition, often stated, that the national economy cannot afford a demoralized peasantry. As President Zapotocky remarked in his signal speech at Klicava Dam in the summer of 1953, "the establishment of collectives by administrative measures, by order, by force, will not help us. . . . Those people will not work properly and will never like the collectives. They will be of no use to us." But the pressure upon Party workers to speed up collectivization is so intense that many of them are driven to the use of any measure that will show results.

The official press continues to excoriate activists who resort to "impermissible methods." The Party monthly *Nova Mysl* confessed in May, 1957, that the collectivizing of a village "often becomes a question of prestige" on the part of local functionaries, and therefore "the farmers are not properly handled, the voluntary principle is violated, kulaks are liquidated in an administrative way, etc." The Slovak Commissioner of Agriculture, M. J. Chudik, exhorted Party workers in August as follows: "It must be emphasized: Comrades, do trust the small and medium farmers; do not dictate, but advise them; stop ordering them about, but guide them, and success will be yours." (*Predvoj* [Prague], August 22, 1957.) And the Bratislava paper *Pravda* warned on August 9: "There is no place in this drive for intimidation or pressure, as some individuals seem to think. . . . A good farmer loathes disorder, lies, or the insidious tactics sometimes employed by local officials."

Economic Pressure

But the regime has other methods of getting its way, and the peasant who wishes to keep his independence is forced to pay for it. Part of the price is a lower return for the produce he sells than that obtained by the collective farm. Although both are subject to the same system of prices, the private farmer has to deliver a larger portion of his crop at the low compulsory delivery prices than does the collective farm, with the result that he is less able to take advantage of the higher prices paid for above-quota deliveries. An example of this discrimination against the private farmer was given in *Zemedelske Noviny* on July 4, 1957, where average quota deliveries of meat, milk and eggs were estimated as follows (in value per hectare of land):

For collective farms:	931.50 Koruny
For private farms:	
2—3.5 hectares	1,049.90
3.5—5 hectares	1,164.00
5—10 hectares	1,270.70

Thus the quotas for medium farmers averaged more than



"On the cattle co-op farm [i.e., collective stock-breeding farm] at Vitinka, near Plzen, all calves from birth are reared individually out-of-doors. This co-op is now in its third year."

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), April 1955

a third higher than for collective farms. Since deliveries over these amounts are bought by the State at higher "bulk purchase" prices (ranging from 50 percent higher for beef to 100 percent higher for milk and eggs), the quantitative difference in quotas amounts to a substantial loss of income for the private farmer.*

Compulsory deliveries are a form of tax. The Communists apply a financial leverage through the property tax as well. Dr. Bedrich Spacil, Deputy Minister of Finance, has declared candidly that the property tax is designed to foster the regime's political goals.

"The chief principles of the law on agricultural taxation are as follows: to encourage the entrance of small and medium farmers into collective farms . . . ; to tax rich farmers and kulaks in such a way that their economic position in the village will be gradually and systematically weakened; to adjust the taxes of wavering medium farmers in such a way that the taxes do not serve as a barrier to their voluntary entrance into collective farms." (*Pravnik* [Prague], March 14, 1956.)

Even the social insurance system has been pressed into service. Members of collective farms receive hospitalization insurance, while private farmers do not. Premiums for retirement insurance (pensions) average about three times as high for private farmers as for collective farm members, and the regime is less generous with private farmers who fall behind. At the end of 1955 the rural population was said to owe more than a billion *koruny* in social insurance payments, and over 90 percent of this sum was due from private farmers. "For example, in the Czech regions the unpaid premiums of private farmers average 1,408.38 *koruny*"—i.e., considerably more than a month's income (*Rude Pravo*, October 1, 1956).

* The official prices for 1957 were published in *Uredni List* (Official Gazette) on December 10, 1956.

The economic prod was strengthened in July 1955 by a government decree granting a moratorium to peasants on their back taxes and certain other debts so long as they belonged to a collective farm.* This was followed in August by another decree making it easier to merge the properties of private farmers into a collective even when they do not choose to join, giving them substitute plots of land elsewhere.** While formerly such a measure had required the consent of a majority of the farmers in the community, the new decree makes it possible to consolidate properties "upon the suggestion of the [local] collective farm or another enterprise of the Socialist sector, or where special reasons of general interest call for it." Thus a farmer who chooses to remain independent may be forced to give up his land in return for other land which he feels to be less desirable.

Still another decree of September 1955 made it possible to displace farmers who failed to exploit their land "properly."*** This measure was said to be aimed at "the land of small and medium farmers who are not capable of fulfilling their production and delivery quotas because of illness, old age or lack of manpower" and at "the badly managed holdings of kulaks." Supposedly the measure was intended to bring fallow land into cultivation by assigning it under contract to those who would till it, and only as a last resort was the land to be assigned to collective farms (*Zemedske Noviny*, December 9, 1955). But in the hands of local Party activists the decree became an instrument of "persuasion," and the more assiduous of them began to discover large numbers of laggard farmers. An editorial in the Ministry of Agriculture's newspaper complained in typical Communist fashion that local organs were using the measure improperly:

"I do not hesitate to say that . . . the organs of the agricultural administration in the district of Sedlcany have used the above law as a form of 'subtle' or 'legal' pressure on farmers. Just imagine: five or six farmers are directly threatened by it, while others are threatened indirectly—being offered land which they are unable to cultivate. The functionaries of the district speak eloquently about the necessity of fulfilling delivery quotas from the allotted land and offer the farmers fifteen minutes to decide: either the law or the collective farm. Farmers are summoned by the security organs for unjustified hearings at the district center. And the result? A collective farm is established—without thorough preparation. The collective, for example, does not have any buildings because its members are mainly pensioners." (*Zemedske Noviny*, May 31, 1956.)

Other Pressure

In November 1956, after the harvest was safely in, the press and radio resounded with a public appeal. Cast in the form of a "Government Letter to Farmers" (Radio Prague, November 17), it called upon all farmers to "strive to develop large-scale Socialist production, start

* Government Ordinance of July 6, 1955, No. 36 *Sbirka Zakonu*.

** Government Ordinance of August 10, 1955, No. 47 *Sbirka Zakonu*.

*** Government Ordinance of September 21, 1955, No. 50 *Sbirka Zakonu*.

new collective farms, increase the membership and area of existing collectives and consolidate them economically with even greater speed and determination than hitherto."

"The government of the Republic is convinced that it is by developing the collective farm movement that you can best carry on the progressive traditions of the Czech and Slovak farmers, traditions going back to the most ancient times in the history of our nations. It is in this way that you can best help to strengthen and consolidate your people's democratic country."

The message reviewed at some length the standard arguments for collectivization, emphasizing chiefly the advantages of large-scale production.

"Large-scale production makes it possible not only to produce far more per hectare, but also per worker. Experience has also shown that [it] makes it possible to expand greatly that portion of the output which is sold off the farm, without prejudice to the personal consumption of the farmer. It is because of these advantages that large-scale agricultural production is winning the day all over the world. In this connection it must be remembered, however, that large-scale agricultural production in the capitalist countries entails considerable disadvantages for the working farmer. In the United States, as a result of the sharp competition of the big farm, practically one-quarter of that country's ten million farms have had to go into liquidation."

Promising that "the government will continue to give farmers all possible aid in expanding collective farms," the letter stressed that collectivization was the basis of the regime's economic policy. "We would be unable to fulfill the tasks of the Second Five Year Plan with small-scale production. To implement and exceed the tasks of the . . . Plan and to raise further the living standard of the nation presupposes a firm decision by all working farmers in the country to embark upon the road of [collectivization]." It appealed both to the farmers' patriotism and to their self-interest:

"The Government has no doubt that the farmers and their wives—conscious of their responsibility for the future and the happiness of their families and of our country—will, as true patriots, consider these problems and find their way into the collectives in order to build up, together with the collective farm members, our Socialist large-scale production. This is the most reliable way to achieve a further and lasting improvement of the living standard of working farmers."

The trade unions have also been thrown into the campaign. The several hundred thousand industrial workers who still maintain small farms are important in numbers if not in economic weight, and their mass collectivization would help to isolate the independent peasants. The Presidium of the Central Council of Trade Unions undertook to play a part in this with a resolution adopted in April 1957, requiring the member unions to "strengthen the political and educational work among the workers living in villages so that they may contribute . . . to the setting up of collective farms and to the development of those already existing. . . ." (*Odborar* [Prague], May 1957.)

Who Will Persuade the Persuaders?


EVENTS IN POLAND, Hungary and Yugoslavia have shown that not all East European Communists believe in collective farming. Thunder in the top echelons of the Party often becomes a mere whisper in the villages, where the real work of collectivizing is centered, and top Party leaders spend much time in whipping the rank-and-file to greater activity. An editorial in *Rude Pravo* on July 21, 1957, observed that Party functionaries in one district seemed to think "that farmers can be made to join collectives without agitation and without political work," and inquired: "Where do these ideas have their roots?"

"Mainly in the fact that several functionaries, members of the Party and of national committees [local govern-

ments], do not like to agitate, do not like to convince farmers and to win them over to the idea of collective farming. The reason? Either they are not convinced themselves of the necessity of building collective farms, and then of course they cannot convince others, or they do not feel 'strong enough' to answer all the questions of the farmers."

An even stronger blast came from *Zivot Strany* (Prague, July 1957, No. 14)—the organ of the Party Central Committee—scoring the level of agitation in the regions of Hradec Kralove, Gottwaldov and Nitra. "There are Party members," it charged, "whose attitude toward collectivization is downright bad."

"Such is the situation, for instance, in Melnik. . . . Here even the chairman of the local Party organization is not



A propaganda cartoon hailing the announcement that "50% of agricultural land is in the Socialist sector." Sign above: "Let's advance with enthusiasm—half of it is done!"

Front page of *Dikobraz* (Prague), August 15, 1957

convinced about the advantages of a collective farm. Nor did the District Party Committee contribute anything to bring about a unity of opinion among local Party members. It is the same way in Polesovice. . . . The local Party organization here numbers 70 members plus 120 registered members of factory cells. Yet only very few of them are convinced that the establishment of collective farms is the proper way. . . . One of the reasons is undoubtedly the fact that only one percent of the . . . members are farmers."

Romania

WHILE THE ROMANIAN COMMUNISTS have avoided the losses and retreats of other Satellite regimes, they cannot claim any impressive success. The great Transylvanian wheat fields have not yet fallen to the Communist cadres. In August, 1957, collective farms covered perhaps 15-20 percent of the arable land, and spokesmen of the regime preferred not to deal in very precise figures. Speaking last August 23 on the 13th anniversary of Romania's "liberation," Deputy Premier Emil Bodnarus said that 37 percent of the arable land now belonged to the "Socialist Sector." He was including not only the collective farms but also State Farms and a large number of "agricultural associations"—covering 5-10 percent of the land—whose members are still independent peasants. Thus Romania not only trails Czechoslovakia in the Communist procession, but has not even reached the degree of collectivization attained by Hungary before its Revolt.

The regime has experimented with all of the tactics employed elsewhere in the Satellites. After the first collectivization drive had spent itself in 1951 the Party turned to a new approach and inaugurated the Agricultural Association. This is a relatively loose relationship among independent peasants who combine only to the extent of common ploughing, harvesting and marketing, while retaining full ownership and control of their property. The regime encourages the Associations as an initial step by the peasant on his journey into "Socialism" and calls them "intermediate forms which convince the broad masses of working peasants of the advantages of working together and make it easier for them to advance on the path of Socialist agriculture."* After 1951 the number of these groups grew much more rapidly than the number of collective farms, until by July 1956 there were about 7,000 associations as against only 2,400 collective farms. Taken together, the two forms of organization included about 16 percent of the arable land and 17 percent of the peasant households.** There were also several thousand crop associations devoted to the production of specific industrial crops.

Looking at this rather unpromising situation, the Party Central Committee decided in the summer of 1956 to intro-

* First Party Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej to the Second Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party, *Scinteia* (Bucharest), December 24, 1955.

** These figures are estimates. The official statement, published in *Scinteia* on July 28, 1956, said only that there were a total of 9,436 collective farms and peasant associations, with 1,703,507 hectares and 577,239 households.

The Price of Independence

HOW THE STATE discriminates in favor of collective farms and against the private farmer is shown by the following comparison, taken from the Czechoslovak newspaper *Osvetova Prace* (Prague), September 1, 1956.

"Rudolf Zemka, a farmer of Cachice, house number 363, farms on 3.52 hectares of land with his wife and four children. He fulfilled his [obligatory] deliveries 100 percent and received for them a total of 6,045.30 *Koruny*. He also sold a steer on the free market . . . for 6,250 *Koruny*. For his year's work he received a total of 12,295.30 *Koruny*. . . . From this he pays for taxes, fertilizers, maintenance of tools, etc.

"Vincent Imriska, a collective farm member from Cachice, is a tireless worker, and not even a snow storm keeps him away from work. He joined the collective as a 3 hectare farmer. In 1955 he completed 638 work units for the collective and received for his work the following compensation:

Payment in kind	2,445.00 <i>Koruny</i>
Deposits	6,381.00
Additional payments	9,572.85
Sale of hogs above quota .	2,477.90

Profit on 125.75 kg. sugar 779.65

Total income 21,656.40

In addition to the above income, collective farmer V. Imriska has his private plot, does not have to pay taxes, and is not burdened by expenses for seeds, artificial fertilizer and maintenance of equipment."

This kind of logic has failed to convince many independent farmers of the "superiority of collective farming." The Ministry of Agriculture recognized their objections in an article published by its newspaper *Zemedelske Noviny* on December 22, 1956. "You are right," the paper admitted, "in arguing that the collective farm does not produce as much per hectare of land as you do. You point out that the collective farm has much more support from the State." The article tried to justify this favoritism with the following argument. "Can you blame the State if, though supporting the private farmer, it gives more and more support to collectives from year to year? The State correctly sees in the collective farms the future of our agriculture, and therefore it is quite justified in giving collective farms greater support than it gives to the private sector."

duce a new form of collective farm. Called the "Cooperative for Agricultural Production with Rent," this form preserves the appearance of private ownership while destroying the substance of it. As described in *Scinteia*, September 29, 1956, the members contribute all their land to the farm but retain title to it. They also contribute their cattle, tools and a sum in cash for each hectare, but are paid back in installments for the animals and tools. The farm's output—after obligatory deductions—is distributed among the members, 75 percent of it according to days worked and 25 percent of it according to land contributed. Those wishing to withdraw from the collective are to receive the "equivalent" of the land they contribute plus half of the money. Since a peasant who leaves the collective has no right to his tools, livestock and other equipment, nor to the same land he brought in, the CAP is really no more than a gesture to the peasant's sense of property.

There is no evidence that the CAP—which is practically identical to the Bulgarian type of collective—has proved any more popular in Romania than the standard *kolkhoz* form. The regime has not seen fit to publish more than the most general sort of statistics, lumping the CAP's together with other collectives and associations. These were said to include altogether about 28 percent of Romania's arable land in October, 1957.* At least five percent of the land belonged to the agricultural associations, leaving at the most no more than 23 percent to the collectives and CAP's.

Thus the task was far from done. The Romanian Communists, like the Czechoslovak, have yet to overcome the resistance of the middle peasants who are the pillar of private farming in Eastern Europe. When First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej expounded the Second Five Year Plan two years ago, he said that by the end of 1960 the "Socialist sector" would have to supply 60 to 70 percent of the marketed produce. The magnitude of this undertaking appears when it is seen that the independent peasants still comprised more than 93 percent of the farm population at the time of his speech, and accounted for more than 80 percent of total grain deliveries.** At the same time Gheorghiu-Dej called for an increase in grain production from about 11 million tons to 15 millions tons and a 9 percent increase in the area of cultivated land.

Since 1953 the Romanian Party has disavowed tactics of force against the peasantry and has, like the other Satellite regimes, cautioned its organizers to use only "per-



Women workers on an Albanian collective farm.

Per Bujqesine Socialiste (Tirana), July 1957

suation." The exhortations have been backed by the same apparatus of economic pressure described earlier: higher taxes, higher delivery quotas, lower income for private farms than for collective farms. But in the meantime the currents of popular dissatisfaction have driven the Party into concessions which may tend to weaken those pressures. After the disastrous harvest of 1956 and the Hungarian Revolt, the Central Committee decided to abandon much of the compulsory delivery system in favor of a State purchasing scheme, in which the State will ostensibly play the part of a commercial buyer. Since the contract prices paid farmers for their crops will be somewhat higher than they were for compulsory deliveries, it follows that the independent peasants may find themselves better off than before. In his report to the Central Committee, Gheorghiu-Dej said:

"... the system of compulsory quotas is a combination of the commercial form of exchange with the form of a tax on agricultural products. . . . In recent years the system . . . began to make the development of agriculture difficult. The compulsory delivery quotas and the level of permanent prices were not a sufficient incentive for the peasantry. . . . The State will insure its central food supply through procurement and contracting by purchasing agri-

* According to Radio Bucharest, October 25, the "cooperatist-Socialist sector"—not including State Farms—contained 2,761,478 hectares of arable land. The percentage given above assumes that the total arable area was 9,700,000 hectares.

** Gheorghiu-Dej said that members of collective farms comprised 5.5 percent of the farm population, employees of State farms less than 1 percent, members of agricultural associations 5.8 percent, small peasants 45.2 percent, medium peasants 40.5 percent and kulaks 2 percent (*Scinteia*, December 24, 1955). Information on grain deliveries was given by Minister of Agriculture Marin Stancu in *Probleme Agricole* (Bucharest), January 1957. The "Socialist sector" together with the agricultural associations accounted for 21 percent of the deliveries of cereals and leguminous plants. For wheat and rye the percentage was 26, but for corn it was only 15. If the contribution of the associations were subtracted, leaving only the State farms and collectives, the figures would be smaller.

Distribution of Arable Land in Romania

	(Percent)			
	1951	1953	1955	1957 (Oct.)
State-held land	9.4	14.6	13.5	43
Collective farms	2.9	7.7	8.2	
Associations	2.5	4.0	
Independent farms	87.7	75.2	74.3	57

Sources: Based on figures published in the Romanian press. Data for October 1957 are from a statement by First Party Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej printed in *Scinteia* (Bucharest), Oct. 30, 1957.



Note: "In a collective farm in Luliakovo [Bulgaria], the women do almost all of the field work, but no woman has a leading position on the farm."

Caption: "What? Put women in the leading jobs? Yes, well, but who will do the work?"

Narodna Delo (Varna), July 21, 1957

cultural products at a price agreed upon with the agricultural producers. The compulsory element—the element of a tax-like nature—is eliminated . . . so that between industry and agriculture, between the working class and the working peasantry, there will be a relationship of exchange, of commerce." (*Scintea*, December 30, 1956.)

As of January 1, 1957, compulsory deliveries were abolished for the following crops: wheat, rye, corn, sunflower seed and other grains, potatoes, hay, and cow and sheep milk. This means a substantial lightening of the load upon the peasant, although its degree will depend on the prices he is able to get from the State under the new contracting system. It is not yet clear just how far the reform goes toward eliminating the discrimination between private and collective farming, but any improvement in the lot of the private farmer is not likely to speed his feet upon the path of "Socialism."

Albania

FAITHFUL TO DOCTRINE in everything they do, the Albanian Communists established collective farms as long ago as 1946. But their number grew slowly until mid-1955, when there were 128 of them. About that time a wave of collectivization began all over the Satellite area, and the

Albanian regime followed suit with an intensive campaign that raised the number of collectives to 308 at the end of 1955. By the end of 1956 there were 881 of them, covering 30.8 percent of the arable land and including 37,167 households. By midsummer of 1957 the regime claimed to have 1,432 collectives, covering 46.3 percent of the arable land (*Radio Tirana*, July 27, 1957).

The Second Five Year Plan calls for the collectivization of 70 percent of the arable land by 1960—not a big task in a country where less than 20 percent of the land is arable. Mountainous Albania has never been self-sufficient in agriculture. Food was rationed until November 1, 1957, when the regime announced that increases in farm production and Soviet help had made it possible to abolish rationing. (See *East Europe*, Dec. 1957, p. 49.)

The Baltic States

THE HISTORY OF COLLECTIVIZATION in the formerly independent countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania demonstrates again that force is the midwife of the collective farm. The Soviets had no need to appease a hostile peasantry, as did the Satellite Communists. Moreover, the collectivization drives were planned and administered from Moscow, leaving no chance for intra-Party conflict to affect the issue as it did in Poland and Hungary.

When the Soviets first occupied the Baltic States in 1940, they immediately carried out a land reform in the classic Communist style. This involved nationalizing the land and redistributing it so that no peasant had more than 30 hectares. It was about to be followed by collectivization when the German invasion of 1941 drove the Soviets out. When they returned in 1944 and 1945 the process began again. Intensive collectivization started in Latvia in 1946, in Estonia in 1947 and in Lithuania in 1948. While the method of approach was similar to that used in the Satellites—propaganda, economic pressure through taxes and compulsory deliveries, and "anti-kulak" measures—the Soviet authorities did not hesitate to use all of the power at their command. In each country more than 90 percent of the peasant households were collectivized within three years, a rate which in itself implies that very forceful measures were employed. Numerous refugee sources report that an important factor in breaking the resistance of the peasants was the mass deportations which occurred in Lithuania in May 1948 and in Estonia and Latvia in March 1949, during which tens of thousands of peasants were carried off to far parts of the USSR.

The next and final article in this series will analyze the economic consequences of Communist agricultural policies in Eastern Europe.

"Anna, The Comrade of the District"

by Kiril Toromanski

From *Literaturn Front* (Sofia), July 18, 1957

The somewhat fictionalized report below is one of the rare examples of journalistic ferment to see publication in Bulgaria, where, as in Romania, Albania and, to a degree, Czechoslovakia, the Polish and pre-Revolt Hungarian thaw has not been allowed to evince itself. Following the article, an account of the subsequent bitter attacks on the author is indication of the methods used by the regime to control its critics. Little is known about Kiril Toromanski.

ONE EVENING at early twilight, when the fields seemed to melt into the golden reflection of the sunset, I walked along the muddy road tracks toward the Gatovska Machine Tractor Station. In the distance I could see faint outlines of the sheds, gas tanks, and the repair workshop, slouching on the horizon like huge grey buffalos. As I approached I saw a woman sitting on a pile of boards. I was still some distance from her, and her back was toward me, but the sight of her forlorn figure gave me a strange feeling. She was wearing a brown threadbare jacket and a black shirt. Her hair was pure white and she had a scarf which had fallen onto her shoulders. . . .

"Anna Parvanova, is that you?"

The woman was startled and turned abruptly; a green quilted coat fell from her hands. Yes, it was Anna Parvanova, the Technical Secretary of the county Party committee. The sight of her face shocked me. It was the same face—old and tired, yet with traces of former beauty. She had a strange look of decisiveness and quiet sorrow, the face of a person who has worked and suffered many years without finding solace for her restless soul. Her eyes were burning—perhaps from the sunset, or from some inner fire. I recalled how, a year ago, she sat at the committee in a



The president of a Bulgarian collective farm.

Bulgaria (Sofia), No. 1, 1956

black apron, her stained hands busy with her work, instructions and letters scattered on her desk.

"Anna Parvanova, what wind brought you here?"

I sat beside her on the boards. . . . For a long time we didn't speak—we sat watching the sunset. But we had shared too many memories and long talks, and unconsciously our thoughts drifted into the past.

She held her scarf in one hand and her coat in the other, talking, then stopping suddenly to look toward the yard of the station, as though waiting for someone. . . .

"I was too restless to stay home. . . . How can I live surrounded by four walls! I sit, sometimes trying to read a book, sometimes taking out my needles to knit—but the truth is, I nearly always sit without doing anything. I have neither hands nor heart for work! I go to the window, scratch the frost on the glass to see outside, and do nothing. But in my heart I never surrendered to loneliness and despair. No, there was still strength in Anna Parvanova! I took the road to the Gatovska MTS and here I am. I must be closer to Vladik now. He is like a wounded bird these days; ready for flight, anxious to spread his wings, but before he could fly they pecked him. It is only a year since he became chief agronomist—and 'reprimanded with final warning' is already on his Party dossier. In those first days after the punishment he was filled with confusion and despair. Later, as his emotions calmed, only sorrow remained on his face. Oh, I am so afraid for my son! Vlahov, the Party Secretary of the station, is different. He, too, is young, but he is harder. Punishment seemed only to fan the fire within him. . . .

"I have come to them—to stay a day or two. Am I not a mother? I want to embrace them both, to look into their

eyes, to say, Courage! Courage, my dears! Listen to your hearts. Look to the people. Injustice does not last long.

"But why do I tell you all this? You already know about Semov. Yes, after the plenum an iron ring seemed to encircle the Party committee. One could scarcely breathe. Perhaps after all the things Vladik and Vlahov disclosed he knew that the ground was crumbling from under him. Oh, I will tell you, I felt sad and sick when I looked at Semov. The face of my old Comrade melted away long ago. Now, pale, with closely cropped hair, his eyes rimmed with dark circles, he rushes quickly into the room—are they talking against him, plotting and criticizing? He sees an enemy in everyone—always snooping into the past of committee people. He has turned into a pen-pusher, a careerist. In front of me I see the shadow of a hardened petit bourgeois, covetous of power, high position, and prestige. Where is the man I shared life and death with in the early years of First Secretary Semov? Now, what I see is a mere bureaucrat, a careerist with all the trimmings. . . .

"The summer passed, then fall and winter. Semov had lost all desire for progress in the district. He settled down in his post and his position—and rolled up his sleeves only to protect them.

"All this time, whenever he passed me, he looked at me as though I were a stranger. Or more correctly, he did not look at me at all. He did not want to see me. But I did not need to be seen; I did not want his attention. You must agree, though, it is somehow offensive—together we had faced bullets, and now. . . . He would open the door, hand me some instruction, and always his eyes would look away.

"In sixty copies . . .

"An hour later: 'All right, is it ready?'

"'All right!' The blood rushes to my head; everything becomes dark. What a way to speak! What kind of an attitude!

"At other times, during office meetings, my hand would become numb from writing and I would stop to rest a moment. He seemed to wait for that moment.

"The Technical Secretary is not supposed to sleep, write down everything!"

"Why should I stay in the committee any longer? To be humiliated, to watch my former Comrade decay, to have my heart torn?

"One day I entered Semov's office. He sat in the middle of stacks of newspapers and did not lift his eyes.

"Comrade Semov, I can't stand it here any longer. I am leaving.' I placed my resignation on his desk. The newspapers moved; Semov raised his head.

"What? He smiled maliciously. 'No one will let you go. Leaving! Just like that. From the outside it will be easy to slander, to fight against Semov, just as your son and the other one. . . . No! Here! Here you will stay and fry with us!'

"Later, I still wanted to leave the committee, but I did not dare. It would give Semov an excuse to make accusations: running away from Party duties, revolting against the leadership, etc. I remained. Perhaps it is better that I did because then I could see exactly what was happening. I

saw everything, heard everything, and now I can tell you everything.

"Recently the Party conference was held. If only you had been there to write it all down! The weather was bad. The second day the snow continued, we all thought the conference would be called off. Who would come in such weather? But sleighs drawn by sweating horses began to gather in front of the Public Library at dawn. All buses were snowbound and trains were late, but the village Communists found their way to the city. The hall was noisy. There was a dank smell of wet clothing and fur, mixed with tobacco—someone was secretly smoking in his sleeve. As the two huge stoves grew red, the room became warm. . . . No, the conference was not called off!

"With a husky voice, Semov read his report for three hours, moving only slightly behind the lectern. Figures, quotations, extracts, filled with self-satisfaction—a pale unrealistic picture of life in the county. In the hall—silence, whispering, and silence again. Everything was going well so far. There was an intermission and afterwards they invited discussion. I must tell you that until that time our county conferences had passed quietly and smoothly. And why not! Did not Semov himself determine who would make statements, and did he not send confidential letters to the Party organizations a week before the conference? That day he had sent his letters—and he was content. He sat on the right of representative Galabov of the district committee, and waited. . . .

"The hall was silent except for an occasional cough. Then from a dark corner under the balcony a hand was slowly raised. Peter Bonin, President of Medenis kolkhoz, had the floor. . . . He was a short, dark man with long drooping moustaches. He advanced to the platform and gripped the lectern with both hands, but instead of facing the crowd, he turned toward the presidium.

"It is very cold Comrades, you can't put us to sleep! No matter how you try, you can not!"

"After he said this, he paused. Did anybody understand him? Everyone understood and applauded loudly. When he began to speak again, others got to their feet. So many wanted to speak! No, nothing like this had ever happened at one of our conferences. Before, at the plenum, only Vladik and Vlahov criticized Semov, but now. . . . So, the glass is overflowing, I thought to myself.

"My hand was numb from writing. People told how the Motor Tractor Stations had governed the county; how the Party organizations in the villages had disintegrated. And they asked, does the county committee see this? Party instructors rush around like comets until the campaign is over, then all is forgotten. The working-day payment in many villages has dropped, the collective farmers are in a bad way.

"Have the shoes of the First Secretary seen the village mud? A zootechnician from the village of Vulchedrum stood, and in the midst of the laughter of the people, proposed that the committee should buy one more automobile if necessary.

"The hall was heavy with tension—it seemed to me there was no air. Semov, pale as cloth, whispered in the ear of Galabov every few minutes. His face had grown red.

"These are Semov's last days in the committee, I thought, and I admit that I felt sorry. Whether it was sentimentality or some deeper feeling, I was sorry that he should leave the platform in shame. But the feeling was momentary, for how can one be sorry when our road has been cleared of obstacles. This was some kind of woman's feeling, momentary. . .

"These feelings were not necessary. In the election Semov succeeded in strengthening his position as First Secretary by a majority of eight votes.

"A week later a letter was received from the district committee offering Semov a chance to study at the two-year Party school in Sofia. Wasn't this a distant echo of the conference? Oh, Semov understood! But did he fold his hands and accept the offer? Semov would not be Semov if he could so easily be parted from his authority and position. He called the members of the office separately and suggested that the district committee proposal would not be in the interest of the county, and that he, Semov, should remain. The office made a decision. We sent a letter saying: At present, in our opinion, the departure of Comrade M. Semov would be to the detriment of our county. Yes, he remained—pale, thin, eyes swollen from lack of sleep, and consumed by the desire to prove that he was, indeed, needed in the district.

"After those days, Semov seemed to be wearing steel gloves. He controlled and squeezed the committee, turning all his efforts to one goal—to clear the committee, to tighten it. He returned Anastasov, the Second Secretary, to the county committee of the Dimitrov Union of People's Youth—perhaps he considered him unfit. He dismissed two department chiefs, and one morning he stopped before my desk.

"'You seem a little tired. You are not sick, are you? If there is anything . . . but, no, we have no right to keep you. Go home and rest. We shall help you if necessary!'

"And so . . . I was sorry to leave the committee, no use pretending; but my sorrow came more from the fact that Semov remained and continued to strengthen his position. Who knows how long he will be able to spread his emptiness.

"Why do such things happen? To be dismissed, a leader must sink to his neck in shame and crime. He may have no qualities of leadership; he may not care about the people—he may be interested only in his post and his pocketbook. But they will tolerate him! And if it becomes necessary to dismiss him, they will do so delicately, careful not to offend him. They will send him some place to study, or transfer him to the district as too valuable a person to be wasted. Why is it this way?"

Anna Parvanova stopped speaking, shivering with a sudden chill. Her face, softly shadowed by the sunset, looked now like the face of a lively young girl. Still sitting on the boards, with her scarf resting loosely on her shoulders, she stared into the distance, her thoughts in the past. I wanted to ask her something, but I did not know what. A horn sounded and Anna Parvanova shivered and got up. Automatically she put on her coat and buttoned it. Her stooped figure suddenly seemed tall. From the yard of the MTS the truck began moving slowly. The driver switched on the lights and the muddy road brightened.

"Where to?" Anna approached the truck with a youthful step.

"To Medene."

"Oh, it is not for me."

She stepped back and stood still, listening to the tires paddle in the thin mud. She returned to the boards but



A woman collective farm worker and the kolkhoz agronomist.

Bulgaria (Sofia), No. 7, 1956

she did not sit. It grew darker and the electric lights at the station were lit.

"I would suffocate in Lom, but here in the station I feel good. When the annual meetings of the farms were held, Vlahov appointed me voluntary assistant on the local committee. I started to visit villages just as I did years ago. Do you know how deeply entrenched Semovism is everywhere? Kolkhoz Chairmen, Party Secretaries—how many of them have turned into common statisticians and registrars. There is Dilov, the Director of the MTS here. When he picks up the telephone and hears Semov's voice on the line, he stands at attention like a soldier. I think to myself—Semov will go today or tomorrow, but 'his people' must be completely stamped out of the villages. I have heard a lot of cursing on the way to meetings. They all unburden their hearts. Discontent and curses; but let me tell you, we do not know our peasant! We know only that he is conservative, a slave of everything that is antiquated, unwilling to learn. This is nonsense! It is not conservatism, it is a love and yearning for the land. Have we not trampled on this love in many ways? With poor ability to organize, the way we race through the village with the campaign, the long lost desire of many leaders to look into the souls of the people! Some of our Machine Tractor Stations are still poor agitators, and we close our eyes to this. We accuse the peasants of being against mechanization, but isn't this their justifiable indignation at the bad performance of these mighty machines? Is it not justifiable anger against the

tractor driver who works conscientiously only under the watchful eyes of the agronomist or Kolkhoz Chairmen, while at other times he will only scratch at the soil as if with his nails?"

Anna Parvanova sighed and looked at me as though afraid she would not be able to convince me with words alone.

"Yes, the little things will make us lose our people. Our tongues have become twisted from mouthing slogans and formulas! What about the living Party work? In the past many of us were true apostles; now we have become common prattlers."

She stopped speaking and looked toward the station where an automobile was drawing near. Her eyes narrowed, then brightened.

"I would like so much to be under fire as a soldier—in the front trenches. What do my years matter? I still have strength. Voluntary assistant of the local committee. . . . Fine!"

Anna Parvanova ran to meet the approaching truck.

"Where to?"

"Kimivo."

They didn't invite her into the cab and she did not ask. I saw her climb clumsily into the back, suspended for a moment; then she disappeared. The truck was covered with canvas—badly fastened so that it splashed in the darkness like a broken bird wing.

The Attack on Toromanski

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE publication of "Anna, the Comrade of the District," its author and the journal that published it were subject to the most vicious attack. This came predominantly from the Party apparatus in the area Toromanski was discussing—Lom County and District Vratsa, of which Lom is a part. The Lom Party organ *Narodna Tribuna*, August 3, carried the following blasts from the county and district apparatuses:

"On July 29, the Party activists of Lom County held a conference which was attended by the members of the plenum of the county committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party in Lom, the Secretaries of the basic Party organizations, and other leading cadres in the town and county. At the conference Comrade Ivan Todorov, Secretary of the District Party committee, read an information message which expressed the view of the Vratsa District committee office regarding the report 'Anna, the Comrade of the District,' by Kiril Toromanski. . . . Seventeen comrades spoke about the information message. Unanimously and with great indignation all of them rejected the nauseating slanders and attacks that have been heaped upon the cadres of our county, attacks that distort the real situation in the collectives and incite people to oppose Party policy. Such filthy writings only serve to encourage our

enemies to struggle against the Party and its cadres.

"The entire aktiv insists that the blustering scribbler, former legionnaire, and instigator, Kiril Toromanski, be held responsible in a stern manner, and that the *Literaturen Front* editorial office should also be called to task for the crude political error it committed in publishing this article. (Signed: The county committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party in Lom.)"

There followed the statement by the district committee:

"Recently, material of increasingly great interest has been published by our press, material which includes a critical analysis of Party work. The concern over instilling Lenin's norms and principles into Party life and strengthening Lenin's method of work and leadership has often been given profound analysis. We consider this approach to be correct, and we believe it should be widely supported and disseminated.

"Diseased Imagination"

"However, the reportage 'Anna, the Comrade of the District,' printed in *Literaturen Front* . . . does not serve this purpose. This article covers various questions relating to Party and economic life in Lom County. In his attempt to cover this field, the author invented many facts out of his diseased imagination, to make easier his task of slander-



Propaganda picture of workers on a Bulgarian collective farm like the one in "Anna, the Comrade of the District."
Bulgaria (Sofia), No. 3, 1956

ing the Party and its cadres, and to sow distrust in the great and just cause of the Communist Party. A crude political error has been committed by printing this article which fails to play a positive role in achieving the goal that the editorial office has set for itself. . . .

"All this does not mean the Lom and other county committees have become faultless models of organizational operation, or that the office or the First Secretary are without shortcomings. The efforts of the office and the First Secretary to improve their organization will continue to be a most important Party task. On the other hand, it is harmful to proceed on the false premise that one should look at past experience only in order to generalize about the present, an approach adopted by *Literaturen Front*.

"We reject with great indignation the vile assessment made of the county committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party in Lom because it depicts the county committee as a beast's lair and a viper's nest where improbable Anna must stay so she can see and hear everything in order to describe it later.

"In its desire to deal the county committee a malicious blow, the report has committed the basest slander by depicting the First Secretary as a man who is constantly snooping, who sees an enemy in everybody, who has become a mere bureaucrat, a hardened petit bourgeois, covetous of power and high position, a man who likes to order people about, a pen pusher, a careerist, and so forth.

"Brazen Lies"

"Press criticism is of great value, but only when it is a healthy and constructive criticism motivated by the desire to help correct the shortcomings of the persons criticized. Unfortunately *Literaturen Front* has forgotten this and has become a rostrum for slander and denigration of a Party organ and responsible leaders.

"Our enemies have always had recourse to inventions and brazen lies in their struggle to achieve their goals. Is this not the method used by hostile radio stations screaming at the top of their voices? However, facts seem to be unimportant to *Literaturen Front* in this case.

"It is not true that the First Secretary was elected by a majority of eight votes since, as pointed out by members at the meeting, all of the 381 participants voted unanimously to elect him. It is known that the election is secret.

"It is also a lie that Atanasov has been returned to the county committee of the Dimitrov Union of People's Youth. There have been no dismissals of section chiefs in the county committee, etc.

"Under these circumstances it is reasonable to ask whether the editorial office understands that reporting must be based on facts, that it must describe concrete people and events, and that these events must be depicted in an accurate and documentary way—that, as Gorki says, 'the report must stand somewhere between a study and a story.' Having lost all sense of measure, the editorial office has publicized a lie without regard for its own social responsibility.

"Instead of showing these people as modest labor heroes, selflessly devoted to the Party and the people and models of the new man, *Literaturen Front* slanders them without stopping to think—calling them people whose tongues have become twisted from voicing slogans and formulas, saying that many who were true apostles in the past have now become common prattlers, claiming that Party instructors are flying 'like comets,' maintaining that kolkhoz chairmen and Party Secretaries have become mere accountants and registrars and have no knowledge of reality.

"All this was necessary to lead up to a directive for future action: 'Semov will go today or tomorrow, but "his people" must be completely stamped out of the villages.' The working people, however, have grown politically and

are capable of deciding who their enemies are. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, that the author is addressing the remnants of the kulaks and other hostile elements who were exposed long ago; that he urges them to engage in overt counterrevolutionary struggle; and that he introduces elements of confusion and disturbance among the working people.

"It is obviously not accidental that the report describes Semov's behavior and attitude as a 'line of conduct' and incites people to destroy the Party's most valuable capital—the cadres. This blow is directed specifically against our glorious Party and against its monolithic unity. This only aggravates the error committed by the editorial office which has forgotten this truth and the Marxist-Leninist evaluation of the significance and role of cadres which has been confirmed by years of experience. The slanderous accusation that the district committee's work with the cadres was unprincipled and vicious can be maintained and confirmed only by persons divorced from the Party and alienated from its life and principles.

"The statement about the 'pale and unrealistic [officially given] picture of life in the county,' and of the condition of kolkhozes; the statement that in many kolkhozes the working day payment has become lower, and that the collective farmers are badly off—all of these are slanderous. Does *Literature Front* know the facts, is it acquainted with reality?

"Facts show that there has been no cut in the working-day payment in Lom County. On the contrary, in 1956 the working-day payment in Lom County amounted to 11.67 *leva*, that is, 1.87 *leva* more than in 1955. During the past year Lom County held second place in the district. . . .

"A Treacherous, Hostile Call"

"The successes achieved in the rural areas justify pride in the working people for their unshakable determination to follow the leadership of the Party to the goal of a successful reorganization of agriculture. The enemies who have been isolated from the people are, in their rage, making desperate attempts to stop our progress. It is to be regretted in this case that *Literature Front* has become the herald of a treacherous, hostile call for a struggle against the Party.

"The report went even further by describing the political situation in the villages as bad. This, in fact, challenges the Party's knowledge of the situation among the peasants and the correctness of Party policy. It is vile and indecent to claim that at meetings the villagers direct abuse, ex-

pressions of dissatisfaction, and curses against the Party. It is true that the hostile legionnaire group with whom the author is linked in long-standing association, and from which he originates, does abuse and curse the Party. We are well aware of this and we understand it perfectly.

"The report claims that we do not know the peasant—that we only know that he is a 'conservative, a slave of everything antiquated, unwilling to learn,' and that we do not understand his love and yearning for the land. The peasants of the district, including those of Lom, repeatedly proved their loyalty to the Communist Party during the glorious September 1923 uprising when they struggled against the author's father—a notorious follower of Tsankov and a coup d'etat specialist—as well as during the struggle against Fascism and the fight for a Socialist transformation of agriculture.

"The author is well aware that the worker-peasant alliance is the backbone of our people's regime. Therefore, he wants to drive a wedge in it. To achieve this aim, it was mandatory to spread the idea that the Party has a derogatory attitude toward the peasants. This is precisely what *Literature Front* has forgotten. As far as 'yearning' and 'love' for the land is concerned, we understand perfectly the crocodile tears of the kulaks and the enemies of the toiling peasants—their feelings for their old land through which they exploited the working people for years. . . .

"Counterrevolutionary Forces"

"In conclusion it must be said that this report slanders and abuses the Party; it casts doubt on important features of Party policy; and it calls all counterrevolutionary forces to unite and engage in active struggle. It is only natural to ask what are the aims of *Literature Front* when it occupies itself with problems of Party life in such a manner and puts its front page at Toromanski's disposal.

"It is not difficult to understand that such writing does not differ from, and strongly smacks of, the same things that were published on the pages of the Polish and Hungarian press at a particular time and that they only serve hostile elements and kulaks. It is not by accident that the entire petit-bourgeois scum and the unhealthy and hostile elements, who at the time of the April plenum and the Hungarian events attempted to strike a blow against the Party and the people's regime, are now again rising in Lom County, particularly in Lom itself, feeling that they have been given support and waving *Literature Front* before them. They are again making plans, impossible to achieve, to put everything they hope and dream into practice."



Current Developments

Area

The Moscow Documents

The issuance of two documents—a twelve-nation declaration of a “Commonwealth of Socialist States” and a “peace appeal” signed by the Communist Parties of 64 countries—followed the Moscow celebrations of the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution. (For earlier details of the anniversary festivities, see *East Europe*, December 1957, pages 31-32.) Marking a high point in international Communist strategy for a return to unity, the “Commonwealth” declaration was significant for its reiteration of Soviet leadership of the bloc, for the priority it gave to “revisionism” as the chief danger to the signatory countries, and for the fact that Yugoslavia—unlike the other nations with “national Communist” tendencies, China and Poland—refused to sign the document.


The reason given by the Yugoslav Central Committee at its December meeting in Brioni was that the 12-nation declaration “contained certain attitudes and appraisals which are contrary to the attitude of the Yugoslav League of Communists and which must be considered as incorrect.” The Yugoslavs did not, however, state their specific objections, and did sign the “peace appeal,” along with all other ruling Communist States and Parties from “non-Socialist” countries. This appeal called for a ban of nuclear weapons, general disarmament along Soviet-sponsored lines, and a new “peace” campaign, similar to those previously managed by the USSR.

“Commonwealth of Socialist States”

Perhaps the most important, if also the most vaguely worded, section of the 12-nation declaration was that in which the notion of a “Commonwealth of Socialist States” was discussed. No operational structure and no regular program of meetings were stated. The new organization is unlikely to duplicate the prewar Comintern and the post-war Cominform, despite apparent Soviet yearnings for a return to centralized control. Polish Party chief Wladyslaw Gomulka was emphatic in his condemnation of both the Stalinist international groups (see Poland, below) and considerable attention was devoted in the document to “national sovereignty,” albeit under the leadership of “the first and mightiest Socialist power—the Soviet Union.”

Both documents contained standard attacks on the West and the usual Communist predictions of the doom of Capitalism. Both hailed the achievements of Soviet science.

Typical comment from the Satellite press was the following passage in a *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) article of



US scientists: “Well, now we have the dog, all we need is the rocket.” Another in the flood of jeers at American failure to equal the Soviet earth satellites.

Dikobraz (Prague), November 22, 1957

November 22:

“The unity of the Socialist countries and of their Marxist-Leninist Parties is unbreakable. . . . The documents are of enormous importance, showing clearly once again the rightness of the decisions of the April Plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee, the rightness of the policy of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and the rightness of the policies of the entire Socialist world.”

On his return from Moscow, Hungarian Party boss Janos Kadar stated that all Communist Parties “agreed on the basic questions of building Socialism and peace.” (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], November 23.) No similar large-scale meeting in the international workers’ movement had taken place in the past 22 years, Kadar averred, adding that the conference had been held on a basis of “parity and equal rights.”

Polish comment, in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 23, was as follows:

“The Leninist principles of relations between Socialist Parties and States . . . are of fundamental importance in strengthening working class unity and solidarity. The unanimous support accorded to these principles by the 12 countries shows that in the future the entire development of our mutual relations will be based on the Leninist tenets.”

Although the 12-member declaration included strong

public avowals of Communist bloc solidarity, there was undoubtedly some dissension during the unreported phases of the conferences. The final result probably amounts to a diluted Soviet victory with the lack of structural hardness in the proposed "Commonwealth" reflecting the continuing desire of at least the Poles and the Chinese to follow their "separate roads to Socialism."

Area-wide "Corruption"

A succession of white-collar financial scandals in the bureaucratic and enterprise management offices over the entire area have recently been given a great deal of publicity in the press and over the radio. Emphasizing the fact that internal troubles do not begin and end with "spies" and "imperialist agents," the scandals, while certainly no unprecedented phenomena in Communist countries, have, during the past year, received increasing consideration in the governmental maneuvers of top Party figures. For example, one important phase of the purge now taking place in Poland concerns the expulsion of financially corrupt Party members. Similar, if less ambitious, "purification" measures are under way in all the other countries in the bloc.

Death Sentences in Bulgaria

The extreme limits of the drive against persons guilty of "theft of Socialist property" has occurred in Bulgaria, where the death sentence has been passed in four separate trials for "fraud" over the past year. The most recent of these, reported in the Sofia daily, *Vecherny Novini*, on

November 12, saw 24 defendants brought to court, including "tax collectors from the Provincial People's Councils, officials of the National Bank, the Savings Office and other institutions." According to the newspaper, the trial "involved fraudulent conversion of over two million *leva* to the detriment of the National Treasury." The three principal accused received the death penalty; others got from three to twenty years' imprisonment.

With the probable aim of warning Polish counterparts of the condemned Bulgarians, the home service of Radio Warsaw, on November 14, reported fully on the trial, including, of course, the frightening severity of the sentences. Such reports of financial criminality in other "Socialist" bloc States are not frequent in Poland. The broadcast was undoubtedly influenced by another of the preceding day in which it was stated that at the present time there are over 45,000 cases of fraud being investigated in Poland.

Czechoslovak fraud trials have not as yet resulted in sentences as extreme as those in Bulgaria, but the corruption problem would seem, nevertheless, to be at least as acute. *Rude Pravo* (Prague) reported on December 3 that a ten-member group—some from the highest managerial echelons—working at the Liberec Wholesale Clothing Store (a State enterprise) had received jail sentences up to 14 years. They were accused of defrauding the store of 800,000 *koruny* by withdrawing quantities of goods from the stock and selling them privately. Included among those sentenced were the enterprise manager, the store manager, the chief accountant and the managers of two branch stores.

On November 28 *Prace* (Prague) described the actions of a "former wage accountant at the Jiri Dimitrov Plant at Letany," which resulted in a ten-year sentence. The newspaper stated:

"The accused took advantage of his position in the plant and of the negligence of several employees who did not observe their directives. He was thus able systematically to steal large sums of money. His method was to submit for payment dockets covering wages for persons who were not entitled to such payments. In this manner he received without justification a total of 258,000 *koruny*."

Demand for "Special Courts"

In Hungary the spread of corruption brought a demand from the official Party organ, *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), November 15, for a revival of "special courts" in the factories to deal with the "free for all." Such courts were set up in May 1956, but their work was halted during the Revolt the following October. Discussing "thieving in the factories, corrupt practices and speculation," the Party organ, after placing the major blame, as usual, on the "counterrevolution," continued as follows:

"Bureaucracy, the deficiencies of the price system and weakness of supervision make it easy, for the time being, to continue such evil practices. . . . The State organs must at long last begin rigorous retaliatory measures against those who commit social crimes. Let the social courts of justice be set up again. Let these pillory the magpies in the workshops."

Not By Bread Alone

THE YUGOSLAV PARTY ORGAN *Polityka* (Belgrade), issue of November 20-December 1, carried an enthusiastic and laudatory article on the Soviet novel "Not By Bread Alone," by Vladimir Dudintsev, which was blasted by Khrushchev last summer for being too critical of Soviet life, and has since been under a drumfire of Soviet criticism.

Among other things, the Yugoslav critic said:

"Dudintsev's novel seeks to remove the barriers in life, the barriers which Dudintsev has smashed in Soviet literature by going so deeply into the heart of the problem. He calls for this removal in the name of the human ideals of the revolution. . . . This problem cannot be discussed by preaching about [such cant phrases as] tragic and glorious aspects of life, about pessimism and optimism, nor merely by recommending ready-made formulae for positive heroes supposedly embodying the full moving force of the people."

One week after the publication of this review, Dudintsev finally submitted to the pressures upon him, and announced that his new book will indeed refrain from serious criticism of Soviet life and will deal, he said, with "positive heroes."



Right, the new Soviet Ambassador to Poland, P. Abrasimov. He replaced P. Ponomarenko, who, before the thaw, had acted as Soviet proconsul for Poland and as such had been detested by the Poles. Abrasimov is shown here with Aleksander Zawadzki, president of the Polish Council of State.

Przyjazd (Warsaw), November 3, 1957

The economic bi-monthly publication, *Gazdasagi Figyelo* (Budapest) on November 7, indicated that "People's Control Committees" had been set up to combat the problem. The journal spoke as follows of the work of one such committee in Fejer County:

"It has been functioning for a month and consists of economic and technical experts, of workers and peasants. It has already achieved results which the central control apparatus has been unable to produce. . . . In the course of investigations held at the Kaloz Agricultural Collective, the Committee proved that valuable goods had been wasted because no one cared for the protection of the collective's property."

No decree has been issued thus far on the functioning of the People's Control Committees.

Delegations to Free World and Within Bloc

In spite of their strengthening ties with the Soviet Union, the Poles continued their efforts to maintain contact with the West. Zenon Kliszko, Chairman of the Organization Department of the Polish Party and a close associate of First Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka, headed a delegation to England, from November 24 to December 5. During the same period Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki was in Sweden and a Parliamentary delegation visited Belgium. The Poles also kept to their close relationship with Yugoslavia, sending a group of educational experts, on November 18, for a fifteen-day sojourn in Belgrade. An agreement

was also signed in East Berlin on November 16 between the Polish and East German regimes for closer cooperation in research and production planning in the engineering industries.

Better relations between Yugoslavia and the Communist bloc were also indicated by the presence of a Hungarian Trade Union delegation in Belgrade, November 17-18, and an agreement with Albania, signed in Tirana on November 13, which will provide for tourist exchanges between the two countries.

The Communist bloc also continued its wooing of Middle-Eastern and "neutralist" nations. A trade agreement was signed in Rabat on November 22 between Morocco and Czechoslovakia. According to a Radio Bratislava broadcast on that day, the Czechoslovaks will export sugar, hops and industrial products in return for phosphates, iron and lead ore, wool, wine and oranges. A Bulgarian Trade Union delegation journeyed to Syria, November 2-24.

Poland

The Purge Goes On

The Party purge formally announced at the Tenth Plenum in October began to gather momentum. Detailed instructions went out to the provincial Party Committees, which held meetings early in the month, and then down the ranks to the district and municipal committees. The proper procedure was outlined by *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) on November 11, distinguishing three categories of Party members to be removed: the corrupt, the indifferent and those belonging to "anti-Party" factions.

Each of these categories was to be dealt with separately. Those members guilty of corrupt practices (bribery, theft, abuse of power) were to be handled by special Party teams set up by the provincial organizations. Ideological deviationists were to be dealt with by control commissions supervised by the central commission of Party control in Warsaw. Aside from these, the overall screening of Party ranks was to be the task of the basic Party units in shops, factories and offices. These were to set up "verification commissions" to review the record of every member and eliminate "passive ballast." *Trybuna Ludu* emphasized that the verification must be carried out reasonably, allowing each "passive" member a chance to decide whether he sincerely wished to remain in the Party. It added:

"Above all, it should be clearly stated that any person who is not verified and who remains outside the Party must not suffer in his professional work and must not be the object of discrimination. . . . On the contrary, such methods would only cause passive members to mask their real attitude and to hold on stubbornly to their Party cards. . . . The decisive factor will be the concrete activity and attitude of every comrade, and not breast beating."

Danger for the Intellectuals

But discussion in the ranks centered chiefly on ideological questions involved in the two-front fight against "revisionists-liquidationists" (the liberalizers) and "dogmatists-sectarians" (the Stalinists). The former, who had been

the vanguard of Gomulka's support in the days of his triumph, were now to be discarded as crypto-liberals and enemies of Marxism-Leninism. The Stalinists, on the other hand, were said to be a lesser menace, drawing much of their strength from the activity of the revisionists.

The practical task of identifying revisionists was made difficult for lack of a precise definition. Many of the most outspoken elements, such as the young rebels of *Po Prostu* and the editorial staff of *Europa*—including Adam Wazyk and Jan Kott—had already been sloughed off or had resigned (see *East Europe*, November and December, Current Developments sections). Others who might have been classed as revisionists for things they had said and written in the past were now heeding the signs of the time. The group most exposed were the intellectuals. An ominous sign for them was the announcement in *Trybuna Ludu* on November 22 that the purging of Party members belonging to the "milieu of the creative intelligentsia" would be carried out by the cultural commission of the Central Committee. Head of the commission is Leon Kruczkowski, chairman of the Polish Writers' Union before October 1956 and strongly identified with the anti-liberal forces. He had written in *Trybuna Literacka* (the new literary supplement of *Trybuna Ludu*) on November 11 that it was time "to evaluate the social role of writers during the last three years." He went on:

"In Poland, more than anywhere else, the situation after the 20th CPSU Congress demanded from those in public life, and therefore from the writers, not only courage but quite exceptional understanding, sobriety and self-discipline. This was the most unsuitable time for attempts to gain easy popularity, for displays of spiritual acrobatics, and for publicly 'discarding one's skin.' . . . In the pre-October [1956] period, the activities of the literary milieu, mainly expressed in journalistic articles, often swerved from basic Socialist premises and even partly appealed to moods, hopes and aspirations of forces either reluctant or outright hostile to Socialism—right-wing reactionaries. . . . At present, certain people deem it possible to take up non-Party or outright anti-Party positions. Now, at a time when we have begun to march along a new and better road toward Socialism, they have deemed it proper to take up openly anti-Socialist positions.

"On the literary front we must in a certain sense begin our efforts anew. Many threads and much good yarn in the development of Socialist literature in Poland were torn in the past years. I have in mind not only the last two or three years, but also several preceding years. This will have to be made up, and it will not be an easy matter."

There were other attacks on the intellectuals, and even on the broader stratum of intelligentsia. W. Jarosinski, a Secretary of the Central Committee, told a meeting in Warsaw on November 18 that the revisionists were particularly active in the radio and the press, and that they had attained great influence in the schools of higher learning (*Trybuna Ludu*, November 19). An article in the Party weekly *Polityka* on October 30 went so far as to suggest abolishing the Party branches in institutions which did not produce goods or services—i.e., in which brain workers predominated—and distributing their members among the workers' and peasants' branches. This was pro-

posed as a means of activating the workers and peasants, and of eliminating office workers "with little or no attachment to Marxist ideology"—in short, of reducing the over-preponderance of white collar elements in the Party—but it would obviously weaken the Party defenses of the writers, students, scholars and other intellectuals.

Warnings Against Anti-Intellectual Excesses

However, voices were raised in defense of the intelligentsia and of the intellectuals. An article in *Trybuna Ludu* on November 15 decried the "anti-intelligentsia mood prevailing in a number of Party bodies."

"Some people narrow this concept [of intelligentsia] to embrace only the intellectuals, thus degrading thousands of other representatives of the intelligentsia. Others extend it to embrace all office workers, something which enables them to charge the intelligentsia with all the sins of bureaucracy. They replace the slogan 'down with the bureaucracy' with the extremely harmful slogan 'down with the intelligentsia.' In doing so they forget that the machine tool operator, the engineer and the teacher are struggling with equal despair in the fetters of red tape. . . .

"The criterion [for eliminating anti-Party elements] must not consist . . . in distinguishing between the intellectual and the worker, but in distinguishing among views and attitudes toward the Party."

Without a Program

A SPLENDID RECENT EXAMPLE of the political confusion now rampant in Poland involved the following *dramatis personae*: Adam Schaff, professor of philosophy, alternate member of the Party Central Committee, an editor of the weekly *Polityka*, (which is the organ of the Gomulka "centrist" faction in Poland), and most recently a leading voice in the attacks against the revisionists; Andrzej Werblan, once Secretary to deceased Party leader and Premier Boleslaw Bierut in the unregenerate Stalinist days, now, oddly enough, also a *Polityka* staff-member, as well as a Central Committee alternate; and, finally, the quite innocently apolitical press reviewer for the Warsaw daily *Zycie Gospodarcze*. The incident, as described by *Express Wieczorny* (Warsaw), November 27, 1957:

"Three weeks ago, Bielinek, the author of the press review in *Zycie Gospodarcze*, reprinted without comment a large fragment from an article by Adam Schaff, a member of the *Polityka* editorial staff well known for his recent statements against revisionism. A. Werblan, a writer on *Polityka*, who apparently did not notice that the statements were enclosed in quotation marks, attributed the views therein to Bielinek himself, and published in *Polityka* a sharp attack against him, accusing Bielinek of "seriously revising Leninism." In the latest issue of *Zycie Gospodarcze* Bielinek clarifies this misunderstanding."



Polish Communists to priest: "May we ask you to say a mass for the intentions of our verification?" (Verification—the current re-examination of all Party members with an eye to expulsion of those deemed unreliable.)
Szpilki (Warsaw), December 1, 1957

Similar warnings came from *Polityka*, November 23, and from Politburo-member Jerzy Morawski, who told the Party Committee at Lodz to guard against "anti-intellectual tendencies" (Radio Warsaw, November 19). Another article in *Polityka* on November 24 said that "anti-intellectual moods" were widespread in the Party.

"Particularly threatening are the tendencies toward an unjust and erroneous treatment of the intellectual group in the Party. In this treatment, regardless of the real state of affairs, there is always an *a priori* assumption of 'revisionist' activity. And so one looks for them [revisionists] among people who are outstanding because of their higher education, that is, engineers, physicians and such. . . . We must say that we have done very little to explain to each Party member the meaning of revisionism and of dogmatism. The confusion which still exists in many lower links of the Party in these matters allows people to pin things on anybody who once somewhere said 'something.'"

Schaff: What Is Revisionism?

Gomulka and his followers had admittedly embarked on a difficult task. The peril of equating revisionists with thinking people in general was the classic danger attending all heresy hunts. Official theorists strove manfully to explain just how Gomulka-ism was to be distinguished from revisionism on the one hand and dogmatism on the other. Professor Adam Schaff, a member of the Central Committee, has recently been foremost among those addressing themselves to the problem. In an article in the November issue of *Zycie Partii*, an organ of the Central Committee, he mentioned the familiar Gomulka-faction line on the double danger to the Party from both revisionist and dogmatic wings: in the former case, the "breaking up of the Party from within"; in the latter, the "sectarian isolation of the Party from the masses of the people." He went on to discuss the question of the revisionists, saying that they centered their activity on attacking "the theory of

Marxism-Leninism and the practice of proletarian dictatorship." Their basic ideas were those of social democracy:

"Reading the writings of our liquidators, no one who knows even a little of the history of our movement and ideology can have any doubt from whom these original creators copy their ideas, though they neglect to mention this. Their spiritual fathers and sources of inspiration are, of course, De Man [Henri De Man, Belgian Socialist], Raymond Aron [contemporary French sociologist and anti-Communist], and Sartre [French existentialist philosopher]. . . . Our Party is a Marxist-Leninist party, we are sharp and definite opponents of social democracy, and that is why, in the name of the Party's ideological unity, we will not tolerate in our ranks the carriers of social democracy."

In another article in *Trybuna Ludu* on November 12, Schaff added to his definition of the revisionist heresy. A prominent characteristic of revisionist arguments was their concern with the role of the Party, the role of the State, and the nature of democracy. They added up to "negation of the leading role of the workers' Party, negation of Socialist democracy—in a word, negation of the dictatorship of the proletariat from the standpoint of theoretical nostalgia for integral democracy, and in practice simply for liberal parliamentary democracy."

"To a person knowing anything about the problem of Marxist theory, it must be absolutely clear that this controversy concerns the central problem in Leninism, the problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The conflict over the dictatorship of the proletariat is an old conflict, a very old conflict indeed. It is the traditional conflict between two great notions in the working class movement: the Leninist (Bolshevik) notion and the social democratic notion. Our liquidators attack exactly these matters, although they insist that they are struggling against Stalinism. I do not know whether this is pretense or ignorance, but in reality they are attacking the fundamentals of Leninism. . . .

"It is necessary to see clearly that the Party is here struggling with an opponent of the right. The notion of a 'left' is just another myth of the past year, a myth which could arise only in an atmosphere of ideological chaos. Since when is opposition to Leninism defined as the 'left' in the workers' movement? . . . Since when is one allowed to wear the spurs of leftism for every spit at Marxism and every kick at Socialism from clearly bourgeois positions?"

An Old Stalinist Speaks Up

An even harsher pronouncement was made by Andrzej Werblan in a talk on Radio Warsaw on November 22. Werblan, once a secretary to Boleslaw Bierut (Premier and Party chief during the Stalinist years), now a *Polityka* staff-member, emphasized the necessity of "the dictatorship of the proletariat." While the Party had abandoned its previous mistakes, and now relied upon persuasion rather than force in its struggle against "bourgeois" attitudes, this did not include "the right to disseminate publications expressing bourgeois views." That was a right demanded by reactionaries who "were concerned with securing more freedom for their own activity and their own agitation among the masses." He admitted that "Socialist" ideas are still weak in Poland, arguing that this justified giving

them a monopoly:

"The public at large is still imbued with the prejudiced opinions of the old system with which it has been conditioned for many decades. . . . They are upheld by the force of tradition, by unsatisfactory standards of culture, and are also actively fostered by our enemies. Many educated people have acquired knowledge in their studies which was tainted with bourgeois ideology, and they too can disseminate the ideology. . . .

"The more Socialist opinions are rooted in the national consciousness, the less dissemination will there be of old bourgeois attitudes . . . and the wider democracy will become. That is why the Ninth as well as the Tenth Plenum condemned those Party members who cling to misconceptions of democracy and to falsely-interpreted ideas of October, who tend to ignore the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat and show liberalism toward the activities of reactionaries."

The Dogmatists

Few words were wasted on the opposite wing of the Party—those who presumably wanted to turn the clock back to pre-Gomulka days. For one thing, many high Party officers had been conspicuous in the days of Stalinism and were now leading the purge against revisionists. During the "October days" they had opposed Gomulka, and later some of them had faded from sight, but in recent months they have been coming into prominence again. Among them are Aleksander Zawadzki, member of the Politburo and president of the Council of State; Zenon Nowak, a Deputy Premier since January 1957; Stanislaw Pawlak, Party boss in the Warsaw Province; and Wladyslaw Kruczek, who holds the same office in the Rzeszow Province. Last June Wiktor Klosiewicz, the former Stalinist head of the Central Council of Trade Unions, was verbally rehabilitated at the Congress of Metal Workers. In the same month the good Stalinists Franciszek Mazur, Stanislaw Lapot, General Kazimierz Witaszewski and Boleslaw Ruminski toured the country as delegates of the Central Committee. (A few weeks ago, however, Mazur was made Ambassador to Prague and Witaszewski his military attache; this is very possibly a stroke by Gomulka to remove some Stalinist extremists from the country.) Kazimierz Mijal, who was said to have led an attack against Gomulka at the Ninth Plenum last May, is now the Director of the Investment Bank. And after the Tenth Plenum, when provincial and district committees of the Party met to discuss the purge, the following old Stalinists were among the representatives of the Central Committee sent out to explain the resolutions of the Plenum: Hilary Chelchowski in Kielce, Walenty Titkow in Zielona Gora, Ostap Dluski in Opole, Jozef Olszewski in Szczecin, Jan Izydorczyk in Poznan, Franciszek Jozwiak in Warsaw.

The Kosa Pamphlet

Possibly for the reason that so many old Stalinists are firmly entrenched in the Party apparatus, speakers and writers who discussed the purge found it difficult to put their fingers on examples of "dogmatism." The dogmatists were said to have withdrawn from Party work, to be operating secretly and by conversation rather than through open



declarations. On November 13, *Trybuna Ludu* broached the existence of what it called "a characteristic encyclopedia of current Polish dogmatism," a typewritten pamphlet of 54 pages under the pseudonym of "Jan Kosa." The pamphlet was said to contain an attack not only on such elements of the Gomulka program as workers' councils and the new agricultural policy, but even on the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU (when de-Stalinization began in the Soviet Union). In characterizing the pamphlet as typical of "current Polish dogmatism," *Trybuna Ludu* was obviously reducing the dogmatists to a fanatical splinter group far outside the mainstream of world Communism—a position occupied by few, if any, Party members in Poland. The paper also suggested that the pamphlet was indirectly a product of revisionism:

"The memorandum by Jan Kosa contains fragments based on authentic quotations from the Polish press . . . published by various revisionist periodicals. We must tell ourselves that, among the various proofs of the harmfulness of revisionism, the fact that Jan Kosa quotes these publications, that he identifies those theses and views with the attitude of the Party, that on this basis he tries to sow doubts as to the correctness of the Leninist line of our Party, is one more proof of the tremendous harmfulness both of revisionism and of all appeasement of it."

A more plausible example of anti-Party activity of this nature was contained in a *Polityka* article on November 17 which described conditions in the province of Cracow. The writer said that many "old comrades" had abandoned Party work since October 1956 and refused to be drawn back. Instead, some of them had become active in the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society and had begun to tour the

province "delivering speeches and making statements in which they question the achievements of the Eighth Plenum (October 1956), the performance of the Party during the last year, and upbraiding the Party leadership for saying nothing about friendship with the USSR. . . . The apparent desire to make the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society a base for sectarian, dogmatic, anti-Party activity cannot be tolerated."

Purge in Veterans' Group

The purge spilled out of the Party into the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy, the only veterans' organization recognized by the regime. Since October 1956 the group had doubled its membership by accepting former members of the Polish Underground Army, including Home Army (AK) and Peasant Battalion veterans, and soldiers who had fought with the West during World War II. It is controlled by the Main Political Center of the Polish Army, headed by General Janusz Zarzycki. On November 12 the General told a plenary session of the organization's Executive Committee in Warsaw that there were elements in the Union that wanted to make it into an anti-Communist political party. The Union, he said, "is not and cannot be a political party." He charged that some of the district leaders were former members of anti-Communist movements. The meeting set up a verification committee to screen the membership, to be headed by General Kuszko, deputy chief of the Army's Main Political Center (*Trybuna Ludu*, November 13).

After the Moscow Celebration

First Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka reported on his visit to the Moscow celebrations of the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution in an address to several thousand Party activists in Warsaw, November 28 (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], November 29). To his Polish audience he somewhat muted the theme of internal sovereignty and "the separate roads to Socialism" on which he had written so forcefully in his *Pravda* article earlier in the month (see *East Europe*, December 1957, page 38). Although stating that "there have been, are and will continue to be differences" among



The pictures on these pages were taken at an exhibition of modern art currently showing in Warsaw. This is the first such exhibition to appear in Poland since 1948. The remarkably "Western" photographs appeared in the Polish picture weekly *Swiat* (Warsaw), November 24, 1957.

the techniques of the various ruling Communist Parties, the Party chief stressed the over-all "unity" of the Socialist bloc.

Gomulka revealed that Poland had been the instigator of the 64-nation peace appeal issued at the celebration. He also declared that if the 12-nation declaration of a "Commonwealth of Socialist States" had been written one year previously, "a number of its political ideas would not have been there," meaning that the Soviet Union and other Communist States had been influenced in permitting variations on "the road to Socialism" by the Polish example. Twelve months of "practical application of the Polish political line" had helped to change the complexion of the document, he said. Discussing the proposed "Commonwealth" in relation to previous international Communist organizations, he stated:

"The Communist International [Comintern] no longer exists, and there is no need to recreate it. Although at first it played a great and positive role . . . practice later showed that a central management of all Communist Parties, each acting in the specific conditions of their respective countries, was not always advantageous and sometimes was even harmful. In 1947, the Information Bureau of Communist and workers' Parties [Cominform] was set up. . . . It is difficult to say anything good about the activity of this organization."

Gomulka appeared pleased, however, with the prospects for the new "Commonwealth of Socialist States," although he did not fail to interject a cautionary note:

"No one could desire more than we do the proposed bilateral and multi-lateral meetings with other Parties. . . . These are new forms of practical ties in the mutual relations of Communist and worker's Parties. . . . But the question of the internal policy of each Party cannot be determined by inter-Party conferences. We must hold to the principle that each Party should decide the best line of policy for itself and its country."

Denies US Influence

On the subject of credits from foreign countries, Gomulka denied that Poland would be influenced either by those extended from the United States or from the Soviet Union. "Poland's policy, both internal and foreign, cannot be shaped by credits," he said, but added a jab at "certain imperialist circles, among others those in the United States." These he characterized as regarding the credits "only from the point of view of the cold war and of sharpening the present international situation." There was no similar mention of dubiously motivated "circles" in the Soviet Union.

At one point in his speech Gomulka referred to the Communist bloc as "the main pillar of world peace." He justified this characterization with the following rather novel argument:

"It is due only to the existence of the Socialist social system, that the divergencies of interests between the capitalist countries do not lead to war between those countries. There is no doubt that if there were no Socialist social system, the present contradictions between the capitalist States would have led them to new wars against each other. In this way the Socialist social system preserves the countries which do not belong to it as well as those which do."

Po Prostu Rioters Jailed

Five students and two workingmen were sentenced in the Warsaw District Court for participation in the riots which followed the banning of the liberal youth newspaper *Po Prostu* (see *East Europe*, November 1957, pages 36-38). According to Radio Warsaw, December 2, the students were given 18 months to three year prison terms, the workingmen—one a "locksmith," the other a "doorkeeper"—received sentences of 18 months and one year respectively.

Journalists' Union Curtails Criticism

The highly vocal criticisms by members of the Journalists' Union will be greatly decreased, according to a resolution issued by the Union after its special meeting, November 16-17 (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], November 21). The voices of the journalists will not, however, be entirely muted, and their liberal leadership will apparently be left intact. Thus it would appear that a compromise has been effected between the regime and the Union. In exchange for acceptance of the recently decreed stricter press controls and for active support of the Party line, the journalists were permitted to subdue the anti-liberal faction in their group and to retain some modicum of the right to future—although certainly less frequent—criticism of some national policies.

In line with the compromise, the resolution contained both self-criticism and self-justification. The former element is typified by the following excerpts:

"The press did not fully play its proper role after the Eighth Plenum [October 1956] in shaping public opinion to support and develop the practice and program of Socialist construction under the new conditions. . . . It was reluctant to support measures which were unpopular, but

"We Could Not Believe Our Eyes"

A DELEGATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE of Komsomol, the Soviet youth organization, toured Poland during the celebrations of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, in November. Interviewed in *Sztandar Młodych* (Warsaw), November 18, the delegates gave their impression of Polish Communism in tones of fastidious revulsion unconcealed by strained politeness; their accents may be compared to those of a lady-in-waiting to Queen Victoria describing a drunken orgy in the slums. Some of the Komsomol delegation's remarks follow:

"The [Polish] Union of Socialist Youth (ZMS) is not sufficiently interested in political work among youth. We did not notice any ideological schooling on a wide scale, as is done in our country. . . . Still, we are full of wonder for the fight of the ZMS against black marketeering. . . . The Komsomol is not interested in this because we have no black marketeering. . . .

"Everybody we talked to, and we even talked to people one might call revisionists, was imbued with great enthusiasm for Socialism. . . . In Wroclaw one of the journalists told us that he does not agree with Khrushchev's theory that art has to be for the Party, and he advocated the slogan of 'art for art's sake.' We argued with him but neither of us convinced the other. We were only surprised that he was a journalist. . . .

"Some of the installations [in Nowa Huta] are . . . more modern than similar ones in Magnitogorsk. Only we were a little surprised by the disorder in the production sections. In our country things are much cleaner. . . .

"We were rather astounded at Bydgoszcz, or, rather, at the Rolling Stock Repair Enterprise in that city. We were told that it would be worthwhile to visit the ZMS club in this enterprise. . . . So we went to the club and in one room people were drinking coffee and reading newspapers, in another they were playing bridge and in a third there was a rock-and-roll session. We could not believe our eyes—ZMS and rock-and-roll!

"What of the Polish fashions? In our country the girls dress much more simply."

nevertheless indispensable, because of the difficult situation of the country."

The resolution did, however, stress that the rank-and-file journalists were "proud of the fight for improvement of Socialist legality and democratization within the Party and the country." It continued:

"Owing to this struggle, the role and popularity of the press increased. This struggle strengthened the link between society and the press and increased the moral and political authority of the press."

In a surprisingly strong passage, the resolution avers that "freedom of speech" and "bold criticism" are requisites for

the present period and equally necessary for "overcoming passiveness in the fight for Socialism." The document also voiced "alarm at the diminishing sharpness of constructive criticism in some newspapers and also in the evident indifference of some authorities and government offices to criticism by the press."

In spite of the boldness of the above, however, the resolution appealed "to all journalists to do their utmost to overcome everything that has hampered the creation of the proper political atmosphere in our situation."

"Security" Enforcement Emphasized

Tightening of security measures and a renewed prominence for the security police were implied by Internal Affairs Minister Wladyslaw Wicha in an interview on Radio Warsaw, November 13. Nowhere in the area has there been so little reliance on police methods as in Poland under the Gomulka regime, and nowhere has the scope of police authority been so sharply curtailed. Wicha's remarks seem to indicate that there is to be some modification of this policy.

After a brief statement that "the tasks" of the security organs are always carried out "on the basis of binding legal regulations," Wicha went to the meat of his message:

"There are still elements working in Poland which take advantage of the broad democratization of our social and political life in order to proclaim an ideology hostile to Socialism, or even worse, to organize anti-State activity. These elements take advantage of the possibility of working in social and political organizations. They also take advantage of the country's broadly developed policy of criticism of errors and distortions. They would like to push the country into the 'second stage,' as it is called by reactionary forces in Poland and abroad, which means the replacement of Socialist democracy by a bourgeois system."

Wicha went on to mention "terrorist and robber-gang" organizations, the former being a term which has not been used publicly by representatives of the security forces since pre-Gomulka days. He also added the following ominous statement:

"One of the manifestations of hostile activity is the slandering and undermining of the good reputations of political and social activists. In such cases the intervention of the security service is becoming ever more effective."

Wicha made accusations against West German tourists whom he accused of coming to Poland in order to spread "revanchist propaganda" among Germans living permanently in the country. He also criticized the "garrulity" of private citizens who "by an observable loss of vigilance" impart information on "various subjects which constitute State or service secrets . . . to agents of imperialist intelligence services."

Cultural Agreement with USSR

In an effort to develop the public's appreciation of Soviet cultural works, the regime entered into an agreement, signed in Warsaw on November 29, with a delegation led by USSR Minister of Culture, N. A. Mikhaylov. Radio Warsaw reported on the same day that the pact "embraces a larger field of problems than did agreements of previous years."

There will be exchanges of scientists, teachers, students, theatrical and artistic groups, and joint productions of films. Also envisaged, according to the broadcast, is "broad cooperation, based on direct agreements, of creative unions, public organizations and journalists' unions." Radio Warsaw also stated that the pact would bring about closer relations between the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society (a Polish group) and VOKS, a Soviet organization dedicated to increasing "cultural" cooperation with foreign countries.

From the regime's point of view the necessity for the strengthened agreement is exemplified by the state of the Polish theater. According to a *New York Times* dispatch, December 6, there are presently in production 17 plays by Western authors, not a single one by a Soviet writer. The same source states that, while there have been many Western novels published over the past year, including works by Ernest Hemingway and the pioneer of the mystery novel, Raymond Chandler, Soviet literature has been represented only in one book by Ilya Ehrenburg.

Radio Warsaw has recently devoted a spate of broadcasts to strengthening Soviet-Polish relations. The weekly *Przyjazn* (Warsaw), November 3, defended this policy as a necessary compensation for defects of "the past period," meaning, apparently, the time since the October 1956 events. These defects, according to the journal, featured an "unhealthy saturation of Western jazz" and a "shunning of politics."

Coal Mining Improves

Poland's coal mines exceeded their 1957 plan by nearly a million tons, according to official figures released early in December. Labor productivity in the mines was also said to have increased for the first time since 1949. These statements were made on the occasion of the annual Miners Day, December 3. Minister of Coal Mining and Electric Power F. Waniolka told the press on November 30 that production costs were between 2.5 and 2.8 *zloty* per ton less than planned. Whereas in 1953 the miners had worked an average of 309 days, at an average daily wage of 96 *zloty*, in 1957 they worked 276 days for an average wage of 165 *zloty*. This explained, he said, why permanently employed personnel had risen from 80 percent to 94 percent of the total mining labor force.

On December 3 Wladyslaw Gomulka told a Miners Day celebration at Bytom in Silesia that the coal miners cannot expect further wage increases in the near future and that they will have to continue some Sunday work in the coming year. He outlined the program of economic austerity that he had presented to the country at the Tenth Plenum in October. Pointing out that the 1958 economic plan calls for the production of 93.5 million tons of hard coal, he said that normal working hours would guarantee only 92 million tons and appealed to the miners to work at least six Sundays in 1958 to produce the extra amount (Radio Warsaw, December 3).

By 1960, with the assistance of Czechoslovak credits, Poland plans to raise its bituminous coal production to 105 million tons. The previous high was 95.1 million tons in 1956, while in 1957, because of the reduction of Sunday

work, production declined to around 94 million tons. Brown coal production, with the assistance of East German credits, is scheduled to reach 11 million tons in 1960, or almost twice the 1955 level.

U.S. Aid

The official Polish News Agency's figures on United States aid to Poland, released November 18, state that since July 23, 1957 the following U. S. produce has been unloaded in Polish ports: 280,000 tons of wheat; nearly 9,000 tons of soya beans; 96,000 bales of cotton; 15,000 tons of fats. A Polish delegation began talks in Washington, October 31, to negotiate for further aid. The discussions are expected to continue for several weeks or more.

Nazi Guards Sentenced

Radio Warsaw, December 3, announced that death sentences had been passed on three "leaders of the guards in the former extermination camp at Koldyczew." The men were stated to have taken part in "the selection and execution of camp inmates." Koldyczew was a war-time German concentration camp.

Trade Union Membership Statistics

On November 15 the official Polish News Agency published trade union membership figures for the first half of 1957. The grand total of 5,100,000 (31 percent women) represented an increase of 270,000 since the end of 1956. The largest union was that of the miners with 463,000 members. Others included the Building Workers (412,000), Textile and Clothing Workers (392,000) and Railwaymen (391,000). Among the smaller labor organizations was the Union of Cultural Workers with a membership of 15,000.

Hungary

Workers' Councils Abolished

The vestiges of one of the most important of the temporary reforms brought about by the October 1956 Revolt, the system of workers' councils, were wiped out by the regime on November 17. A decree, published in *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest) on that date, dissolved the workers' councils and substituted more easily controlled "factory councils." Two-thirds of the membership of the factory councils will be made up of trade union functionaries and representatives of enterprise management; only one-third will be elected by the workers. Since the unions are as subservient to the State as are the factory officials, it may be surmised that the regime—and thus the Party—will have little difficulty in dominating the new councils.

After their spontaneous appearance during the Revolt, the workers' councils—along with the Writers' Union—were able to hold out against the Kadar regime until the early part of 1957; since the Spring of that year, however, most of them had ceased to function. The new decree merely drives the last nail into the coffin of any hopes for their revival.

In a report on the situation (*Nepakarat* [Budapest],

November 17), Gyorgy Varga, Secretary of the Trade Union Council, characterized the workers' councils as "counterrevolutionary forces . . . [embodying] a denial of the role of the working class." Varga spoke of the new factory councils in the following manner:

"Why are the factory councils needed? First of all, because this is a suitable means of drawing all the workers of an enterprise into management and control. If the factory councils function well, they may become important factors in strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat and in improving the economy. They may also play a serious role in the battle for protecting social property."

In a discussion of "democratization in the factories," *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), the theoretical organ of the Party, in its October 1 issue, attempted to prepare the ground for the abolition of workers' councils with the following statements:

"Democratization is in order for the factories, yet the workers' councils are unsuitable for this purpose. The widening of factory democracy can be served by an organ of which Comrade Kadar [First Secretary of the Party] spoke on his return from China. This would be a system of factory councils, directed by the trade unions, thus assuring extensive influence of the workers' Party on factory management."

More Executions

Istvan Szortsey, who took part in the heroic action at Kilian Barracks during the Revolt, has been executed (Radio Budapest, November 24). Previously the Budapest Court had sentenced Szortsey to life imprisonment, but the Supreme Court, reviewing the case, decreed the death penalty. This was the first announced execution of a "counterrevolutionary" since the "softening" of Kadarist official reprisal measures begun at the time of the UN debate on the resolution condemning Soviet Russia for aggression in Hungary.

Another execution, that of Major Anta Palinkas Pallavicini, was reported by Radio Budapest on December 10. Pallavicini had been commander of the armored unit which freed Cardinal Mindszenty from his imprisonment in Felsopeten during the Revolt. At the same time his soldiers arrested 17 Security Police members who were guarding the Cardinal.

Western sources reported the recent arrest of two prom-

Supreme Court Justice

RADIO BUDAPEST, NOVEMBER 25, 1957: "Istvan Szortsey, a criminal with 19 previous convictions, joined the counterrevolutionary group at the Kilian Barracks [in Budapest] last year and took part in armed actions and in the murder of several people. The Budapest court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court, reviewing the case, sentenced him to death. The death sentence has been carried out."



A meeting of KISZ, the Hungarian youth organization, electing officers in Budapest. The regime recently stressed that KISZ is to be the only acceptable youth organization, to the exclusion of the others formed during the Revolt period.

Nok Lapja (Budapest), October 31, 1957

inent intellectuals, Dezso Keresztury, Director of the library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and Professor Domokos Kosary. In 1946-47, Keresztury, a member of the Peasant Party, was Minister of Culture. Kosary, an outstanding historian, had spent several years in the United States. Both men had sympathised with, but had not actively participated in, the Revolt. The reason for their arrest is unknown.

Writers Trouble Regime

The regime is still troubled by, and because of, its writers. The jail sentences imposed on leading writers Tibor Dery, Gyula Hay, Tibor Tardos and Zoltan Zelk (see *East Europe*, December 1957, page 42) aroused sufficient protest in the West to merit an angrily defensive article in the Budapest weekly, *Magyarorszag*, November 18. "All significant Hungarian writers have remained in Hungary," claimed the journal, "and they have never written so much as they do now." The latter contention was argued by the citation of "701 Hungarian works of literature" allegedly published during the first half of 1957. The Budapest literary magazines *Elet Es Irodalom* and *Kortars*, were also cited. The first of these is the mouthpiece of the Kadarist intelligentsia. *Kortars* is a periodical which first appeared in September when the post-Revolt "writers' strike" was broken; its contributors, many of whom took part in the Revolt, have so far failed to turn out the enthusiastic Party-line material urged by the regime. Among those presently engaged in "active literary work" for the Hungarian press, the *Magyarorszag* article singled out Peter Veres, Pal Szabo, Laszlo Nemeth, Janos Kodolanyi, Geza Feja and Lajos Kassak. All these writers were identified with the Revolt or with opposition to the regime before the uprising.

The Stalinist tinge of the Kadar cultural policies is perhaps most clearly indicated by the widely publicized writings of Jozsef Revai, who was one of the chief theorists of the Rakosi era and who appears to be aiming at similar prominence under the present regime. In two *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest) articles, on November 7 and November 24, he vigorously attacked the writers of the

Revolt. In addition to the standard vilification of the literary figures who produced the "ideological preparation of the counterrevolution" and "contaminated the youth . . . with their chauvinist demagoguery," Revai proceeded to make an oblique defense of the policies of Andrei Zhdanov, the late Soviet Politburo member who espoused absolute Party control over literary and cultural work. While not defending Zhdanov outright, Revai attempted to associate attacks on "Zhdanovism" with revisionism:

"Those who reject Socialist realism and those who fight against Zhdanovism do not truly fight the ideas of Zhdanov. Instead they struggle against Leninist principles as applied in the domains of literature and art."

Historians Attacked

Historians also came under censure in the Party organ. On November 20, in an edition commemorating the 39th Anniversary of the founding of the Hungarian Communist Party, *Nepszabadsag* complained that, not only "certain historians," but even "Party historians," had contributed to the ideological preparation of the Revolt "by running down the Party's past struggles." The paper called it "intolerable . . . that the role of the Party should be obscured and that the unselfish fight of the most devoted army of the people should be deprecated."

Marosan Speaks

Politburo member Gyorgy Marosan, the regime's chief spokesman in the continuing campaign of intimidation against possible "counterrevolutionary" elements, delivered a lecture at the Budapest Party Political Academy, November 18. As abridged in *Nepszabadsag* the following day, the talk ranged over a variety of subjects, from the duties of the press, to anti-Semitism, to proper conduct for Party members. Couched in less brutal terms than the usual Marosan effort, the speech nevertheless held to the familiar policy of blaming all evils on those who had supported the 1956 Revolt.

The regime's chronic inability to control the intellectuals was emphasized by Marosan's attacks on "the reactionary clique of writers and journalists who are convinced that without them Hungarian literature does not exist." He advocated the use of satirical humor "to single out hostile views," but characterized as "intolerable" a condition in which "jokes and satires should be turned against Socialism."

Marosan turned his attention briefly to anti-Semitism, which he said was a "bourgeois creation . . . fostered by the counterrevolution." The principal evil in hatred of Jews, he said, was that "it denies and blurs class differences, pretending to see unity among those who speak one tongue, despite the fact that some [Jews] are the exploiters and others the exploited."

Condemning Communists who use their Party connections to gain better jobs, Marosan singled out for criticism the "incorrect, negative and rigid attitude adopted by members of collective farms especially by some managers of collectives, who treat those left out of the collectives as enemies." He was also concerned with the behavior of Party members in the mass organizations, stating his views in the following

manner:

"Of all the mass organizations the trade unions are the most important, because they are the liaison between the Party and the working class in the field of production, and because trade unions, which have nearly two million members, are the schools of Communism. We must therefore refute the revisionist idea that trade unions should concern themselves solely with protecting the workers' interest."

Regime Propagandizes Catholics

Continuing its attempt to gain some sort of mass support from the bitterly resentful population, the regime has formed a mass organization for the country's 5,500,000 Roman Catholics (to be distinguished from the existing "Peace Movement" which includes only the clergy). The new organization, called "Opus Christi," is headed by Canon Bela Mag, one of the most prominent collaborationist priests (Radio Budapest, December 3).

The "Peace Movement" is considering publication of a "Catholic Peace Journal," according to Radio Budapest, December 4. The movement's previous organ, *Kereszt*, was banned by the Vatican in 1956, and its subsequent journal, *Katolikus Szó*, has not appeared since the Revolt.

Regime Attacks Lutherans

Meanwhile, relations between the regime and the 500,000-member Lutheran Church deteriorated. Radio Budapest reported an interview with Janos Horvath, head of the State Office for Church affairs, on December 10, in which Lutheran leaders were denounced as "stiff and stubborn." The broadcast stated that negotiations between the Lutheran clergymen and the State had been broken off, because of the religious leaders' refusal to apply for State sanction for dismissals and new appointments, as prescribed by Hungarian law.

Single-Slate Election

A typical 99 percent election "victory" was obtained by the regime in the balloting for seats on the Budapest City Council, November 17. As usual, the elections were held under the auspices of the Patriotic People's Front, with one and only one candidate for each post. Statistics reported by *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest) on November 19 alleged that 104,733 voters (93.5 percent of the eligible electorate) went to the polls. Of these, 103,858 (99.7 percent) voted for the Front ticket, 268 against. 614 ballots were disqualified.

The elections were held to fill seats on the Council which had become vacant due to the dismissal of "counter-revolutionaries."

Czechoslovakia

New Stress on Party Pre-eminence

Assumption of the Presidency by Party First Secretary Antonin Novotny (see *East Europe*, Dec. 1957, pages 45-46) marks the first occasion since the death of Klement Gottwald in March 1953 that the top Party and State posts have been held by the same man. This would appear to be

another manifestation of the regime's recently enlarged efforts to rally the population to new unity behind the Party. Such an intention was frankly stated in the nominating speech of Premier Viliam Siroky to the National Assembly, just before Novotny's "unanimous election" by that body. "The primary need is for people to draw even more closely together under the leadership of the Communist Party," the Premier averred. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], November 20.) He went on to characterize as "politically expedient in the present situation a combination of the functions of the President of the Republic and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party."

The same issue of *Rude Pravo* carried an editorial hailing the proletariat for producing such worker-Presidents as "the carpenter Gottwald, the mason Zapotocky . . . the metal worker Antonin Novotny." The newspaper continued as follows:

"It is of the utmost significance that the supreme State



Funeral cortege of Czechoslovak President Antonin Zapotocky passing over the Jan Sverma Bridge in Prague.

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), November 23, 1957

office is now held jointly with the office of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. This clearly stresses the leading role played by the Communist Party, a fact recognized by all Socialist and democratic forces in our country, by the Czech and Slovak working people, and by the entire National Front."

Amnesty Decree

One of Novotny's first acts as President of the Republic was the issuance of an amnesty decree, published in *Rude Pravo*, December 1, which lowered prison terms three years for certain categories of offenders. Entirely excluded from the amnesty were those guilty of "speculation," and of "hooligan rioting." The decree, however, remitted six months from the jail sentences of those convicted of "political crimes," murder and sexual offenses.

The December 1 issue of *Rude Pravo* emphasized the fact that there would be no significant amnesties for "political offenders" in the following words:

"It would be wrong to think that our laws will be lenient to those perpetrators of criminal offenses who attempt to undermine the security of our country, to impair the foundations of Socialist relations among people, to harm the health, dignity and even the lives of their fellow citizens. There is not, and cannot be, any leniency toward the lackeys of the instigators of a new war."

"Discussion" Campaign Foundering

The highly publicized "discussion" campaign, inaugurated October 18 with a letter "to all working people" from the Central Committee of the Communist Party (see *East Europe*, December 1957, pages 46-47), has apparently aroused disappointment in the Party hierarchy and dissatisfaction among some trade union functionaries. Entailing a series of country-wide "discussions," the campaign has, seemingly, fallen short thus far in its aim of arousing popular enthusiasm for increasing production. *Rude Pravo* on November 26 admitted that "We frequently find that the discussions fail to yield the expected results." The Party journal went on to chasten local officials for merely reading the letter at meetings, without having "thoroughly prepared" the groundwork for subsequent question-and-answer periods.

There appears also to have been dissension between Party officials and the ordinarily compliant trade union leadership, at least on the regional levels. According to *Nase Pravda*, the official Party organ of the Gottwaldov region, on November 5, many union functionaries failed to participate in the "discussion" campaign. These functionaries, claims the newspaper, said they had abstained "on a hint from above." The paper denied that the Party issued such instructions and called the unnamed individuals who used such an argument to justify their conduct "a discredit to the revolutionary traditions of the trade unions."

Answering the above article, the trade union organ, *Prace* (Prague), November 26, termed the point of view of the criticized trade unionists "a curious attitude." However *Prace* complained that questions of trade union work were left "almost untouched" in discussions conducted by



First picture of the newly-formed Bulgarian "workers' militia," composed of armed Party stalwarts. They are parading in Sofia during the celebrations of the Fortieth Anniversary of the October Revolution.

Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia), November 8, 1957

Party officials. The paper seemed to infer that the attitude of the trade unionists resulted from dissatisfaction with the Party's lack of attention to proposals for union participation in the management of enterprises: "Practically unmentioned in the discussions have been problems referred to in the Central Committee's letter dealing with the participation of the workers in the management of production enterprises. Therefore some comrades are not quite certain about the position of the trade union organization and its factory council as representatives of the workers' collective."

Prace also stated that this minimization of the part of the trade unions in Party-held meetings on the letter of the Central Committee "is not limited to the Gottwaldov region," but is also apparent in the Hradec Kralove and the Liberec regions.

Bulgaria

Zhivkov's Pre-Election Review

In connection with the widely publicized campaign for the Parliamentary "elections" of December 22, a joint rally of the Party and the Fatherland Front was held in Sofia on November 25. The chief speaker for the regime single-slate ticket—which was, as usual, to run under the aegis of the Front—was Party boss Todor Zhivkov, who spoke on several aspects of national life.

At the beginning of his address, published in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), November 26, Zhivkov characterized as "the cornerstone" of his country's foreign policy the co-operation and "mutual aid between the Bulgarian people and the peoples of the other Socialist countries, headed by the great Soviet people." He also praised the "good neighborly relations" with Greece and chided Turkey for "endangering" the independence of Syria. Turning to internal economic problems, Zhivkov said:

"In building our national industry and developing the entire economy, we must take into consideration the fact that Bulgaria is a component part of the Socialist camp,

a fact that is of tremendous significance for the economic development of our country and gives us great advantages. . . . At present it is unnecessary for our country to develop all branches of industry. For us this would be a task beyond our capacity. Relying on the upsurge of industry in other Socialist countries and mutual assistance, we are developing in our country only those branches of industrial production which are most suitable for us and for which we have the most favorable conditions. . . . We shall continue, however, to give priority to the development of heavy industry as the basis for the development of our entire economy. . . . At the same time, light industry and food production will be developed to satisfy more completely the needs of the working people."

Zhivkov spoke with apparent satisfaction of the development of agriculture collectivization. However, he urged increased production on these farms, as well as higher productivity in the factories. He also warned the intelligentsia of the need "to struggle even more actively against bourgeois and petit-bourgeois influences in its ranks."

The Party chief ended his speech on a soothing note combined with a threat. "We do not desire an intensification of the class struggle," he said, "for all residents in our country, including former capitalists, are equal before the law." However, some of the former "exploiters," according to Zhivkov, "dream about their past glory, their factories and kulak estates." He went on as follows: "We have nothing against such dreaming, if it gives them pleasure and is good for their nerves. But if they dare to do more than dream, to raise their hand against the Socialist regime, let them blame only themselves afterwards. The raised hand of the criminal will be cut off by the sword of the people's regime."

National Collective Farm Conference

The Fifth National Conference of "Agricultural Cooperatives" was held in Sofia December 2-4. It was attended by more than 1,000 delegates and 60 foreign guests, including representatives from the Soviet bloc countries and from Egypt, Syria, Italy and India. First Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov read the report on the state of collective farming and its future tasks. Pointing out that collectivization is now virtually complete, embracing 86.5 percent of the arable land, he went on to call for the development of an intensified agriculture. He said that the consumption of chemical fertilizers must be increased from 4 kilograms per decare at present to 20 in the course of the next five years. The

irrigation system, which now covers 4 million decares, will be expanded to 6 million at the end of 1962. He also stressed improvement in agricultural techniques, including better crop selection, better use of machinery and the expansion of animal husbandry so as to double the production of meat. The last portion of his speech was devoted to a detailed criticism of the work of the collective farms, particularly the organization of labor. He criticized some farms for allowing their members to expand their private plots at the expense of collective production.

Albania

USSR Credit Grant

An agreement by which the Soviet Union has made available to Albania a new long-term credit of 160 million rubles was signed in Moscow on November 22. Radio Tirana, in discussions of the agreement on November 24 and 26, stated that the credits will be paid for by "ordinary Albanian goods." Technical assistance for the development of Albanian agriculture and industry will also be provided by the Soviet Union. The pact was signed by Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu and witnessed by Party chief Enver Hoxha. Politburo member Andrei Mikoyan signed for the Soviet Union.

The agreement is in line with the policy of increased aid for Albania by the Soviet Union. In April 1957 previous grants totalling 422 million rubles were written off by the Soviet Union.

Amnesty Granted

In honor of the 45th Anniversary of the Proclamation of Independence, the regime, on November 27, declared an amnesty for nearly all categories of prisoners, with the important exception of those in jail for "political crimes." (Radio Tirana, November 27.) The terms of the amnesty applied to all persons serving sentences up to three years. Releases or pardons were granted to males over 60 and females over 50 years of age, to women with children under seven, to pregnant women, to all persons jailed for military crimes and to those under labor punishment sentences. One-fourth of the unexpired term was remitted for those serving more than three years' imprisonment.

Along with the political prisoners, those sentenced for "theft" and second or habitual offenders were excepted from the amnesty.



Recent and Related

Blueprint of Deception: Character and Record of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, by Vladimir Kabes and Alfons Sergot (*Mouton & Co., The Hague*: \$5.00). This is a study of the record of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers. Its purpose is to trace the cleverly concealed origins of the IADL in the past of the Comintern's global activities, and to serve as a warning against unqualified acceptance of those vehicles of Soviet subversion which masquerade as independent international organizations. The study, using the IADL as a typical example, seeks to reveal the internal connection between the designs of the Soviet Union and the intricate system of controls through which it manipulates the operations of such organizations. In the foreword, the authors state that the purpose of the study is not to publicize an organization the true influence of which is in no proportion to its extravagant claims; the IADL's national sections are primarily political dependencies without spontaneous expression, while individual adherents are recruited in free countries from among faithful Communists, fellow-travelers and misguided "progressives." Most jurists who believed in the ethical principles of their vocation and supported the IADL have long since left its ranks. The authors, both lawyers with European background and personal experience with Communist techniques, wrote this book in the hope that it would help warn the free world against the influence of observers who fail to distinguish the true nature of the Soviet system, believing that unless the democratic public knows the facts and renounces all forms of self-delusion it cannot face a protracted period of wider intercourse with the Soviet orbit without serious danger. Because the official IADL sources yielded incomplete material, the authors relied heavily on local reports by Communist members speaking freely before local audiences. Beginning with a chapter on the forerunners of the IADL, the book traces the development of the organization from its origin in 1946, through its bid for international recognition in Brussels in 1947, its refusal to recognize Marshal Tito in 1949, the Korean conflict in 1952 and the subsequent two-year period of camouflaged activities from 1952-1954, the uses the organization made of McCarthyism and

the H-bomb, and finally to the impact of the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's assumption of power. Sources and references, indices. (U. S. distributor: Gregory Lounz Books, 11 E. 45 St., N. Y. C.) **Soviet Education**, by George L. Kline (*Columbia Univ.*: \$3.50). Nine first-hand reports by former Soviet teachers and students, covering Soviet education from the nursery school and kindergarten to secondary school and university. These essays describe classroom instruction in such diverse subjects as music, literature, geography, mathematics and engineering, and include a description of the actual workings of the much publicized Soviet campaign against illiteracy. Soviet education embraces the entire cultural apparatus of the nation—all of the agencies involved in the training and informing of the minds of both young and old, including the people's schools, the military schools, and the Party schools. In addition, the system also encompasses the press in all its forms and manifestations, every area of entertainment, the ideological aspects of all the arts and sciences, and the political and cultural phases of all organizations. This book provides a unique source of insight into the day-to-day functioning of this vast educational system, and the impact on classroom instruction and student discipline of the recent shifts in Soviet educational policy. Bibliography.

Red Scare, A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920, by Robert K. Murray (*Univ. of Minnesota Press*: \$4.75). This is the story of the great Red Scare in the United States following World War I when the nation was fraught with intolerance, mob violence, exaggeration, and fear. The author traces the roots of this phenomenon, relates the outstanding events of the period, and evaluates the significant effects of the hysteria on subsequent American life. Mr. Murray has used materials from the radical literature collection in the Library of Congress as well as pamphlet material from various organizations, and published writings, memoirs, or collected manuscripts of the important figures in the Red Scare. In addition, he also consulted more than ninety periodicals and newspapers covering all shades of opinion to obtain the feel of the public mood of the period, and evaluate the growth of hysteria. The author feels that, in view of current

events, the Red Scare offers many valuable lessons which should go a long way to avert some of the tragic consequences that the nation suffered a generation ago before the fear and hysteria had run their course. Footnotes, index.

Studies in Rebellion, by E. Lampert (*Frederick A. Praeger*: \$6). An analysis of the origins of revolutionary thought in Russia as represented by three prominent men: Vissarion Belinsky, Mikhail Bakunin, and Alexander Herzen. Since the author is primarily concerned with examining underlying revolutionary attitudes rather than discussing the merits and demerits of political systems and ideologies, the book emphasizes the inner character of the revolutionary movement and not its outer circumstances. Belinsky, who set the pattern for much of nineteenth century radical thought, was a Socialist who was also a strong individualist, a radical who rejected all forms of utopianism. Bakunin, with a passion for propaganda, agitation, and incessant activity in founding and organizing plots and conspiracies, has been called the greatest revolutionary figure of the age. Herzen is presented as a disillusioned philosopher who denounced Western democracy as harshly as he did Tsarist autocracy, a radical whose outstanding qualities were negativism and skepticism. The author shows how these men prepared and enriched revolutionary thought, how revolution became for them a form of liberty, and how revolt became the cornerstone of an entire philosophy of life in which man turns not only against a particular social discipline, but against the whole of society. Notes, index.

Bulgaria, Edited by L. A. D. Dellin (*Frederick A. Praeger*: \$8.50). Another in the series "East-Central Europe Under the Communists," planned by the Mid-European Studies Center, a unit of the Free Europe Committee. The nineteen chapters cover various aspects of Bulgaria—geography, demography, government, religion, education, literature and arts, labor, agriculture, industry, trade. Each chapter has been prepared by an expert, or group of experts, in that field. The appendix includes biographical sketches of leading Communists, a chronology from 1944-1956, and treaties and agreements. Appendix, bibliography, index, maps.



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